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Abstract
This thesis aim s to investigate the process through which discourses promoted by one level of governance 
are diffused and becom e accepted  in another. It defines the European Employment Strategy (EES) as  an 
attem pt to se t m em ber s ta te s ’ employment policy agendas by imposing a  specific policy discourse defining 
the problem s of European labour markets and the appropriate solutions and it looks at how, by who and 
under what conditions this w as adopted or refused at the national level. It argues that existing accounts of 
the effects of the EES, which em phasise m echanism s relying on incentives and sanctions, policy-oriented 
learning and socialisation, do not pay enough attention to whether and why different dom estic actors and 
groups might support it in the  dom estic arena and to the role of dom estic institutional settings. The thesis 
holds, first, that the diffusion of the Strategy’s  discourse at the national level depended  on the presence or 
ab sen ce  of national coalitions of actors willing to adopt and advocate it. The empirical evidence collected 
in the c a se  studies on France and Italy suggests that the Strategy’s  discourse w as limited to narrow 
communities com posed of civil servants, experts and social partner representatives. The second 
contention is that th ese  coalitions’ su ccess depended on the institutional resources and constraints facing 
them . In both countries studied meeting the Strategy’s  requirem ents stimulated a  m easure of 
administrative adaptation, which provided supporting coalitions with additional resources and facilitated 
norm diffusion. Yet the diffusion of information on the Strategy w as limited even within the central 
administration, am ong the rank-and-file of the social partners and at the regional and local levels of 
government. Thus the last contention of this work is that the coalitions promoting the EU discourse 
remained w eak due to the scarce  diffusion of information beyond restricted circles and the limited 
institutional resources provided by the Strategy. Supporting coalitions have only been influential when 
directly involved in specific policy choices m ade at the centre and, even then, implementation has proved 
difficult if actors other than the central government were involved.
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INTRODUCTION
Do sovereign states comply with international, and particularly European, norms in the absence of 
‘hard law’ incentives and sanctions? If so, why? Students of European integration have increasingly 
turned to such questions as the European Union (EU) expanded its activities into sectors where it 
does not have the power to legislate and relies on ‘softer’ forms of regulation1. The Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC), launched in 2000 for the purpose of dealing with structural reform in a broad 
range of economic and social fields (European Council 2000), is the main instance of the Union’s 
reliance on policy coordination rather than legislation. Open coordination is based on flexible and 
revisable guidelines, open-ended targets and a system of multilateral surveillance and peer review 
that restricts the scope for circumvention. A great deal of academic interest was stirred by the 
novelty of the method, whose aim is to organise a mutual learning process at the EU level and foster 
a gradual convergence of member state policies, as well as by its application in a growing number 
of policy areas. Yet the early enthusiasm shown by scholars interested in changing patterns of EU 
governance (Mosher 2000; Rhodes 2000; De La Porte 2002; Scott and Trubek 2002) quickly gave 
way to disillusionment, as it became apparent that member states were hardly reaching the targets 
set at the European level (Kok 2004; European Commission 2005). Thus more recent studies have 
painted a much bleaker picture of the OMC’s transparency and potential effectiveness in promoting 
policy change (Chalmers and Lodge 2003; Radaelli 2003b; De La Porte and Nanz 2004) and 
concluded that member states are only likely to ‘learn’ from Europe if they wish to do so anyway 
(Visser 2005).
This thesis takes a different perspective on the domestic impact of EU-level policy 
coordination. It concentrates on the European Employment Strategy (EES), the oldest and most 
structured OMC in the social policy field, and builds on the findings of existing research regarding 
the merits and limits of open coordination. It shies away, however, from considering policy 
outcomes as good indicators of EES-induced policy change, as these are influenced by a number of 
factors (GDP growth, the business cycle, the overall macroeconomic framework and so forth) 
which are outside the scope of the Strategy, and focuses, instead, on how the coordination process 
played into domestic employment policy-making. This thesis defines the EES as being essentially 
an attempt to set member states’ employment policy agendas by imposing a specific policy 
discourse defining the problems of European labour markets and the appropriate solutions. It looks
1 This work takes a broad view of regulation, defined as ‘the rule-setting and monitoring measures used by the EU to 
govern the political behaviour of [...] member states’ (Jacobsson 2004: p.356).
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at how, by who and under what conditions it was adopted, refused or ignored where employment 
policy decisions are made, i.e. at the national level. It argues that existing accounts of the effects of 
the EES, which emphasise mechanisms relying on incentives and sanctions, policy-oriented 
learning and socialisation, do not pay enough attention to whether and why different domestic 
actors and groups might support it in the domestic arena. Finally, by investigating the identity of 
these groups as well as their position and resources in different institutional settings, it aims to 
identify the conditions under which institutions facilitate or hamper the diffusion of new ideas and 
discourses.
What is the nature of open coordination and how can its impact on national policies be 
conceptualised? What is the role of discourse and ideas in promoting policy change? And how do 
discourses promoted by one level of governance become diffused and accepted in another? These 
questions are at the centre of this thesis. Answering them necessarily implies contributing to fill the 
serious empirical deficit that affects much of the debate on the impact of the Strategy (Zeitlin 
2005a, 2005b). With very few recent exceptions2, in fact, the available empirical research is 
relatively preliminary and based on single-country studies, most of which either rely on a narrow 
range of often outdated evidence mainly based on official printed sources, or point to long-term 
processes without showing much evidence of them. This work tries to advance the existing 
empirical knowledge of the strategy’s impact by providing a structured comparison between 
different member states and how they respond and react to the EES, based on a common conceptual 
framework and a single set of working hypotheses.
The following sections illustrate the above in greater detail. The first section fleshes out the 
puzzle that is at the core of the thesis and quickly outlines its argument, conceptual framework and 
working hypotheses. The second section discusses methodology issues and the choice of case 
studies. Finally, the third section presents a brief overview of the thesis and concludes.
1. Thesis puzzle, conceptual framework and working hypotheses
As will be argued in Chapter 2, the EES emerged from a crisis that came to a head in the mid- 
1990s. European welfare states were under acute strain and joblessness had risen dramatically. At 
the same time, the completion of the Single Market, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the
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increasingly wide reach of Community competition law imposed tight constraints on national policy
| autonomy. Although the European-wide character of the problem suggested a common response, a 
further expansion of the Union’s legislative competences in the social field was blocked by
2 See, for instance, Ardy and Umbach (2004) and Buchs (2005).
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budgetary constraints and concerns over democratic legitimacy. Within this context, a different 
course of action was chosen, relying on new policy instruments based on alternatives to traditional, 
‘top-down’ forms of regulation. The EES in its current form is the result of a process initiated by 
the 1993 Delors White Paper on ‘Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment’ (European 
Commission 1993). It is an extremely institutionalised annual process based on such items as non­
binding guidelines, benchmarking and peer review. It involves non-governmental actors and 
different levels of government, and shows a new division of labour between the EU and the member 
states as well as between the Union’s institutions. However, since such important areas as 
monetary, fiscal, and wage policy that critically influence economic growth and job-creation are 
outside its scope, it is fair to say that the EES is not so much an overall strategy for employment, as 
a residual labour market strategy based on a compromise between the liberal model of Ireland and 
the U.K. and the social-democratic model of the Scandinavian member states.
The EES held out much promise. It seemed to have the potential positively to address the 
legitimacy problems of EU policy-making as well as to encourage the reform of national 
employment and labour market policies by organising an EU-wide learning process. It is, thus, not 
surprising that the launch and increasing political salience of the EES -  and, subsequently, of the 
OMC -  elicited a wide array of contradictory assessments concerning, in particular, its effectiveness 
in delivering policy reform. The bulk of the relevant literature (Goetschy 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003; 
Biagi 2000; Rhodes 2000; Bertozzi and Bonoli 2002; De La Porte 2002; Trubek and Mosher 2003; 
Eberlein and Kerwer 2004; Jacobsson 2004) insisted on the quality of the EES as a cooperative, 
participative process essentially aimed at promoting policy change through learning, as opposed to 
more traditional, top-down forms of governance. Based on a sociological institutionalist reading of 
the effects of the Strategy, much of this literature focused on the long-term socialising impact of the 
EES and implied an eventual convergence of member state employment policies around the 
Union’s main goals as stated in the guidelines. As time went by, however, both official reports (Kok 
2004; European Commission 2005; European Central Bank 2005) and the results of independent 
research (Govecor 2004) started to show some disappointment with the EES’ (and, more generally, 
the OMC’s) seeming inability successfully to bring about national reform and reach the targets 
agreed at the EU level. Thus commentators took an increasingly pessimistic view of the merits of 
the Strategy. A number of authors (Scharpf 2002; Chalmers and Lodge 2003; Radaelli 2003b; De 
La Porte and Nanz 2004; Visser 2005) pointed to the technocratic and opaque nature of the 
Strategy, to its subservience towards the ideologies and path-dependencies of EMU, to its inability 
to impose sanctions for non-compliance, and concluded that the EES is little more than an exercise 
in ‘symbolic politics’ unlikely to have any effect whatsoever.
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This thesis takes issue with the existing literature on two main points. On the one hand, the 
debate surrounding the EES suffers from a striking deficit of empirical evidence (Zeitlin 2005a, 
2005b). Most of the relevant studies either rely solely on a narrow range of (often outdated) official 
sources, or point to long-term processes without showing much evidence of them. On the other 
hand, empirical research tends to focus on end-states (policy outcomes, labour market performance 
according to agreed benchmarks and targets), which are virtually impossible to trace back to a 
single source of inspiration. This work contends that the most appropriate way to investigate the 
impact of a non-binding process such as the EES is to analyse the process through which 
employment policy decisions are made. Following Radaelli’s advice (Radaelli 2003a), one must 
look into what went on at the level of policy-makers ‘at the hub’ of national policy puzzles and 
observe whether EU guidelines and recommendations provided resources and cognitive drives, or 
else were just irrelevant.
The large body of material generated so far on the operation and effects of the EES -  from 
the National Action Plans (NAPs) and Joint Employment Reports (JERs) produced for the annual 
coordination cycles, to the Commission’s mid-term reviews (European Commission 2002, 2005) 
and the studies undertaken by academic research groups or individual scholars (De La Porte and 
Pochet 2002; Govecor 2004; Zeitlin et al 2005) -  does, indeed, show some significant (if 
preliminary) evidence of impact on national decision-making processes. First of all, a measure of 
administrative adjustment has been necessary in all member states in order to comply with the 
Strategy’s requirements. Inter-ministerial coordination has improved in nearly all countries and 
monitoring and reporting capabilities have been upgraded where they were poor. Second, country 
studies confirm that the EES has been taken into account on the occasion of specific policy 
decisions in individual member states. EES influence on national policy has been reported, in 
particular, in the introduction of personalised activation services for the unemployed, in the reform 
of benefit systems and in the area of equal opportunities. Third and finally, one of the most widely 
attested claims of the existing empirical work on the Strategy is that it has contributed to broad 
shifts in national policy orientation and thinking, involving the incorporation of EU concepts and 
categories into domestic debates. The most widely cited examples of this concern the shift of 
emphasis from reducing unemployment to raising employment rates, from passive income support 
to activation of the unemployed and from a curative to a preventative approach to fighting 
unemployment.
By investigating the impact of an EU process on national policies, this study clearly shares 
the same broad research interest that informs the blossoming literature on Europeanisation. The 
| author, however, chose not to refer to the term ‘Europeanisation’ explicitly since, as discussed in
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Chapter 1, it is generally defined so vaguely and used to label such a widely diverse range of studies 
as to be virtually useless. The view of the policy process that is taken here closely resembles a 
‘garbage can’ model of organisational choice (Cohen et al. 1972; Kingdon 1995) in which decisions 
are made under conditions of uncertainty and bounded rationality. This thesis, therefore, disputes 
the rationalist assumption whereby actors simply know what their interests are and are able to 
calculate the consequences of their actions. At the same time, it does not adopt a perspective similar 
to that of constructivist studies on social learning and deliberation (Risse 2000; Checkel 2001,
2003; Checkel and Moravcsik 2001; Johnston 2001; Niemann 2004), since showing evidence of 
such processes occurring in practice is methodologically daunting and necessitates the close 
observation of group dynamics in isolated social environments (closed networks, committee 
meetings). The research focus of this work is, instead, on the interactive processes through which 
the EES’ proposed policy model became advocated and diffused within different national policy­
making arenas. The Strategy, as argued in Chapter 2, is best understood as an attempt on the part of 
the EU to structure a distinctive employment policy discourse -  influenced by the prevailing 
international consensus and by the constraints imposed by EMU -  and institutionalise it through a 
cyclical coordination process involving national and EU actors alike. Drawing from the literatures 
on discourse (Hajer 1995; Schmdit and Radaelli 2002, 2004), agenda setting (Kingdon 1995; 
Zahariadis 2003) and policy ideas (Hall 1989; Blyth 1997), policy-making is conceived of as 
involving a competition between different sets of ideas concerning the definition of the problems to 
be addressed and of the appropriate solutions. Ideas define the material reality, reconfigure actors’ 
interests and build and re-build actors coalitions in novel ways.
On this basis, this thesis advances six working hypotheses, which are illustrated in detail in 
Chapter 1. First of all, since employment policy decisions must be made at the national level, it is 
there that one must look for evidence of the Strategy’s impact. The availability of a new 
interpretation of the existing problems and the appropriate solutions, though, is not sufficient: 
purposeful domestic actors must mobilise to support and diffuse it. Thus all the hypotheses proceed 
from the argument that the diffusion of the Strategy’s discourse at the national level depends on the 
presence or absence of national coalitions of actors willing to adopt and advocate it. Instead of 
trying to show processes of social learning and deliberation, of which existing studies find little 
evidence anyway, this thesis focuses on the interactive processes through which the specific 
employment policy discourse structured and institutionalised by the Strategy became advocated and 
diffused within different national settings.
The first three hypotheses concern the logic of actions and composition of national 
coalitions. In order to overcome a fictitious distinction that is often made in the literature, it is
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hypothesised that (1) the coalitions advocating the EES discourse were motivated by both 
normative and strategic considerations. In other words, even discourse diffusion and change is 
expected to be, at least in part, driven by actors’ interests and agendas. The composition of national 
coalitions, in turn, is likely to depend on (2) the specificities of national systems of employment 
policy-making (the role of civil servants and experts in policy formulation, the degree of 
centralisation of executive authority within the state apparatus) and (3) on how the NAP-drafting 
process was carried out (the degree of involvement of local governments, other Ministries, public 
agencies, non-state actors). Given that, as shown by previous research, the drafting of the NAPs was 
in all member states a bureaucratic, non-participative process, the expectation is that national 
coalitions remained limited to ministerial circles without much input from social partners and local 
authorities. Thus the national supporting coalitions identified by the case studies are expected to be 
narrow, tightly-knit groups of purposeful actors, resembling quite closely Sabatier’s advocacy 
coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1998).
The success of these coalitions, then, is likely to depend on the opportunities and constraints 
offered by the institutional context in which they operated. In particular, it is more likely if (4) 
participation in the drafting of the NAPs caused the strengthening of coalition members’ positions 
within their organisations and (5) only a limited number of actors are involved in employment 
policy-making. Given the restricted participation in the stages of the coordination process that take 
place at the national level, indeed, the EES discourse is unlikely to travel much further than Labour 
Ministries and the leadership of interest organisations. Last but not least, even when the EES can be 
proved to have influenced national policy developments, these are likely to be shaped by 
established policy traditions. Thus this work’s final hypothesis is that (6) except for the few cases in 
which the guidelines contain specific policy objectives, these are only likely to influence the overall 
goals and ambitions of policy, but not the design of policy instruments and settings.
In order to find evidence of the existence of national coalitions advocating the EES 
discourse, their composition and degree of success in influencing policy, the empirical part of the 
thesis looks into the process through which national employment policy decisions were made. 
Specific instances of policy change (or lack of it) were selected on the basis of the issues 
highlighted by the Strategy’s recommendations as in need of reform. This should make it easier to 
observe variation in the direction suggested by the EU. Two chapters are dedicated to the analysis 
of employment policy traditions and modes of policy-making in the two member states under 
examination (France and Italy) in order to outline existing policy models and identify who is 
involved in policy formulation. Since the link between national policy decisions and the EES must 
be drawn by the actors involved, the thesis investigates who participated in the making of specific
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policy decisions and whether that coincided with those who were involved in drafting the NAPs. 
Thus evidence of the existence of national coalitions is represented by the verbal and written 
utterances of actors involved at different levels in national systems of employment policy-making 
(the government, the social partners, local authorities). Since the drafting of the NAPs is the stage 
of the coordination process in which information about the Strategy is diffused at the national level, 
the identity of coalition members is sought among those who were in charge of the plans as well as 
those involved in policy formulation in different national settings. Proof of coalition members’ 
motivations is sought in the statements of the individuals involved or of informed observers 
concerning whether these supported the EES discourse because they though it was an accurate 
definition of reality or because they meant to strengthen their own influence or the government’s 
pre-existing plans. The position occupied by coalition members within their organisations and the 
position of their organisations within national systems of policy-making is taken as an indicator of 
the institutional resources at their disposal. Moreover, evidence of the further resources provided to 
coalition members by the participation in the drafting of the NAPs is sought in such developments 
the participation of the same individuals in major domestic policy initiatives (policy documents, 
social pacts, new legislation) or their career progression within their organisations. Finally, the level 
at which influence on policy can be detected (overall goals as opposed to instruments and settings) 
is analysed by comparing policy documents (legislation, white papers, official reports) with the EES 
guidelines and recommendations. If no evidence can be found of groups of actors advocating the 
Strategy’s discourse can be found among those in charge of the NAPs and involved in policy 
formulation, if these are in no position to influence policy even as a result of their involvement in 
the drafting of the NAPs and, lastly, if no evidence of impact of the guidelines and 
recommendations can be found in policy documents, then all or some of these hypotheses will be 
taken as refuted. The thesis’ working hypotheses and the types of evidence relevant to each of them 
are summed up in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Working hypotheses and relevant evidence
Hypotheses Evidence
1. The coalitions were motivated by both 
normative and strategic considerations
Verbal/written utterances of actors involved in 
employment policy-making and in the drafting 
of the NAPs
2. The composition of national coalitions 
depends on the specificities of national systems 
of employment policy-making
Position occupied by coalition members within 
their organisations and the position of their 
organisations within national systems of policy­
making
3. The composition of national coalitions 
depends on how the NAP-drafting process was 
carried out
Identity and affiliation of the individuals 
involved in the drafting process
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4. The success of national coalitions is more 
likely if participation in the drafting of the NAPs 
caused the strengthening of coalition members’ 
positions within their organisations
Career progression of individuals in charge of 
the NAPs and their participation in major 
domestic policy initiatives (policy documents, 
social pacts, new legislation)
5. The success of national coalitions is more 
likely if only a limited number of actors are 
involved in employment policy-making
Impact of EES discourse on policy in single­
actor systems (like France) and multi-actor 
systems (like Italy)
6. The guidelines are only likely to influence 
policy goals, but not the design of policy 
instruments and settings
Consistency between national policy documents 
and EES guidelines and recommendations
In sum, this thesis argues that the best way to investigate the domestic impact of the EES is 
to trace the process behind domestic policy decisions and focus, in particular, on the activity of 
national coalitions advocating its discourse. At the same time, it accepts the fact that discourse and 
norm diffusion must be seen in their institutional context (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004) and 
maintains that path-dependencies, policy-making arrangements and policy styles allow the use of 
certain types of arguments in certain institutional settings and not in others. A study of this kind, of 
course, ought to be comparative in nature. The real test for the above hypotheses is to be found in 
the development of employment and labour market policies from the inception of the Strategy in 
countries with different policy-making arrangements, political systems and institutional set-ups. The 
national case studies presented in Chapters 3 to 6 investigate the identity, activities and resources of 
supporting coalitions in member states with different systems of employment policy-making. The 
following section illustrates the methodology adopted by this thesis -  relying on ‘process-tracing’ 
as a means to analyse the process behind specific policy decisions -  and the criteria used for case 
selection.
2. Methodology and choice of cases
Assessing the causal impact of an iterative policy-making process based on cooperation between the 
EU and the member states without legally binding sanctions is bound to be methodologically 
challenging. National representatives participate in the definition of objectives, guidelines, targets 
and indicators, which makes it difficult to identify what comes from where. Also, member 
governments may have various political reasons for playing up or down the domestic influence of 
the EES, hence National Action Plans and evaluation reports are not entirely trustworthy as a source 
of relevant information.
Thus the most appropriate way to identify the influence of the Strategy as an independent 
variable is to concentrate on single instances of change (or lack thereof) and trace the process
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behind them. Accordingly, the main empirical focus of the present work is on the recommendations 
that single member states have not initially followed or do not intend to follow in order to see 
whether and by whom the EES’ advice has been advocated and/or adopted. A focus on the issues 
raised by the country-specific recommendations issued by the Council on a proposal from the 
Commission has the advantage of narrowing the research down to the aspects of national 
employment policies where the ‘lack of fit’ with the Strategy’s discourse was greatest. This will 
make the comparison more ‘contextualised’ and will bring up the main ‘sticking points’ in different 
national settings (Locke and Thelen 1995).
In practice, the empirical part of the thesis follows Van Evera’s (1997) and Checkel’s (2005) 
suggestions for ‘process-tracing’ as a basic method to investigate and explain the chain of events or 
the decision processes by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes (see also 
Radaelli 2003a). In the present case, this method aims at uncovering the setting and reconstructing 
the mechanisms through which actors seek to advocate and diffuse new policy concepts and 
discourses. Process-tracing is generally supported by three sets of tools:
• qualitative content analysis of official documents and major media and specialist 
publications;
• the examination of temporal sequencing of events and decisions;
• interviews with policy-makers and experts.
Relevant evidence here consists of explicit changes in policy (new employment legislation), policy 
documents like white papers or committee reports and statements by key policy actors drawn from 
parliamentary acts, newspaper articles, semi-structured interviews where explicit or implicit 
reference to the EES is made. The focus is on shifts in the content, motivation and instruments of 
policy rather than just on quantifiable changes. Triangulation between temporal sequencing, 
interviews and content analysis is meant to multiply the number of observations and minimise the 
impact of the ‘political bias’ of official documents.
The first type of source used by this work is the academic literature on employment and 
labour market policies in the countries under consideration. The existing literature offers essential 
background information on the policy models, instruments, settings and debates in existence before 
the inception of the Strategy as well as on how they have developed since. Some useful information 
regarding instances of policy change and relevant actors and procedures has also been taken from 
the few country-specific studies that have already been undertaken regarding the functioning and 
impact of the EES.
The second type of source is official documents and press material. Content analysis, relying 
on the coding of recurrent themes, key words and expressions, has helped to re-trace the chain of
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events that led to particular decisions and to disclose the diffusion of shared discourses. In the 
selection of the sample of media content, the focus has been on quality newspapers across the 
political spectrum with a high circulation and a considerable influence on other types of media, such 
as TV, radio and the popular press. The obvious choices have been Le Monde, Le Figaro and Les 
Echos for France and II Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa and II Sole 24 Ore for Italy. 
Relevant articles have been identified by using and refining keyword scanning on the LexisNexis 
database between January 1998 and early 2006. The co-occurrence of themes and codes, the timing 
of statements and decisions and explicit or implicit references to the EES has been considered as 
evidence of the Strategy’s impact on national employment policy discourses and arrangements. 
Content analysis, moreover, was utilised as a crucial tool to set the context and identify the 
conditions under which instances of change have occurred.
Finally, a number of semi-structured interviews with civil servants, social partner 
representatives and experts has been undertaken in both the countries studied (nine in France, 
thirteen in Italy). The aim was to identify the actors who have been involved in the coordination 
exercise either at the national or at the European level and to establish a link between instances of 
change and employment policy coordination. Questions have been posed along the following broad 
lines:
• How have the NAPs been prepared in your country? Who participated in the process 
(Ministries, public agencies, social partners, sub-national governments)? Who participated 
in the peer review processes in Brussels?
• Did your country make any adjustments in order fully to participate in the coordination 
process? Have new bodies been created and/or old ones revamped?
• Do you think the guidelines/recommendations/NAPs had any input in the process through 
which key employment policy decisions were made in your country? Were they 
advocated/opposed by any specific groups involved in policy-making? If so, would you give 
any specific examples?
Potential interviewees have been identified, first, by getting in contact with the national Ministries 
of Labour and, then, by using a classic ‘snowballing’ technique, that is, asking the first interlocutors 
who else it would be interesting to talk to.
A study such as this requires a careful case selection. In order to isolate the EES’ impact and 
keep other potential causal variables constant, this work follows a ‘most similar cases’ strategy. It 
concentrates on countries with similar starting conditions (employment policy traditions, labour 
market performance) so as to keep potential alternative explanations constant and check for the 
impact of the variables discussed above (presence/absence of supporting coalitions, institutional
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resources/constraints). Based on these premises, a study on France and Italy seems to be a fitting 
one. These two countries, indeed, show similar forms of state intervention in the labour market -  
highly restrictive labour market regulation, public expenditure almost exclusively geared toward 
passive income support -  and a similar labour market performance -  comparatively low 
employment rates and high unemployment rates in the period under consideration. Although both 
countries supported the introduction of an EU strategy on employment, their employment policy 
models were very far from the EES. In both countries the drafting of the NAPs, after the first few 
years in which the Strategy enjoyed visibility in the press and was the focus of much political 
attention, gradually became a bureaucratic exercise carried out within the national Labour 
Ministries with some input from interest organisations and (in Italy) local governments. A first 
noticeable difference, however, is that, whereas in France the drafting process was a responsibility 
of the Ministry’s administration under the close supervision of the haute administration, in Italy it 
was delegated to outside experts and required a significant upgrading of the administration’s 
capabilities for analysis and evaluation. This points to a difference in the identity of those who are 
involved in governmental policy-making: a powerful echelon of permanent civil servants in France, 
restricted circles of outside experts and academics in Italy, who acquired a more active role in the 
wake of the political crisis of the 1990s. More broadly, the two countries have very different 
institutional set-ups and policy-making arrangements. France has a semi-presidential political 
system with a very resourceful and centralised state apparatus, in which the executive is in a 
position to pass and implement policy without involving non-governmental actors and sub-national 
authorities. By contrast, Italy is a parliamentary system with a weak executive and a highly de­
centralised state apparatus. Employment policies are usually negotiated with the social partners and 
need to be at least partially implemented by regional governments. Chapters 3 and 5 will add to the 
complexity of the picture by pointing to the developments of the 1990s and early to 2000s. In 
France successive attempts to reform welfare and employment policies were blocked by widespread 
public protests and forced the government to seek the support of part of the labour movement. In 
Italy, instead, the election in 2001 of a centre-right government with a large parliamentary majority 
opened the field to a more unilateral policy style.
A comparison along these lines, in sum, seems to have a number of significant advantages. 
First, the fact that both countries have employment policy traditions which are inconsistent with the 
Strategy makes it easier to signal variation. Second, the different kinds of actors involved in policy­
making should show the existence and activities of different kinds of supporting coalitions. Third 
and finally, France and Italy’s diverging institutional set-ups and policy styles provide enough
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leverage to investigate the impact of different institutional conditions in determining national 
supporting coalitions’ success in influencing policy (hypotheses 4 and 5).
3. Overview of the chapters
This work aims to provide a comparative analysis of the impact of the European Employment 
Strategy -  the oldest and most developed ‘open method of coordination’ in the social policy field -  
on member states’ employment policies. It is argued that the EES is best understood as an attempt 
to disseminate a specific employment policy discourse and that it is only likely to influence national 
policies if it is adopted and advocated by purposeful domestic actors and coalitions. These 
coalitions’ success in diffusing the EES discourse, in turn, depends on the institutional resources 
and constraints facing them in the specific settings in which they act. This introduction has briefly 
outlined the thesis puzzle, the structure of the argument and a number of working hypotheses and, 
lastly, its methodology and choice of cases.
Part I of the thesis is dedicated to outlining the conceptual framework and reviewing the 
existing literature on the EES. Chapter 1 argues for a focus on discourse and on the causal role of 
policy ideas as necessary conceptual tools to investigate how perceptions of policy problems and of 
the available solutions are identified, where they come from and how they change. It outlines an 
approach to the diffusion and advocacy of the EES discourse based on the identification of 
supporting actor coalitions, and blends it with an understanding of the institutional settings in which 
they operated and on how these facilitated or hampered their efforts. Chapter 2 takes stock of the 
literature on the governance, content and impact of the Strategy as a basis for the empirical part of 
the thesis. It defines the EES as a means to structure and institutionalise a specific employment 
policy discourse based on a compromise between existing models and influenced by the 
macroeconomic policy set-up of EMU. It is contended that the literature on the Strategy’s impact, 
relying on concepts such as incentive structures, policy learning and socialisation, provides useful 
insights into its nature and operation, but fails to appreciate the reality of national employment 
policy-making.
Part II presents the two case studies on France and Italy. Chapters 3 and 4 chart the 
evolution of French employment policies and policy-making before and after the inception of the 
EES. Employment policy-making in France is characterised by a highly interventionist state 
machine and weak interest organisations. The labour market is tightly regulated and public 
expenditure on income support and employment programmes is comparatively high. Although the 
discourses of flexibility, dynamism and industrial competitiveness were in good currency since the
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1980s, themes such as the activation of the unemployed, active ageing and lifelong learning only 
entered French debates after the launch of the Strategy. Chapter 4 investigates how the new 
reporting obligations have been carried out as well as key instances of policy change in areas that 
had been highlighted by the EES recommendations with a view to showing the role that the Strategy 
played in the process leading to them.
Chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on the Italian case. Employment policies in Italy followed a 
somewhat unbalanced pattern of development: a very high level of protection of the individual 
employment relationship coexisted with low public expenditure on income support policies and 
employment programmes for the unemployed. Unlike in France, Italian governments have long 
been weak and unstable and needed the agreement of relatively powerful interest organisations 
before adopting major pieces of legislation. As in France, however, new themes entered 
employment policy debates around the time the EES was launched and in the process of qualifying 
for Economic and Monetary Union. The analysis focuses on two policy areas that the EES 
recommendations identified as in need of reform (public employment services and social shock- 
absorbers) in order to observe possible instances of discourse or policy change. The case study 
results will show whether the complexity of Italian policy-making hindered discourse change and 
policy innovation.
The Conclusion, finally, sums up the findings and elaborates on some critical theoretical 
issues. What is the nature of the supporting coalitions that have been identified in France and Italy? 
What do the case studies say about the kinds of institutional arrangements that facilitate or hamper 
the diffusion of new ideas and discourses? How can one build a typology of policy impacts of soft 
non-binding instruments like guidelines and recommendations?
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CHAPTER I
T he D iffusion  and Advocacy  of EU  E m ploym ent P olicy: 
A Theoretical  Fram ew ork
The emergence of new modes of EU intervention, based on coordination and ‘soft law’ instruments 
rather than binding legislative acts, in domains that are traditionally left to national sovereignty like 
employment policy has been the object of a great deal of academic interest in recent years. The 
available empirical studies, however, generally show some disappointment with the European 
Employment Strategy’s apparent lack of substantive effects on national policies. The purpose of this 
chapter is to build a theoretical framework for the study of the EES* domestic impact. Based on the 
contention, illustrated in Chapter 2, that the Strategy is best understood as an attempt to provide 
policy-makers with a legitimising discourse involving an interpretation of the problems of European 
labour markets and a recipe for future action, it maintains that evidence of the EES’ influence must 
be witnessed at the level of the national actors who were involved in key policy decisions over the 
period under consideration. It argues for an approach based on methodological individualism to the 
diffusion and advocacy of EU employment policy ideas and discourse by seeking to identify 
supporting actor coalitions, and blends it with a focus on the institutional settings in which they 
operated and on how these facilitated or hampered their efforts.
The development, policy content and governance of the EES are treated in Chapter 2. The 
sections of this chapter elaborate on the claims made above and formulate a number of hypotheses 
that will be tested in the case studies on Italy and France. Section 1 challenges the time-honoured 
notion of policy change and policy output as being determined by the struggle between groups 
within the polity whose interests and preferences are determined by their positions in the economy 
or the political system. Individuals and organisations must act in conditions of bounded rationality 
and uncertainty: their capacity to process and evaluate information is limited, and so is their ability 
to predict the future consequences of present alternative courses of action (Cohen et al. 1972; 
Kingdon 1995; Hemerjick and Visser 2003). Under such conditions policies are likely to change in 
a gradual and incremental fashion, based not only on the power of self-interested groups to impose 
their pet solutions, but also on past experience, new information and the degree to which actors 
come to agree on the definition of the existing problems and appropriate solutions. Thus a focus on 
discourse and on the causal role of policy ideas, it is argued, is necessary to investigate how 
perceptions of policy problems and of the available solutions are identified, where they come from 
and how they change.
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Sections 2 and 3 review the existing literature on the domestic impact of European 
integration. As the EU started to intervene in a growing number of policy areas, the academic 
literature on Europeanisation has drawn the attention of researchers to the ways in which different 
modes of EU policy-making impact on different policy sectors as well as to how national actors 
react to it. The Europeanisation literature is useful in placing the relevant discourse (which is 
structured at the EU level) and in identifying the direction of communication (from the Union to the 
member states), but does not in itself say much about the institutional conditions and patterns of 
actor interaction that lead to discourse diffusion and adoption. Thus, based on different versions of 
neo-institutional theory (Hall and Taylor 1996), the Union’s interventions have been conceived of, 
variously, as providing new opportunity structures for national actors to exploit, path-dependent 
mechanisms and norms of appropriateness, symbols and structures of meaning for them to 
internalise. Although these different variants of new institutionalism appear to be better placed to 
account for policy continuity rather than change (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004), they nonetheless 
provide useful insights into the role of the institutional context in structuring actors’ behaviour and 
in facilitating or hampering the diffusion of new discourses and ideas.
Section 4, finally, outlines a number of hypotheses on the conditions under which new 
discourses and ideas are likely to become diffused and influence policy. In order to become diffused 
and accepted, a new discourse must be supported by a coalition of ‘believers’, i.e. domestic actors 
who (for normative or strategic reasons) decide to embrace and advocate it. This coalition must be 
as large and encompassing as possible, spanning through different branches of the central 
government, interest organisations and local authorities, depending on the institutional and policy­
making set-up in which it operates. In order to influence policy, finally, this coalition must have 
considerable institutional resources at its disposal, such as analytical tools to support its arguments, 
access to financial resources and authority over decision-making and implementation. The country 
studies presented in the empirical part of this thesis will show who the EES discourse was adopted 
by and whether they had sufficient resources at their disposal convincingly to advocate it.
1. Bounded rationality, uncertainty and the role of discourse
Much political science literature assumes that politics is mainly about conflict and power. 
Governments reconcile conflict through public policies, which are then changed when there is a 
change in the power relations among conflicting groups. These groups’ interests are determined by 
their respective positions in the economy or in the existing political system; they are assumed to
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simply know what their interests are and to act upon that knowledge. Thus interests are taken as 
given or exogenous to the phenomenon being explained (McNamara 1998).
These assumptions are unrealistic. Studies of organisations and research in the field of social 
psychology have shown that actors and organisations often act in conditions of uncertainty and 
bounded rationality. More specifically, (1) individuals and organisations have little ability to foresee 
and evaluate the future consequences of present alternative courses of action, and (2) their capacity 
to process and evaluate information is limited and their choice behaviour is often driven by routines 
that have developed on the basis of selection and adaptation rather than rational calculation. Under 
conditions of bounded rationality, ‘choice follows a process of trial-and-error’ and ‘search 
processes for new solutions take place incrementally and in the vicinity of existing solutions’ 
(Hemerjick and Visser 2003: pp.7-8). As a consequence, organisations -  in particular public ones -  
often assume the features of what Cohen et al. (1972) called ‘organised anarchies’: inconsistent and 
ill-defined preferences, unclear technology3 and fluid participation4. Problems are identified 
independently from policies and these are often answers in search of a question instead of the other 
way round. Participants come and go and must attend to several issues at the same time. Choice 
opportunities tend to look like ‘garbage cans’, where various kinds of problems and solutions are 
dumped. In such conditions, policy output will depend on the ‘coupling’ of problems and solutions 
by those who are paying attention at the time when choice opportunities come up (Zahariadis 2003).
Thus, even though it may be convenient to picture decision-making processes as rational 
procedures whereby problems are identified first, then decision alternatives are generated and 
evaluated in the light of one’s objectives and finally a decision is made, this is often a poor 
description of what happens in reality. Policy-makers are constantly exposed to a range of 
conditions that may or may not constitute a problem and to a number of possible courses of action 
that may or may not respond to possible inadequacies of the present situation. In conditions of 
uncertainty actors will find it difficult to interpret their predicament and to predict the consequences 
of their actions, and will therefore be forced to rely on conceptual frameworks to make sense of the 
world and of their place within it.
A fundamental critique of ‘rationalist’ approaches comes from the social constructivist 
school (see Checkel 1997,1999; Risse 2000, 2004; Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003). 
Constructivism is based on the assumption that the environment in which agents take action is
3 This property refers to the fact that the organisation’s own processes are 'not understood by its members. It operates 
on the basis o f simple trial-and-error procedures, the residues o f learning from the accidents o f past experience, and 
pragmatic inventions of necessity' (Cohen et a l ,  1972: p .l).
4 'Participants vary in the amount o f time and effort they devote to different domains; involvement varies from  one time 
to another. As a result, the boundaries of the organization are uncertain and changing; the audiences and decision 
makers fo r  any particular kind o f choice change capriciously’ (Cohen e t a l ,  1972: p.l).
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social as well as material. The environment -  be it the institutional context or broader notions of the 
local ‘culture’, depending on the research focus -  provides agents with understandings of their 
interests and identities, i.e. it ‘constitutes’ them (Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003). In this 
context, agents’ behaviour is not based on self-interested cost-benefit calculations, as rationalist 
accounts would suggest, but rather on a ‘logic of appropriateness’, whereby actors ‘follow rules that 
associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for 
action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general 
concepts of self and situations’ (March and Olsen 1998: p.951). Norm-driven behaviour of this kind 
fundamentally differs from instrumental or strategic behaviour in that actors try to ‘do the right 
thing’ rather than maximising their own given preferences (Risse 2004).
It is worth noting, however, that, apart from clear issues of operationalisation (how do I 
know a norm when I see one?), social constructivism runs into two kinds of problems. On the one 
hand, it is an inherently ‘static’ approach in so far as it does not say anything about the processes 
through which actors come to agree on norms of appropriateness and how these change over time. 
On the other hand, it draws a fictitious distinction between strategic, interest-based behaviour on 
one side and norm-driven, socially-minded behaviour on the other. In reality, norms and rationality 
are intimately connected. In fact, ‘rationality cannot be separated from any politically significant 
episode of normative influence and change, just as the normative context conditions any episode of 
rational choice’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: p.888). Interestingly, studies integrating strategic 
behaviour and the role of norms and ideas have started appearing on both the rationalist and the 
constructivist camps. McNamara’s study on the politics of monetary integration in Europe 
(McNamara 1998) and Schimmelfennig’s work on the role of the strategic use of arguments in the 
EU’s eastern enlargement (Schimmelfennig 2001) are cases in point. Also, on a different note, 
others have tried to contribute to the debate by specifying the conditions under which one logic of 
behaviour prevails on the other. Hence, some leading constructivist scholars (Risse 2000; Checkel 
2001, 2003; Checkel and Moravcsik 2001; Johnston 2001) concentrated their efforts on identifying 
the conditions under which ideal-typical norm-driven behaviour occurs while relations of power and 
social hierarchies recede into the background, thus leading to processes of deliberation, social 
learning and persuasion.
This latter exercise, nevertheless, is of little help for the development of the literature, as it 
restricts the scope for constructivist research mainly to small, closed environments inhabited by 
people sharing the same technical or scientific background. Instead, a much more interesting 
development resides in the interest scholars are taking in the role of ideas and discourse in shaping 
policy outcomes. A discourse-based approach starts from the observation that the way actors
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understand their roles in society and act upon them is linguistically constructed. In this sense, this is 
an inherently, literally constructivist endeavour. Discourses are sets of linguistic material or 
‘systems o f meaning’ (Howarth 1995: p.l 15), which ‘have a degree of coherence in their content 
and organisation and perform constructive functions’ (Coyle 2000: p.253) in a given social context. 
Discourse, in essence, is constituted by spoken and written words. The assumption is that there are 
no objective ‘truths’ out there; social reality does not exist beyond the ways actors perceive and 
describe it. Public policies, of course, are no exception to this. They are based on certain 
interpretations of social problems and on theoretical assumptions about their possible solutions. 
Based on recent work by Schmidt and Radaelli (2002, 2004), policy discourse is defined as (1) a set 
of policy ideas regarding the soundness and appropriateness of policy programmes and (2) the 
processes of policy formulation and communication that serve to generate and disseminate those 
policies.
A focus on policy discourse and ideas is helpful for a number of reasons. First, by arguing 
that actors’ verbal and written utterances must be taken seriously, discourse provides constructivist 
scholars with a clear empirical focus. As will be argued in the following chapter, the EES guidelines 
and recommendations sketch out a comprehensive employment policy model providing domestic 
decision-makers with an interpretation of the problems of European labour markets and of their 
appropriate solutions. Second, a focus on discourse has the potential to overcome the ‘static’ bias of 
social constructivism by including notions of agency and power. As there is always more than one 
competing discourse in every policy area, policy-making is inherently a battle for ‘discursive 
hegemony’ (Hajer 1995). In order for a particular discourse to become accepted, it must be adopted 
and advocated by purposeful individuals or groups. This work takes a distinctively positivist view 
on the role of ideas in policy-making. Following Hall (1989, 1993) and Blyth (1997), ideas are seen 
as a necessary condition for collective action, as able to redefine actors’ interests and reconfigure 
actors’ coalitions. It is at the level of actors, it is argued, that one must look in order to investigate 
the interactive process of discourse diffusion. Moreover, discourses have in-built structures of 
power within them. The discourse that wins the battle will become the accepted interpretive 
framework, thus setting the standards of ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ behaviour and defining 
what is a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ state of affairs. By pointing out the problems to be addressed, policy 
discourses limit the range of alternatives under consideration, which is, as Schattschneider noted,
‘the supreme instrument of power’ (quoted in Haas 1992: p. 16). Third and finally, a focus on 
discourse can serve to bridge the gap between structure and agency. As suggested by Schmidt and 
Radaelli (2004), the role of discourse and the interaction between actors should be understood in 
their institutional context. The coalitions advocating a particular discourse are bound to operate
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within the boundaries of the constraints and opportunities offered by the institutional setting in 
which they operate. This can affect their activities in a number of ways. Discourse diffusion, for 
instance, might be more difficult in systems in which a large number of actors have a say in policy 
formulation than in majoritarian systems where the executive has considerable control over policy­
making. Ideas might flow more easily in states in which experts and academics are widely consulted 
by the administration than in those in which policy advice comes primarily from restricted circles of 
civil servants (Hall 1989).
This work, thus, shies away from the extreme ontological stance whereby discourse is 
everywhere and constitutes the only possible form of reality from the actors’ point of view 
(Howarth 1995). It assumes, instead, that the relationship between ideas and the material reality is a 
complex one and that the influence of a set of ideas or discourse rather than another does not 
depend on its innate qualities alone. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the conditions that allow 
a particular discourse, structured and diffused by one level of governance (the EU in this case), to 
become diffused and accepted in another (the member states). This work, hence, falls broadly 
within the remit of the thriving literature on the domestic impact of European integration or, to use a 
term that has become fashionable in recent years, ‘Europeanisation’.
The research focus of Europeanisation, in fact, helps to situate the relevant discourse -  
which is structured at the EU level -  and to identify the direction of communication -  i.e. the 
member states, especially those whose employment policy tradition is farthest from the guidelines5. 
Yet, it is argued, the Europeanisation literature is too unspecified as regards the institutional settings 
and patterns of interaction leading to discourse diffusion. Useful hints in this regard can be found in 
different strands of neo-institutional theory. Thus the following two sections review the literatures 
on Europeanisation and new institutionalism, looking for theoretical insights that might help in 
fulfilling the thesis’ task. The last section of this chapter, finally, formulates a number of hypotheses 
on the conditions that facilitate or hamper discourse diffusion. These, in turn, will be tested in the 
case studies presented in Part II.
2. Europeanisation and the domestic impact of EU policies
Research on European integration has, over the past few years, moved from an almost exclusive 
focus on explaining the process of integration as such to a broader interest in how the EU works as 
a system of governance and in the impact it has on member state policies and institutions (Caporaso 
1996; Hix 1998; Featherstone 2003; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). The study of the European Union,
5 See Chapter 2.
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in other words, is no longer primarily concerned with categorising the process and outcome of 
integration. The main issue now is how the EU works as a decision-making system and how 
effective it is in delivering such goods as economic growth and better governance.
This shift in research interests is at the very core of the thriving literature on 
Europeanisation (for an overview see Olsen 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). The common 
denominator of the large number of studies grouped under this label is a focus on the domestic 
impact of EU-level developments -  policies as well as institutional arrangements -  and an 
appreciation of the fact that this is inherently complex and diverse. The Union, indeed, intervenes 
differently in different sectors and different modes or mechanisms of intervention are, in turn, likely 
to trigger different kinds of domestic responses and effects. A very broad research agenda is, 
therefore, a striking feature of this literature, along with is its widespread reliance on different 
strands of neo-institutional theory6. Europeanisation, it has been argued, is not a theory in its own 
right, but rather an umbrella term or an ‘attention-directing device’ (Olsen 2002), that is, a research 
focus and a starting point for further exploration. Studies of Europeanisation concentrate on 
different kinds of domestic impacts (predominantly on public policies, but also on polities and 
national institutions), different sectors, different modes of EU intervention (from binding legal acts 
to soft law instruments like guidelines and recommendations); so much so, in fact, that doing away 
with the word altogether would not entail a significant loss in terms of explanatory power. It is for 
this reason that, even though it shares the same broad research focus, this thesis does not refer 
explicitly to the term.
The extreme comprehensiveness of Europeanisation, in sum, represents both its strength and 
its principal weakness. This is reflected in the difficulty scholars have met in defining the term in a 
way that is amenable to empirical research. The most popular definitions present in the literature, in 
fact, leave out surprisingly little of the entire range of human endeavours. In the introduction to a 
recent collection of comparative studies, Green Cowles et al. (2001: p.3) define Europeanisation as 
‘the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures o f governance', a 
process of political institutionalisation involving ‘the development of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, norms, and practices governing politics at the European, national and sub-national 
levels'. According to Radaelli (2003: p.30), Europeanisation consists of the construction, diffusion 
and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways 
of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms’ first defined at the EU level and then ‘incorporated 
in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies’. Dyson and 
Goetz (2004: p.30) further extended the scope of the phenomenon by defining it as a ‘complex
6 See below.
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interactive “top-down ” and “bottom-up” process in which domestic polities, politics and public 
policies are shaped by European integration and in which domestic actors use European 
integration to shape the domestic arena’. All these definitions stress Europeanisation as a process 
and put the emphasis on change as its end-result. They do not only refer to EU laws or decisions of 
a similar level, thus including new modes of governance not targeted toward law-making, such as 
the OMC. By including not only processes of member state adaptation to EU actions, but also the 
use domestic actors make of the EU in order to legitimate policy reforms, develop policy solutions 
and alter policy beliefs, they avoid the chicken-and-egg question of ‘what comes first’ or ‘who 
influences whom’ (Featherstone 2003). However, extending the definition to such a broad range of 
supranational stimuli and potential effects and mechanisms of influence amounts to taking on just 
about everything, thus making it somewhat difficult to ascertain what Europeanisation is not.
That said, however, this large body of literature provides a number of theoretical insights 
that are of considerable help for the task of the present chapter, which is to formulate some 
hypotheses on the conditions under which the EES is most likely to influence member states’ 
employment policies. Researchers, in particular, have made some interesting attempts to 
conceptualise the mechanisms through which European integration affects domestic arrangements. 
Some of the most widely-cited studies on Europeanisation (Borzel 1999; Green Cowles et al 2001; 
Borzel and Risse 2003) focus on the notion of ‘goodness of fit’ (i.e. the degree of institutional 
compatibility) between European policies and domestic institutions as the main trigger of change. 
The basic idea is that Europeanisation only matters if there is some degree of incompatibility, or 
‘misfit’, between European-level and domestic arrangements. Poor ‘fit’ will produce adaptational 
pressures, which will then be filtered through and mediated by domestic institutions. A considerable 
pressure to adapt to European stimuli, however, is not a sufficient condition for domestic change to 
happen. According, for instance, to Borzel and Risse (2003), two kinds of mediating factors present 
at the national level are likely to influence the outcome of a process of Europeanisation. On the one 
hand, European stimuli will produce domestic change if national institutional settings provide 
supporting actors with adequate material and ideational resources and do not empower, by contrast, 
opposing actors or ‘veto players’. On the other hand, European policies that do not resonate well 
with national beliefs and expectations will be more likely to produce change if ‘change agents’ or 
‘norm entrepreneurs’ will mobilise to persuade domestic actors to redefine their interests and 
identities in the context of a non-conflictual political culture and informal institutions conducive to 
cost-sharing and consensus-building. Thus the domestic impact of EU policies is said to depend on 
the activity of national actors as well as on institutional factors. Since the institutional settings of
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member states differ widely, in turn, Europeanisation will probably produce diversity rather than 
convergence (Borzel and Risse 2003).
Reasonable as it may sound, however, the ‘goodness of fit’ argument is not without 
problems. As suggested by Radaelli (2003a), the metaphor of the ‘fit’ potentially covers such a 
wide range of elements (presence-absence of Roman law, strength-weakness of bureaucratic 
structures, corporatist-pluralist style of decision-making, etc.) that there can be no absolute 
compatibility or mismatch. The ‘goodness of fit’ argument, moreover, is useless in the absence of a 
clear, detailed EU model to be adopted or in the presence of national policy ‘voids’, as not all 
member states have a fully developed set of institutions or public policies (Dyson and Goetz 2004). 
More generally, the degree of compatibility or incompatibility is subjective and often politically 
constructed, and is likely to depend on the interpretation of the decision-makers involved. Thus a 
consensus seems to have emerged that there is not one, but many mechanisms of Europeanisation 
and that research designs must be framed accordingly. Recourse has, therefore, been made to a 
range of different theoretical lenses, generally based on different varieties of ‘neo-institutionalism’ , 
in order to study analytically distinct parts or phases of Europeanisation processes.
Considerable efforts have, therefore, been made to build typologies of different domestic 
impacts of EU policies based on different modes of EU intervention. Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002), in 
particular, started from the observation that EU policies do not always produce new legally binding 
rules for member states to implement. Occasionally they aim, instead, to strike down existing 
regulations or just to influence domestic debates. Relying on and extending the time-honoured 
distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ forms of integration -  essentially regulatory versus de- 
regulatory policies - , they outlined three separate mechanisms of Europeanisation. The first 
mechanism takes the form of positive integration and is found when EU obligations prescribe an 
institutional model to which domestic arrangements have to be adjusted, as is the case, for instance, 
in the areas of environmental protection and health and safety at work. Europeanisation here rests 
on the institutional ‘goodness of fit’ of domestic and European settings. The second mechanism is 
labelled negative integration and occurs when EU legislation alters the domestic rules of the game. 
Examples can be found, in particular, in many market-making policies of the EU, which basically 
work to exclude certain options (barriers to trade, to the free movement of workers, and so on) from 
the range of national policy choices rather than prescribe specific models to be introduced at the 
national level. Europeanisation here acts by altering the ‘opportunity structures’ that determine the 
distribution of power and resources between domestic actors. The third and weakest mechanism is 
found where European policies aim to alter the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors, which
7 See below.
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may in turn involve a change in preferences and strategies. This last mechanism is dubbed ‘framing 
integration’ and can be observed, it is argued, in those EU actions whose aim is to prepare the 
ground for subsequent, more demanding policies of positive or negative integration, as in the case 
of the Community’s railway policy.
Following a similar line of reasoning, Radaelli (2003a) has recently spoken of ‘vertical’ and 
‘horizontal’ mechanisms of Europeanisation. Vertical Europeanisation occurs when the EU 
prescribes the adoption of a specific model, thereby exercising some form of adaptational pressure 
on member states to adjust. By contrast, horizontal mechanisms look at Europeanisation as a 
process where there is no pressure to conform to EU policy models, which is the case in the 
presence of policies of ‘negative integration’ -  where the key mechanism is international regulatory 
competition -, as well as of several soft ‘framing’ mechanisms, such as minimalist directives, non- 
compulsory regulations and the Open Method of Coordination8.
The most advanced empirical study on Europeanisation to date is the one produced by 
Falkner et al (2005, 2007). Based on the results of a large-scale qualitative project on the 
transposition, enforcement and application of 6 EU labour law directives in 15 member states, the 
authors come to contest the general relevance and applicability of the most diffused hypotheses of 
the implementation literature, including those relying on the notion of ‘fit’ between EU norms and 
national arrangements and on the presence or absence of ‘veto players’ in domestic political 
systems. They argue, instead, that different factors are relevant in different country studies and 
cluster member states in three different ‘worlds’ of compliance: a world of law observance, where a 
widespread ‘culture of compliance’ overrides the emergence of national concerns regarding the 
rules to be adopted; a world of domestic politics, where domestic interests prevail every time they 
conflict with the new rules; and a world of neglect, where national arrogance or administrative 
inefficiency often result in lack of compliance and policy inertia.
The scope of the Falkner study is necessarily limited, as it is only concerned with the 
transposition of legally binding instruments. However, its conclusions seem to confirm the 
relevance of some key findings of the Europeanisation literature. First, the domestic impact of EU 
policies does not depend on just one factor -  say, institutional ‘fit’. In order to account for Europe’s 
impact, reference must be made to a mix of different variables in any one case. Second, the 
domestic impact of EU policies is the outcome of an eminently political process or, in other words, 
a matter of state choice (Haas 1998). Since the EU lacks the authority over its subunits that most 
national governments have over their lower political forms, compliance hinges either on the 
strategic calculation of member countries or on the existence of shared causal beliefs about the issue
8 See below.
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to be dealt with and the degree to which the rules in question promote valued ends. Member states 
are, therefore, most likely to adjust to EU rules and norms if they want to, either because they deem 
it to be in their interest or because they ‘believe’ they should do it. It is not surprising, in this sense, 
that in the Falkner model administrative variables are considered significant only in the third 
cluster, the world of neglect, and even there they are not named as the only factor leading to policy 
inertia.
To sum up, the literature on Europeanisation shows that the impact of EU policies on the 
member states cannot be pictured in a top-down, chain-of-command fashion. The way member 
states respond to EU initiatives, including its legally binding acts, must be explained by reference to 
domestic factors, be they institutional factors or the activity of national actors or groups. Domestic 
structure and agency, in turn, are conceptualised differently depending on the kind of EU 
intervention under examination (positive/negative integration, binding/non-binding acts) and the 
theoretical lens adopted. Europeanisation, as said above, is an empty box in theoretical terms and 
must rely on the insights of other theories as an explanatory tool. Different variants of new 
institutionalism have constituted the theoretical basis for studies on the domestic impact of 
European integration, each having a different way of defining institutions as well as a different 
views of the role of agency. The next section analyses in more detail three different strands of neo- 
institutional theory in order to find out how they can contribute to explaining the conditions under 
which the EES discourse got diffused and advocated at the national level.
3. The new institutionalisms as the theoretical basis for the study of Europe’s domestic impact
New institutionalism emerged as a reaction to the behaviouralism of the 1950s and 1960s, which 
regarded all political phenomena as the aggregate consequences of individual behaviour and 
political action uniquely as a result of choices based on calculated self-interest (March and Olsen 
1984; Immergut 1998). New institutionalism rejects these reductionist and utilitarian assumptions 
and builds on the apparently banal claim that ‘the organisation of political life makes a difference’ 
(March and Olsen 1989: p.l). Policy outcomes and policy differences are explained by reference to 
institutions -  broadly defined as relatively stable collections of practices and rules defining 
appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations’ (March and Olsen 1998: 
p.948) -, which structure and pattern relationships within the policy process. Although the interest 
in institutions is as old as political science, what is ‘new’ about recent thinking is the recognition 
that political institutions have a degree of autonomy with respect to the society that expresses them
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and that individual means-ends calculation is not the only logic of action that takes place in practice 
(March and Olsen 1984).
New institutionalism, though, is not a unified body of thought: at least three different 
branches have appeared over the last few years -  a rational choice institutionalism, a historical 
institutionalism and a sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996) - , each of which has a 
different conception of institutions and, consequently, a different characterisation of the policy 
process. To start with, rational choice (or actor-based) institutionalism reiterates the utilitarian 
assumptions of earlier accounts and postulates that actors have fixed, pre-determined preferences 
and aim to maximise the satisfaction of their self-interest. Their behaviour is driven by a ‘logic of 
consequentialism’ (March and Olsen 1989), that is, by interests, preferences and by expectations 
about consequences. Institutions are ‘thin’: at most, they are a constraint on the behaviour of actors 
(Checkel 1999). Their role is limited to structuring actors’ interaction or ‘bargaining game’. In this 
context, the policy actions and institutional setting of the EU affect the range and sequence of 
alternatives on the domestic choice agenda, provide information and offer enforcement mechanisms 
that reduce uncertainty about others’ behaviour. Thus, EU-level arrangements act as an ‘intervening 
variable’ between actors’ power and preferences and their subsequent choices (Featherstone and 
Kazamias 2000). Europe, in other words, emerges as a new political ‘opportunity structure’, which 
offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while constraining the ability of others to 
pursue their goals (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Borzel and Risse 2003).
Moravcsik (1994: p.l) applied a similar line of reasoning when he argued that European 
integration redistributes domestic political resources in favour of the executive by ‘shifting control 
over domestic agendas (initiative), altering decision-making procedures (institutions), magnifying 
informational asymmetries [...] (information), and multiplying the potential domestic ideological 
justifications for policies (ideas)’. By contrast, Gary Marks (1993) came to the opposite conclusion 
that the Union provides sub-national and supranational actors with new resources, as it enables 
them to circumvent or bypass national executives. Domestic actors may also seek to be bound by 
EU constraints to pursue their own goals. Dyson and Featherstone (1996) noted how being bound 
by the Maastricht criteria on EMU was seen by technocratic elites in Italy as a way to impose a 
vincolo estemo (external constraint) on the errant instincts of the old partitocrazia, so as to enforce 
a discipline on the state’s economic and monetary policies. Giuliani (2000) found empowerment in 
Italy from the EU across a broader range of actors and policy sectors. Featherstone et al. (2001), on 
the contrary, described the failure of pension reform in Greece as a result of the weakness of 
technocratic empowerment from the EMU commitment in the face of wider social and political 
obstacles.
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By focusing on the interaction between individuals and groups and on the role of institutions 
in structuring it, rational choice institutionalism draws researchers’ attention to the fact that policy 
outcomes are the result of the activities of purposeful actors. As the discussion in section 1 
indicates, however, the assumptions it makes about the actors’ logic of action are often untenable, 
as their ability to process information and predict the consequences of possible courses of action 
tends to be limited by conditions of uncertainty and bounded rationality. Actors often act on the 
basis of discourses and ideas defining the situation they are in and their position within it, rather 
than pre-determined interests and preferences. Moreover, rational-choice institutionalism’s 
definition of institutions appears overly restrictive. Institutions do not just provide the ‘rules of the 
game’ for actors to play: they also tend to establish, or ‘lock in’, certain courses of action rather 
than others and influence actors’ choice of behaviour by providing them with new identities, beliefs 
and expectations.
For historical institutionalists institutions get ‘thicker’, but only in a long-term perspective.
In the short term, they structure the game of politics and provide incentives for rational actors to 
rethink their strategies. Over time, though, institutions can have deeper effects on actors, as 
‘strategies, initially adopted for self-interested reasons, get locked into and institutionalised in 
politics’ (Checkel 1999: p.547). Institutions, in other words, can be both independent and 
intervening variables. The ‘historical’ aspect of the approach is reflected in the attention given to 
‘path dependent’ processes and ‘unintended consequences’, referring to the fact that particular 
courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse and that this may, in turn, 
produce results that were not initially foreseen by those who established them (Pierson 1996b,
2000). Historical institutionalism lends itself to studies which follow the ‘deepening’ of European 
integration and the strengthening of the institutional setting over time. For instance, Dyson and 
Featherstone (1999) showed that, as European monetary cooperation intensified, the relevant 
institutions -  ECOFIN, the EC Monetary Committee and the Committee of Central Bank Governors 
-  assumed a distinct identity and created a specific set of venues which affected the nature and 
content of what was agreed at Maastricht in 1991. Armstrong and Bulmer (1998) took a similar 
historical institutionalist perspective on the emergence and development of different forms of Single 
Market regulation.
Historical institutionalism, thus, makes the helpful claim that institutions, once established, 
are far more than a simple constraint on behaviour. They only permit certain courses of action by 
making it very costly to change them. Established institutional paths may also facilitate or hamper 
the diffusion of new discourses and policy ideas. They determine, for instance, the number of actors
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who have a say over policy-making and implementation and, thus, must be ‘convinced’9. 
Nevertheless, historical institutionalism has been criticised for being inherently ‘static’ (Schmidt 
and Radaelli 2004). In other words, its emphasis on institutional path-dependencies, sunk costs and 
unintended consequences is better suited to explaining policy continuity rather than change. 
Moreover, as said above, actors do not only act on the basis of cost-benefit calculations. They 
interpret the stimuli they receive from their environment and act following their ideas and 
understandings of the predicament that they and their organisations are in. New ideas and 
discourses can reconfigure existing coalitions and, by providing new opportunities for action, may 
even change seemingly stable institutional set-ups.
The conception of institutions is broadest for the third strand of neo-institutional theory, i.e. 
sociological institutionalism. Institutions here include not just formal rules, procedures or norms, 
but also ‘the symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the “frames of 
meaning ” guiding human action * (Hall and Taylor 1996: p.947). They provide the social 
environment in which actors -  individual and corporate -  act and define their interests, preferences 
and identity. Actors’ behaviour is not based on self-interested cost-benefit calculations, as 
rationalist accounts would suggest, but rather on a ‘logic of appropriateness’10, that is, by applying 
social norms of appropriateness in any given situation (March and Olsen 1998). Institutions, in this 
view, ‘constitute’ actors, as they provide them with identities and norms of behaviour, thereby 
affecting their interests and preferences. Institutions, in a few words, are an independent variable: 
they explain actors’ choice of behaviour (Checkel 1999).
Borzel and Risse (2003) outline two potential explanations that sociological institutionalism 
can offer for domestic change in response to European integration, one more structuralist, the other 
more actor-centred. The first one focuses on what organisational sociologists call ‘institutional 
isomorphism’ (Di Maggio and Powell 1991), suggesting that institutions that frequently interact, are 
exposed to each other or to a similar environment develop similarities over time in formal 
structures, practices, ways to allocate resources and reform patterns. This argument, however, meets 
serious difficulties in accounting for variation in institutional adaptation to similar environments. A 
second account, by contrast, focuses on processes of socialisation by which actors learn to 
internalise new rules of appropriateness through processes of arguing, persuasion and social 
learning (Checkel 2001, 2003). Social learning and socialisation entail a different logic of action 
from that of rationalist accounts, as actors do not only adjust their strategies to changing conditions 
in order to pursue their pre-determined goals, but adopt new norms and rules with a view to 
becoming members of the international society ‘in good standing’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
9 See below.
10 See above.
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In this vein, Checkel (1997) distinguished between actors internalising international norms, 
adopting new values and interests, and actors choosing to follow new norms for purely 
instrumentalist reasons, naming one process ‘elite learning’ and the other ‘societal pressure’.
Sociological institutionalism, unlike the other two variants of new institutionalism described 
above, emphasises the importance of non-material factors -  ideas, beliefs and norms as opposed to 
interests, preferences and cost-benefit calculations -  in determining actors’ behaviour and the role 
of institutions in conveying and diffusing them. Yet it seems to suffer from the same ‘static bias’ as 
historical institutionalism, as it is better placed to account for continuity than norm or ideas change. 
As discussed in section 1, theories of social learning are of little help since they are best applied to 
small, closed environments inhabited by people sharing the same background. A further feature of 
this approach is that it defines institutions in very broad terms -  what is not an institution? -  and 
underestimates the role of actors. Institutions, indeed, do not have cognitive capacities of their own 
(Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). It is actors who must mobilise to advocate and diffuse certain 
discourses and ideas in order for them to be accepted by others within a given institutional setting.
In sum, different variants of new institutionalism provide useful insights into how the 
European and the national level interact. They entail different logics of action, different conceptions 
of what institutions are and of their role in policy-making, different ways to envisage the dichotomy 
between structure and agency. They all have their merits and their shortcomings with respect to this 
thesis’ task, which is to investigate the interactive processes through which the employment policy 
discourse produced by the EU got advocated and diffused among national policy-makers. The 
hypotheses presented in the last section of this chapter rest on a conception of structure that is 
borrowed from the historical and sociological strands of new institutionalism. The institutional 
context is seen as facilitating or hampering certain courses of action rather than others, as well as 
certain ideas and discourses over others. In order to overcome neo-institutional theory’s inherent 
difficulty in explaining change, though, this work pays a great deal of attention to the role of actors 
who advocated the policy model proposed by the EU. Thus the empirical part of the thesis seeks to 
trace the presence and activities of the actors and coalitions that advocated the EES discourse in 
different national settings.
4. The diffusion and advocacy of EU employment policy discourse
The argument presented here is blends insights borrowed from new institutionalism11 with a view of 
agency similar to the agenda-setting model applied by Kingdon (1995) to policy-making in the US
11 See above.
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Congress. The literature on agenda-setting seeks to understand how issues are put on the political 
agenda, that is, how they come to be issues in the first place. Agenda-setting is defined as the phase 
in the policy process where problems are defined and the possible alternative solutions identified 
before authoritative decisions are made. In contrast to models that stress consequential action (see 
March and Olsen 1984, 1989 cited above), whereby problems are spotted first, then solutions are 
devised and finally a choice is made, the agenda-setting model proposed by the likes of Kingdon 
(1995) and Zahariadis (2003) rests on the notions of ambiguity and temporal sorting. Ambiguity 
denotes a ‘state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena ’ 
(Zahariadis 2003: p.2) and is different from the related notion of uncertainty, which refers instead to 
the inability accurately to predict an event or its consequences. Temporal sorting, in turn, evokes the 
fact that time is a scarce resource and that the identity of those who are paying attention to what and 
at what point in time is of critical importance. Choice has more to do with the simultaneous 
emergence and coupling of given problems and solutions than with any inherent correlation 
between the two.
Kingdon’s agenda-setting model builds on a ‘garbage can’ model of organisational choice 
(Cohen et al 1972) and on the idea of multiple streams running through the policy process, 
meaning that different components of it are best thought of as separate ‘streams’ that flow through 
the system and are only joined at particular points in time. Kingdon identifies three such streams: 
problems, policies and politics. Problems are no more than conditions that are brought to the 
attention of policy-makers by systematic indicators, focusing events like crises or disasters or by 
feedback from the operation of existing programmes. Many policy responses are possible in 
principle. They are often generated independently of perceived problems and floated around by 
specialists in a variety of ways -  from simple conversation to the introduction of draft legislation -, 
but those that survive to the status of serious consideration generally meet criteria having to do with 
their technical feasibility, their fit with dominant values and the general mood and their budgetary 
implications. The political stream, finally, includes factors like swings of national mood, interest 
group support or opposition, the orientation of the administration in power. Kingdon’s main 
contention is that issues are most likely to rise to a position of prominence in the political agenda 
when these three streams are joined together (or ‘coupled’) at particularly favourable points in time 
-  which he calls ‘windows of opportunity’ -  thanks to the activism of ‘entrepreneurial’ actors, that 
is, ‘people who are willing to invest their resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems' 
(Kingdon 1995: p.20).
Agenda-setting is generally deemed to be the central phase of the policy process, where the 
orientation of policy is determined, whereas at the decision-making stage only a degree of fine-
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tuning is possible (Sabatier 1999; Behning 2006). Kingdon’s model suggests that policy-making is 
often more ‘untidy’ than purely rationalist accounts would assume, as policy problems and 
| solutions are often generated separately, and that the role of agency is central, as it is 
entrepreneurial actors who mobilise to select the issues that are considered by policy-makers. It also 
suggests that the garbage can conditions described in section 1 can be generalised to most policy 
sectors and decision situations. The politics of employment policy in Europe in the last two decades 
is a good illustration of this state of affairs. The literature on welfare retrenchment and recalibration 
has shown that, although relatively generous European welfare states are under stress for a number 
of reasons -  ranging from increased international competition to low productivity growth, 
population ageing and maturation and ‘growth to limits’ of governmental commitments (Pierson 
1996a, 1998) - , their reform has proved to be extremely difficult due to the vast popular support 
they enjoy and to the institutional ‘stickiness’ produced by veto points and path-dependent 
mechanisms (Pierson 1996a, 1998, 2001; Tsebelis 1995). In addition to electoral and institutional 
constraints, welfare and employment policy reform in Europe is said to be surrounded by conditions 
of ‘deep uncertainty ’ both as regards the problems reforms are meant to address and the scope and 
depth of the required changes (Schelkle 2005). More specifically, there is no agreement among 
experts and policy-makers regarding issues such as: do the problems of European welfare states 
originate from market integration, technological innovation, or demographic change? Should 
member states find reforms that suit their own welfare models or is there one Third Way to go for 
the whole Union? If so, is there a single model that could be successfully applied to all? Economies 
admired for their employment record in the 1990s, such as the UK and Ireland, have persistently 
high rates of poverty. By contrast, the Scandinavian systems -  the ones that have reached the best 
results both in terms of employment rates and coverage of benefits -  rely on levels of taxation that 
would be unacceptable in the rest of the continent.
Nevertheless, reforms did take place. Boeri (2001) counted nearly 200 reforms of 
unemployment insurance, employment protection and pensions in Western Europe between 1985 
and 1995, most of which decreased the level of generosity of existing programmes even by a small 
amount. The reality of policy change in the face of powerful constraints and in conditions of deep 
uncertainty, thus, begs some compelling theoretical questions as to how interpretations of the 
problems to be addressed are diffused, information is processed and reform agendas are set. In order 
to do this, the actors and coalitions who support particular interpretations of policy problems and 
solutions must be identified, along with the strategies they adopt and the venues in which they act.
The theoretical framework proposed here proceeds in three steps. The first one starts from 
the consideration of the Strategy’s function as a mechanism to structure and institutionalise a
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specific employment policy agenda and discourse. Chapter 2 sketches out in detail the content of 
the EES discourse, by arguing that it constitutes a ‘residual’ labour market strategy, largely 
influenced by supply-side theoretical interpretations of the causes of unemployment in Europe and 
constrained, as to the policy options it advances, by the monetarist imperatives that inform 
Economic and Monetary Union. As far as the governance of the EES is concerned, particular 
reference is made to the Strategy’s institutional framework (decision-making in the European 
Council, the Labour and Social Affairs Council, the EMCO) and to the identity and role of the 
actors involved at the EU level (the Commission, the member states, non-state and individual 
entrepreneurial actors). The second step focuses on the diffusion of the Strategy’s discourse at the 
national level and on the presence or absence of national coalitions of actors willing to adopt and 
advocate it, whereas the third looks at the institutional limits and constraints on these coalitions’ 
efforts. The assumption is that, for both theoretical and methodological reasons, the most 
appropriate way to investigate how EU guidelines and recommendations play into the politics of 
employment policy-making in the member states is to analyse what goes on at the level of policy­
makers ‘at the hub’ of national policy puzzles and answer the question whether these provide 
resources, cognitive drives, or are just irrelevant. In other words, as suggested by some of the most 
advanced literature on Europeanisation (Olsen 2002; Radaelli 2003a), one should not focus on end- 
states -  policy outcomes in this case - , which are anyway almost impossible to trace back to a 
single source of inspiration, but pay attention instead to the process through which certain decisions 
were made in the first place.
4.1. The advocacy of the EES discourse
Since the policy decisions recommended by the guidelines must be taken at the national level, it is 
there that one must observe whether the Strategy has been used to set the employment policy 
agenda. In other words, one must observe whether new policy problems as highlighted by the 
guidelines and recommendations have been made the focus of national policy-makers’ attention, 
new solutions have been aired in response to old problems, or old solutions have been re-framed in 
reference to newly-conceived problems. In terms of Kingdon’s model, though, the availability of 
problems and policy solutions is not sufficient to set policy agendas: purposeful actors must 
mobilise in support of particular interpretations and recipes for action and the political conditions 
must also be right. Discourse is essentially a spoken act. As a consequence, in order for the EU 
employment policy discourse, as structured by the EES, to become diffused and adopted at the 
national level it must be advocated by coalitions of domestic actors. The national case studies
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presented in Chapters 3 to 6 will analyse different systems of employment policy-making with a 
view to unearthing the identity and activities of the members of such coalitions.
The description and characterisation of supporting coalitions leads to a number of theoretical 
| and empirical issues. A first key issue, which has long been debated in the literature, concerns the 
determination of individual preferences or, to use the terminology adopted by March and Olsen 
(1984,1989, 1998), actors’ ‘logic of action’. As indicated by the previous discussion, rational 
choice-based accounts consider actors’ interests and preferences as pre-determined and fixed, 
whereas their strategies might change in response to changes in the incentives and opportunities 
provided by the environment in which they take action. Constructivist accounts, by contrast, regard 
actors’ motivations as shaped by norms and ideas which are transmitted to them by their context 
(social as well as institutional) and by the interaction with other actors. As shown Chapter 2, much 
of the literature on open coordination takes this latter view and points to the EES’ potential for 
changing policy-makers’ ideas on employment policy through processes of social learning and 
deliberation. Yet the evidence of such processes occurring in practice is, at best, mixed. This thesis 
seeks to overcome this pitfall by focusing, instead, on the EES’ potential for structuring and 
institutionalising a specific employment policy discourse and on the interactive processes whereby 
this discourse got advocated and diffused within different domestic settings.
Actors’ motivations in adopting the EES discourse are, obviously, a matter of interpretation. 
The evidence presented on this point by the case studies is necessarily weak, as no research method 
is sharp enough as to enter people’s minds. Given this caveat, this thesis will try to draw some 
tentative conclusions. This work’s first hypothesis is, thus, that strict theoretical fences between a 
logic of consequentialism and a logic of appropriateness, or interest-based and norm-driven 
behaviour, are unlikely to stand the test of empirical research. Evidence of strategic behaviour can 
be found even in instances of normative/discursive change such as the ones discussed in this work. 
Although the distinction between strategic and normative motives is analytically useful, in other 
words, it is often untenable in practice. In more formal terms, the hypothesis put forth here is that 
(1) actors were pushed to adopt the Strategy*s discourse by both strategic and normative 
considerations. The case studies will seek evidence of both kinds of motivations. This hypothesis 
does not rule out the possibility that single instances of learning might have occurred: it only 
maintains that, on the whole, the members of national coalitions advocating the EES discourse did 
so on the basis of pre-determined strategic and normative beliefs. As a consequence, the expectation 
is that, on the one hand, domestic actors referred to the EES as a strategic lever to support pre­
existing plans for employment policy reform. This could be a strong motive especially in countries, 
like Italy, where selective references to ‘Europe’ have long been used to legitimise potentially
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12unpopular choices . Moreover specific groups of domestic actors, such as civil servants and outside 
experts, may have used references to EU-level discourses in order to increase their influence over 
policy-making. On the other hand, actors like experts and academics involved in policy-making 
may have held strong normative beliefs in line with the EES, which by the way is consistent, with a 
few differences in emphasis, with a widespread international employment policy consensus13.
A further important issue regards the composition of national coalitions. These are likely to 
depend, first, on specific features of national employment policy-making. Thus, for instance, in 
certain systems policy advice is primarily the province of permanent civil servants, whereas in 
others a prominent role is assigned to external experts and academics. In some systems policy­
making authority is concentrated in the hands of the executive, whereas in others it is more diffuse 
across different levels of government (national, regional, provincial) and between governmental and 
non-governmental actors (trade unions, employers’ organisations). Thus the second hypothesis of 
this work is that (2) the composition of national coalitions depends on specific features of national 
systems of policy-making, such as the role of civil servants and experts in policy formulation and 
the degree of centralisation of executive authority within the state apparatus. As will be shown, the 
state administration in France is more impermeable to outside input and far more executive-led and 
centralised than in Italy. The expectation is, therefore, that national coalitions will be very different 
in character. In France supporting coalitions are expected to be composed of actors coming from the 
central state apparatus, notably civil servants from the Ministries and public agencies involved in 
employment matters. In Italy, by contrast, coalition members are expected to come from a wider 
range of backgrounds: not only civil servants from central and regional branches of the 
administration, but also outside experts and social partner representatives.
The composition of national coalitions is also likely to depend on the way in which the 
National Action Plans (NAPs) to be sent to Brussels in the framework of the EES14 were drafted in 
different national settings. The drafting of the NAPs was meant to be the key phase of the 
coordination process, the one in which information on the Strategy was diffused at the national level 
and member states were asked to respond to the guidelines and recommendations. The new 
reporting obligations required -  especially in countries, like France and Italy, that were quite distant 
from the Strategy’s proposed policy model -  the adoption of a new language and new indicators, 
the development of new capabilities for analysis and impact evaluation, the involvement of non­
governmental and local actors even in those countries where they do not traditionally have an active 
role in policy-making. Accordingly the third hypothesis is that (3) the composition of national
12 See above.
13 See Chapter 2.
14 See Chapter 2.
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supporting coalitions and the resources at their disposal depended on how the NAP-drafting 
process was carried out, notably the degree of involvement of bodies other than the Labour 
Ministries (local governments, other Ministries and/or public agencies, non-state actors) and its 
incorporation in the broader framework of national policy-making (i.e. the budgetary process). 
Provided that the existing evidence depicts the drafting of the NAPs as a rather opaque, non- 
participative process, one expects to find that the relevant national coalitions remained secluded 
within restricted Ministerial circles without much input from social partners and local authorities.
Based on the above, the next step is to compare what has so far been generically called 
‘coalitions of believers’ or ‘supporting coalitions’ to the main types of actor coalitions present in the 
literature. Drawing on the existing theoretical literature, supporting actor coalitions can be depicted, 
variously, as epistemic communities, discourse coalitions, advocacy coalitions or policy coalitions. 
They vary along three key dimensions: the glue of the coalition, its cohesiveness and the more or 
less strategic motivations of its members. Epistemic communities (Haas 1992; Verdun 1999) are 
loosely connected networks of actors with a claim to knowledge relevant to policy and a normative 
agenda. They promote policy change by providing scientific knowledge about cause and effect 
relationships. The influence of epistemic communities depends on the degree of uncertainty among 
policy-makers, on a high level of consensus among experts in a given policy sector and on a high 
level of institutionalisation of scientific advice therein. Only the first of these elements is 
unquestionably present in the policy field being examined, whereas the other two are to a much 
lesser extent, given the inherently contentious and politicised nature of employment policy. 
Discourse coalitions (Hajer 1995) are equally loose groupings. The glue of a discourse coalition lies 
in the fact that its members somehow develop and sustain a particular way of talking and thinking 
about a policy issue. Its members need not have met, let alone follow a carefully laid out and agreed 
upon strategy. Politics is conceived of as a struggle for discursive hegemony, in which actors try to 
impose their definition of reality. This struggle, however, is eventually resolved not by a coalition’s 
strategies and resources, but by the discourse’s own features, notably its credibility, its degree of 
acceptability and the trust it inspires. Advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 
Sabatier 1998) are more closely connected groups of individuals intent on putting their ideas and 
policy beliefs into action. The basic idea is that actors in each policy sector can be grouped into a 
number of opposing coalitions (generally one to four), which are ‘composed of actors from various 
governmental and private organisations ’ and held together by a shared set of normative and causal 
beliefs (Sabatier 1998: p. 103). In order to count as advocacy coalitions, members must have 
engaged in (a non-trivial degree o f coordinated activity ’ over an extended amount of time, possibly 
some years. Advocacy coalition members mobilise to advance their policy beliefs, which are very
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I difficult to change a can be essentially taken as given, but are prepared to modify their strategies
f
and secondary aspects of their belief systems in order to achieve their goals. Finally, policy 
coalitions are ad hoc alliances that develop in an issue-specific manner, ‘often but not exclusively 
from a pool of actors whose general suitability as an ally or source of information is taken as a 
matter of course9 (Warleigh 2000: p.232). The primary rationale for developing policy coalitions is 
the achievement of specific policy goals, and not long-standing common interests based on shared 
value systems as is the case for advocacy coalitions. Nonetheless, ties within such coalitions can be 
very strong, bordering at times on mutual dependence.
The case studies will reveal which of these types the relevant national coalitions resemble 
most closely. The first set of hypotheses outlined above, however, seem to rule out both epistemic 
communities and discourse coalitions. Epistemic communities are kept together by a common claim 
to scientific or technical knowledge, but its members need not have the same political views or a 
political agenda. Discourse coalitions only share the adoption of the same language, but are 
otherwise very loose groupings whose members need not know each other. The national coalitions 
which the empirical part of the thesis will look for, instead, are more tightly-knit groups of 
purposeful actors who, for both normative and strategic reasons, advocated the EES discourse as a 
means to obtain a certain kind of employment policy reforms in a context of widespread uncertainty 
and perceptions of policy failure. The issue whether the national coalitions of ‘believers’ resemble 
either advocacy or policy coalitions (or neither) will be settled in the conclusion on the basis of the 
findings of the case studies. Be that as it may, these coalitions’ success in diffusing and advocating 
the EES discourse are likely to depend on the resources and constraints facing them within the 
institutional settings in which they had to operate. It is to these conditions that the last hypotheses 
now turn.
4.2. The diffusion of the EES’ discourse in institutional context
Institutional and policy-making arrangements can facilitate or hamper the diffusion of new 
discourses and ideas in several ways. To start with, the sets of incentives and sanctions that are 
attached to the discourse itself can act as powerful resources in the hands of those who advocate it. 
For instance, actors might decide to adopt a certain discourse in order to gain access to particular 
resources or to avoid being criticised by their constituencies or their peers. Furthermore, as said 
above, factors such as the degree of governmental authority relative to other bodies (parliament, 
public agencies), the degree of involvement of non-governmental actors (trade unions, employers’ 
organisations) and the degree of centralisation or de-centralisation of the state apparatus are crucial
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j determinants of the number of actors who have a say in policy-making and implementation and,
!
(thus, must be ‘convinced’ by a given discourse in order for it to influence policy. Finally,
!
institutional path-dependencies and established policy traditions might oppose some resistance to 
change in accordance with non-binding European guidelines.
In both the countries studied meeting the new reporting obligations imposed by the Strategy 
stimulated a measure of administrative adaptation in the branches of the national government that 
were in charge of it15. Analytic and statistical tools have been upgraded, new bodies have been 
created or old ones revamped and destined to new uses. Contacts with relevant stakeholders have 
been renewed and strengthened. Even though the drafting of the NAPs, as said above, always 
involved a limited number of actors of very specific descriptions -  the higher echelons of the 
national Labour Ministries’ administrations, select public agencies (i.e. the public employment 
agency in France), high-ranked trade union and employer representatives, outside experts and 
academics -, all those who participated, with very few exceptions (parts of the French trade unions, 
for instance), tended to be enthusiastic about the Strategy’s proposed policy model. The institutional 
adjustments prompted at the national level by the coordination process, in turn, potentially provided 
those in favour of the EES discourse with new resources and strengthened their positions within 
their organisations. Thus the fourth hypothesis advanced by this work is that (4) the success of 
national coalition members in influencing the discourse of their organisations (especially Labour 
Ministries and interest organisations) depended on the adjustments made to meet the Strategy’s 
reporting obligations and on the extent to which the process became institutionalised. Evidence of 
coalition members’ strengthened position will be sought in such developments as the participation 
of those involved in drafting the NAPs in major domestic policy initiatives (policy documents, 
social pacts, new legislation) or their career progression within their organisations. The conclusion 
will elaborate on the consequences of such strengthening in providing, for instance, a measure of 
continuity in employment policy discourse as governments of different political colour came to 
power.
Once a new discourse has been introduced into domestic debates, then, the extent to which it 
will become established and influence policy is likely to be linked to a number of further 
institutional features. According to Schmidt and Radaelli (2004), in ‘multi-actor systems’ like Italy, 
where a large number of actors have a say over policy formulation and implementation, it is more 
complicated to reach agreement among policy-makers around a given discourse than in ‘single­
actor systems’ like France, where power is concentrated in the executive and the greatest efforts are 
put into convincing the public of the appropriateness of policies developed with little outside input.
15 See Chapters 4 and 6.
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Moreover, given the non-participative nature of the NAP-drafting process, the EES discourse is 
unlikely to have travelled much further than national Labour Ministries and the leadership of 
interest organisations. Hence it is hypothesised here that (5) the success o f the coalitions advocating 
the EES discourse in influencing national employment policies is more likely in systems where a 
| limited number of actors have input into policy-making and implementation. Accordingly, if the 
case studies will find more evidence of EES impact in Italy than in France, both in terms of the 
adoption of new policy and of its implementation, this hypothesis will be taken as refuted.
A last important point concerns the kinds of impact one expects to find. A first fundamental 
distinction must be drawn between governmental discourse, actual government policy and policy 
implementation. Noticeable shifts in the government’s employment policy discourse may not 
necessarily result in new policy, just as new policy may not be swiftly implemented on the ground. 
A further distinction to be made is between two different types of objectives set by the Strategy: 
specific objectives detailing the policy means to put into practice the content of the guidelines and 
broader targets meant to mobilise the member states in the larger context of the Lisbon Strategy, 
such as the employment rate targets set in Lisbon and Stockholm16. The last hypothesis advanced by 
this thesis, thus, is that (6) the kind of policy impact obtained by the EES depended on the specificity 
of the relevant guidelines. In other words, the hypothesis is that specific objectives play a role in the 
definition of the problems and the actual design of policy, but not of its overall goals and ambitions. 
The broader targets, by contrast, are likely to influence policy goals as well as the definition of 
policy problems, but not the design of policy itself.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the best way to investigate the impact of EU-level employment policy 
coordination is to look at the national level, where the ultimate responsibility for making policy still 
lies, and to analyse the processes through which key decisions were made rather than focusing 
exclusively on policy output, which is virtually impossible to trace back to a single source of 
inspiration. In particular, it is contended, one must look at the actors involved in national policy­
making and see whether the EES has provided them with arguments, cognitive drives, new 
resources or has instead remained irrelevant (Radaelli 2003a; Radaelli and Schmidt 2004). The role 
of different institutional settings in facilitating or hampering the diffusion of the Strategy’s 
discourse is, then, presented as a key variable in accounting for the extent to which supporting 
coalitions have been successful in promoting it.
16 See Chapter 2.
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In an attempt to set up an appropriate theoretical framework to support the empirical part of 
| the thesis, this chapter has reviewed the literatures on Europeanisation, new institutionalism,
; discourse and agenda-setting. The approach it proposes borrows from garbage can and multiple 
streams models of the policy process the idea that the interpretation of problems and solutions does 
not necessarily proceed in a consequential fashion and blends it with a discourse-based perspective 
on power and resources. It presents different ways in which actors’ interaction could be patterned, 
leaving it to the case studies to determine which of them is the best depiction of what occurred in 
practice. Finally, it accepts the fact that discourse and norm diffusion must be seen in their 
institutional context. It maintains, in this respect, that path-dependencies, policy-making 
arrangements and policy styles allow the use of certain types of arguments in certain institutional 
settings, but not in others.
The hypotheses put forth in this chapter aim to shed some light onto the role of coalitions of 
domestic actors in advocating and diffusing policy models and discourses promoted by the EU as 
well as on the role of national institutions in facilitating or hampering their efforts. If validated, they 
will improve researchers’ understanding of the dynamics of compliance and policy change in 
Europe. The significance of the thesis’ findings will be discussed in the Conclusion. The following 
chapter, meanwhile, analyses in more detail the discourse and governance of the EES and reviews 
the existing literature on its impact on member states’ employment policies. The case studies will 
then be presented in Part II.
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CHAPTER II
Th e  E uropean  E m ploym ent  Strategy : G overnance  and  D iscourse
The European Employment Strategy (EES) constitutes the main attempt made in the 1990s to find a 
way for the EU to intervene in sensitive areas without resorting to binding legislative instruments. It 
is the most structured version of the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) launched by the 
Lisbon European Council in 2000 as a tool for the Union to deal with structural reform in a broad 
range of economic and social fields. Its novelty as a mode of EU intervention and its application in 
more and more policy areas spurred a great deal of academic interest in recent years. The task of 
this chapter is to take stock of the state-of-the-art literature regarding the governance and discourse 
of the EES as a basis for the empirical part of the thesis. It aims to answer questions such as: what is 
the EES? How does it work? What does it recommend member states to do? The main claim made 
here is that the Strategy is best understood as a means to centralise and diffuse employment policy 
knowledge and discourse. It represents an attempt on the part of the EU to develop a full-blown 
employment policy discourse (Radaelli 2003b; Jacobsson 2004) providing national decision-makers 
with a common vocabulary and a legitimising project. It is, in other words, an attempt on the part of 
the Union to exercise a form of leadership and power over member states’ employment policies by 
pointing out the problems to be addressed and limiting the range of alternatives under 
consideration17. As it turned out, however, the EES always remained a very ‘soft’ process, since no 
significant incentives or sanctions were provided to promote member state compliance. Moreover, 
in spite of its much-vaunted potential for promoting mutual learning and deliberation among 
national policy-makers, the Strategy’s governance often assumed the time-honoured features of 
intergovernmental bargaining.
The four sections of this chapter build this argument in steps. Section 1 traces the origins 
and antecedents of the EES. It is maintained that the insertion of a Title on employment in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and the launch of a coordinated strategy were advocated by the Commission 
and supported by key left-wing governments and a trans-national coalition of pro-integration elites 
in the wake of widespread public discontent with rising unemployment and the deflationary 
implications of EMU. The result was a coordination process based on annual (now triennial) cycles, 
relying on such ‘soft law’ instruments as flexible and revisable guidelines, monitoring, peer review 
and benchmarking of performance. The aim was to spread a common interpretation of the problems
17 See Chapter 1 on the power of discourse.
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, of European labour markets and of the appropriate policy solutions, while helping implementation
s
by sharing relevant national experiences.
Section 2 sketches out the governance of the Strategy at the EU level and identifies the 
actors involved and the institutional settings in which they interact, while section 3 focuses on the 
policy content of the Strategy and describes the development of the Employment Guidelines. The 
evidence presented here suggests that, instead of the open and inclusive process geared toward 
experimentation and learning it promised to be, the EES developed as a somewhat elitist, opaque 
governance process. The main decisions concerning guidelines, recommendations and reports are 
negotiated in true bargaining fashion by the Commission and member state representatives, whereas 
parliaments and non-governmental actors, with the relative exception of the social partners, are 
hardly involved at all. This pattern remained unchanged despite two major overhauls of the 
Strategy’s governance in 2003 and 2005. As regards policy content, it is held that the Strategy has 
carved out a specific and recognisable EU employment policy advice based on a compromise 
between different existing models and influenced, in its scope and inspiration, by the 
macroeconomic policy set-up of EMU. Despite two major changes in format and a gradual shift of 
emphasis toward market flexibility to match the preferences of the right-wing governments that 
came to dominate EU politics in the early 2000s, the content of the guidelines has in fact remained 
remarkably stable over the years.
Section 4, finally, reviews the burgeoning literature on the EES’ impact on national 
employment policies. Each strand of this literature, employing concepts such as incentive 
structures, policy learning and transfer, ‘discursive regulation’ and socialisation, offers useful 
insights into the eminently discursive nature of the Strategy and the inherent ‘softness’ of its 
instruments. However, it is contended, none of these approaches pays enough attention either to the 
activities of domestic actors and coalitions who advocate the Strategy’s proposed policy model or to 
the role of domestic institutional settings in facilitating or hampering norm and discourse diffusion.
1. The European Employment Strategy: origins and antecedents
The EES has its roots in the high unemployment that tainted western Europe’s economic 
performance in the mid-1990s. Unemployment had been increasing steadily in Europe since the 
1970s and by 1997 it had come to hit as much as 10% of the European workforce, i.e. around 15 
million people (European Commission 2000). At the same time, European integration gradually 
placed tight constraints on the ability of member states to act autonomously in the employment and 
social policy fields. This was linked, on the one hand, to processes of market integration. The last
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four decades witnessed a gradual, if incremental, expansion of Community-produced regulations, 
market compatibility requirements and, especially, court decisions that seriously eroded national 
welfare state sovereignties. As a consequence of rulings and regulations concerning the freedom of 
movement of workers and the freedom to provide services, for instance, member states may no 
longer limit most social benefits to their citizens to the exclusion of other EU nationals, nor may 
they insist that their benefits only apply to their territory and may only be consumed there 
(Leibfried and Pierson 2000). The increasingly wide reach of Community competition law has also 
begun to affect employment by limiting certain types of state aid to undertakings in specific sectors 
and by granting or withholding permission for mergers and takeovers by major industrial or 
financial groups. On the other hand, the advent of EMU prevented member state governments from 
resorting to traditional means of macroeconomic management. A common monetary policy makes 
it is no longer possible to combat unemployment by means of competitive devaluation and 
adjustment of national interest rates, whereas the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which binds the 
members of the euro-area to keep their budgets close to balance or in surplus in the medium term, 
prohibits large public deficits and thus also extensive public-sector job creation.
In such circumstances, growing popular discontent over unemployment started to turn 
toward the EU and national actors started to look for European solutions to the ‘spillover’ problems 
created by the integration process (Scharpf 2001). The ‘Vilvorde case’ regarding the sudden closure 
of a Renault plant near Brussels triggered the first ever ‘Euro-demonstrations’ and had a 
considerable influence on the 1997 French general election campaign, with the newly elected 
government making French approval of the SGP conditional on stronger EU action on employment 
(Fischer and Tholoniat 2006). Yet the room for activist social policy initiatives at the EC/EU level 
was extremely limited. Member states were always unwilling to hand over their authority on 
welfare and social policies, which have long served as an instrument of state-building and a source 
of mass legitimacy. At the same time, the Union does not have anything approaching the financial 
resources required by modem welfare states and specialises, instead, on social and economic 
regulation, the costs of which are bome directly by the firms and individuals who have to comply 
with it (Majone 1993). Thus social and employment policy in the EU looks like an extremely 
bottom-heavy multi-tiered system. Any intervention from the top has to build on a thick network of 
existing national programmes, which in turn generate sunk costs and networks of political interests 
that diminish the prospects for reform (Leibfried and Pierson 1995).
Hence, substantive policy applications in the field of employment have been relatively rare 
and have always concerned somewhat technical aspects of labour market regulation. European 
legislation until the early 1990s was limited to a few areas where the Treaty of Rome or the single
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market project allowed some latitude. A number of directives on equal treatment were adopted by 
| the Council in the 1970s under the gender equality provisions of Art. 119 (now 141) EEC and then 
I interpreted extensively by the European Court of Justice (Leibfried and Pierson 2000). The 1986 
Single European Act allowed qualified majority voting (QMV) on issues concerning health and 
safety in the workplace (Art. 118a (now 137) EEC) so as to avoid that national regulations could be 
used as non-tariff barriers to trade. EU competences were, then, somewhat extended by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, which for the first time included a full-fledged Social Charter. The mandate on 
health and safety was broadened to cover all ‘working conditions’ and the one on gender equality 
was extended to all labour force issues and was placed under QMV for the first time (Art. 137(1) 
EEC). Two additional QMV competences -  worker information and consultation and integration of 
persons excluded from the labour market -  were introduced (Art. 137(1) and 137(2) EEC) and 
unanimous decision-making was extended to five new topics -  social security and protection of 
workers; protection of workers when the employment contract is terminated; collective interest 
representation; employment of third-country nationals; and financing measures to integrate the 
excluded. Yet, in order to tame the scope of the new treaty clauses, three topics were explicitly 
declared off-limits: pay; the right of association; and the right to strike and to impose lock-outs (Art. 
137(5) EEC).
A second attempt to raise social policy on the European agenda via legislative means was 
made through the so-called ‘Euro-corporatist’ procedures established by the Maastricht Social 
Agreement in 1992 and then universalised in Amsterdam in what became Art. 138-39 (ex 118a and 
118b) EEC. However these procedures, which allow the official representatives of employers and 
employees to enter into voluntary agreements that are subsequently enacted as directives by the 
Council, have not yet proved to be very productive (Falkner 1996; Rhodes 2005). A long-delayed 
European Works Councils Directive was the first piece of legislation to be considered, but the social 
partners eventually failed to reach an agreement on the matter. A directive on parental leave was 
adopted in 1996, one on part-time work in 1997 and one on fixed-term work in 1999. Nevertheless, 
this ‘contractual’ route to legislation has so far led to nothing else.
In the face of the failure of EU interventions based on legislation, then, a new middle path 
was chosen between the adoption of directives and resorting to forms of ‘neo-voluntarism’ (Streeck 
1996) leaving policy entirely in the hands of the member states. The insertion of a title on 
employment in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the launch of a stronger form of coordination of 
member states’ employment policies were advocated by a transnational coalition composed of the 
European Commission, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the Party of European 
Socialists (PES), the Nordic member states and individual policy entrepreneurs -  especially Allan
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Larsson, a former Finance Minister of Sweden and Director General of the Employment and Social 
Affairs DG of the Commission between 1995 and 2000 (Johansson 1999). The trend toward open 
coordination, as said above, was also undoubtedly influenced by developments in the field of public 
administration and law. New public management and new regulatory paradigms based on 
alternatives to traditional regulation provided the background wherein ‘soft’ policy coordination 
could be seen as a better way forward, and no longer a second-best option, in cases in which 
legislation could not be produced (Radaelli 2003b). In the mid-1990s, a consensus emerged among 
various academic and political networks around a new ‘method’ to address the social dimension of 
Europe, which was to involve agreement on non-binding common objectives and a surveillance 
procedure, so as to progressively establish a European-level framework for analysis and action (De 
La Porte and Pochet 2002). The model of policy coordination it entailed drew upon the economic 
convergence process built around the annual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) (Hodson 
and Maher 2001). It was also inspired by the ‘recommendation policy’ and peer review of the 
OECD Job Study (Casey 2004; Marcussen 2004), as well as by the benchmarking exercises of 
private companies (De La Porte, Pochet and Room 2001).
Employment policy coordination has actually been present in the Treaties since 1957. Art. 
118 EEC listed a number of ‘social fields’ (employment, labour law and working conditions, 
vocational training, social security, occupational health and safety, collective bargaining and the 
right of association) where member states were encouraged to ‘cooperate closely’. A Standing 
Employment Committee composed of Ministers of Labour, social partner and Commission 
representatives was set up in 1970 with the aim to coordinate national employment policies, but it 
soon proved ineffective due to the member governments’ unwillingness to facilitate its functioning 
(Goetschy 1999). Employment issues were put on the European agenda some years later by the 
Delors Commission with the 1993 White Paper on ‘Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment’ 
(European Commission 1993)18. The White Paper’s ambition was to combine the seemingly 
contradictory aims of meeting the convergence criteria of EMU, the implications of which were 
deflationary, and achieving higher levels of employment. For this purpose, the Commission 
proposed an economic strategy that entailed both supply-side and Keynesian measures. On the one 
hand, the White Paper claimed that the only way to increase employment passed through greater 
flexibility, lower non-wage labour costs and more active labour market policies. On the other hand, 
it proposed a grand pan-European project of investments in infrastructure that was to mobilise 600 
million ECU and promised to create 15 million jobs in five years. In immediately political terms the
18 In the 1990-91 IGC that led to the Maastricht Treaty some attempt was made to cover issues relating to common 
economic governance (gouvemement economique) and matters close to employment, but to no effect (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999).
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initiative failed, as member states swiftly rejected such an ambitious and costly approach. A more 
long-lasting achievement, though, was that employment became a prominent part of the agenda of 
every subsequent European Council (Regent 2003).
The strategy for employment suggested by the Delors White Paper took a clearer shape at 
the 1994 Essen European Council, where its main axes were translated into five overriding 
‘priorities’: (1) promoting investment in vocational training and encouraging lifelong learning; (2) 
increasing the employment intensiveness of growth through a more flexible organisation of work 
and working time, wage restraint and job creation in local environmental and social services; (3) 
reducing non-wage labour costs, particularly for low-skilled workers; (4) developing active labour 
market policies through the reform of employment services, the encouragement of occupational and 
the development of incentives for the unemployed to return to work; (5) targeting measures to help 
groups particularly affected by long-term unemployment (women, youth, older workers). A 
multilateral monitoring procedure was also established, requiring member states to translate these 
priorities into long-term programmes in the light of their specific economic and social 
circumstances and to submit annual progress reports. On the basis of the national reports, the 
Commission, in conjunction with ECOFIN and the Labour and Social Affairs Council, was to 
prepare an annual assessment of progress for the December European Council. The summit would 
then review the priorities, issue further recommendations and launch new initiatives at the 
i Community level (European Council 1994).
| The procedures set up at Essen, however, proved to be largely ineffective due to the lack of
i
I  quantified and measurable objectives and an insufficient political consensus (Regent 2003). Yet the 
| Commission had succeeded in keeping employment on the EU agenda. In June 1996, the newly- 
j  appointed Commission President, Jacques Santer, tried to give new impetus to the reforms 
envisaged in the White Paper by proposing a European ‘Confidence Pact’, conceived as a 
counterweight to the SGP advocated at that time by the German Finance Minister Theo Waigel in 
order to ensure budgetary discipline among the members of EMU (Goetschy 1999). The Confidence 
Pact was intended to reinforce the dynamics of EMU and maximise the potential of the internal 
market by speeding up the reform of employment policies in line with the Essen priorities and 
developing Community-level initiatives to encourage employment-creation. This was to be 
achieved, inter alia, by increasing the budget for Trans-European networks and redirecting 
structural fund financing toward employment-related objectives. To this end, the social partners 
were urged to agree on employment-generating measures both at Community and at the local level 
through ‘territorial employment pacts’. Yet again, however, concrete actions converting words into 
practice went missing (Regent 2003).
45
The EES was, then, finally established with the inclusion of a Title on employment in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Employment was not originally on the agenda of the intergovernmental 
conference, but it soon became a priority due to the lack of progress in other areas (institutional 
| reform, Common Foreign and Security Policy) and to the victory of social democratic parties in the
i British and French general elections of early 1997 (Goetschy 1999; Johansson 1999). The result
i
was an extremely formalised cyclical process, with a systematic in-built monitoring system, 
quantified targets and a high level of political participation, supporting a strategy for the reform of 
employment and labour market policies based on a compromise between the liberal model of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries and the social-democratic model of the Scandinavian member states 
(Bertozzi and Bonoli 2002).
i
j 2. The governance of the European Employment Strategy: process and reform
i
I
Title VIII of the Amsterdam Treaty (Art. 125-130 EEC) outlines the main features of the EES. 
According to Art. 126, member states shall regard employment as a ‘matter of common concern ’ 
and shall develop a coordinated strategy aimed, in particular, at ‘promoting a skilled, trained and 
| adaptable workforce and labour markets responsive to economic change ’ (Art. 125). The main 
lines of the strategy are drawn by Art. 128. Every year, the Labour and Social Affairs Council,
‘acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the 
I Employment Committee shall ‘draw up guidelines which the member states shall take into account 
| in their employment policies’. These guidelines shall be consistent with the BEPGs referred to in 
Art. 99(2) TEU. Each member state shall then ‘provide the Council and the Commission with an 
annual report on the measures taken to implement its employment policy in the light of the 
guidelines’. On the basis of the national reports, the Council, ‘having received the views of the 
Employment Committee, shall each year carry out an examination of the implementation of the 
employment policies of the member states in the light of the guidelines’, and may, if it deems it 
necessary, make recommendations to the member states acting by qualified majority on a 
recommendation from the Commission. Hence, the Council and the Commission shall submit ‘a 
joint annual report to the European Council on the employment situation of the Community and the 
implementation of the guidelines for employment’ and plan for a new set of guidelines for the 
| following year. Finally, Art. 130 establishes the above mentioned Employment Committee with 
advisory status and provides that it shall be composed of two members from each member state and 
two from the Commission. In fulfilling its mandate, the Committee shall consult the social partners.
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The approach to policy coordination that lies at the basis of the EES was first adopted by the 
EU in 1993 for the purpose of coordinating national macroeconomic policies under the Maastricht 
Treaty (Hodson and Maher 2001) and was later dubbed ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) by 
the 2000 Lisbon European Council. The OMC was launched with a view to implementing the new 
ten-year goal for the Union to become ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion’ (European Council 2000: par.5). In its purest form, it consists of four 
fundamental elements {ibidem: par.37): (7) the fixing of guidelines for the Union combined with 
specific timetables for achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms; (2) 
the establishment, where appropriate, of quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks 
against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different member states and sectors as a 
means of comparing best practice; (3) the translation of the European guidelines into national and 
regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and 
regional differences; (4) periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual 
learning processes. The method is designed to set in motion an EU-level process aimed at helping 
member states to develop their own policies. It differs in some key respects from more traditional 
‘soft law’ measures such as codes of conduct, recommendations or resolutions as it is not only a 
provision, but also a process that has its own method of sanctioning -  based on peer pressure, 
‘naming and shaming’ and multilateral surveillance -  and a follow-up system that significantly 
limits the scope for circumvention (Regent 2003). The purpose is to organise a learning process 
based on the exchange and emulation of best practices. The aim is not harmonisation or mutual 
recognition, but rather convergence on agreed common priorities and targets, while respecting 
national and local differences (European Council 2000).
The EES, and the OMC, have been hailed by academic observers as a ‘new mode of 
governance’ that differs in several respects from the classic ‘Community method’, which entails the 
adoption of legally-binding acts by the Council and the European Parliament on the initiative of the 
Commission (European Commission 2001; Scharpf 2001; Wincott 2001). The relevant literature 
(Mosher 2000; Scott and Trubek 2002; Cohen and Sabel 2003; Borras and Jacobsson 2004) 
identified a number of key characteristics that set new governance apart from more traditional 
modes of policy-making and legislation. To start with, new governance is designed to foster the 
participation of stakeholders and a degree of deliberation and power-sharing among them. It accepts 
the possibility of continuing national diversity and relies on open-ended standards, flexible and 
revisable guidelines and other forms of ‘soft’ law rather than binding legislation. Finally, new 
governance is aimed to facilitate experimentation and learning by encouraging extensive
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deliberation among participants, multilateral surveillance, benchmarking of performance and the 
exchange of experience and information.
Since Lisbon, versions of the OMC have been applied to such a diverse blend of policy areas 
as education, enterprise, better regulation, information society, research and development, 
taxation19. Successive European Councils in Gothenburg, Stockholm and Laeken in 2001 launched 
fresh coordination processes in the areas of social inclusion, sustainable development, healthcare 
and pensions. Finally, forms of open coordination have been proposed in a number of other sectors 
where the possibility of adopting ‘harder’ legal measures already exists, such as immigration and 
asylum, disability policy and market liberalisation in certain formerly public services like 
telecommunications (De Burca 2003; Laffan and Shaw 2005). It is worth noting that open 
coordination does not always correspond to the template presented above. So much so, in fact, that 
it as been argued that there is no single ‘open method’, but rather ‘a range of different kinds, all 
broadly sharing some characteristics but with variations and distinctive features according to the 
particular policy area ’ (De Burca 2003: p.824). The literature, indeed, identified ‘lighter’ and 
‘heavier’ versions of the OMC, depending on the presence or absence of a number of structural 
features: a legal basis in the treaties; the adoption of guidelines and recommendations; the adoption 
of explicit indicators and targets; the requirement to produce periodic ‘action plans’ subject to peer 
review processes; the yearly or multi-annual nature of the coordination ‘cycles’; the degree of 
openness to the participation of non-governmental actors (De La Porte 2002; De La Porte and 
Pochet 2002; Radaelli 2003b; Laffan and Shaw 2005). On the basis of these criteria, although it is 
not ‘OMC’ in the strict sense since it was launched before 2000, the EES must count as the most 
structured version of open coordination as it contains all the elements of the ideal-type identified by 
the literature. By way of comparison, the pensions process, whereby the member states are under 
the only obligation to report every three or four years on how they are including the ‘commonly 
agreed objectives’ (not guidelines) into national policy, is considerably lighter.
Does the practice of the EES’ governance measure up to the ideal-type of ‘new 
governance’? The available evidence paints a somewhat different picture. Although the 
Employment Title is not explicit on the point, subsequent EU summits insisted that national 
governments should engage parliaments, social partners, local and regional authorities and various 
civil society actors both in developing and in implementing the National Action Plans (NAPs). The 
participation of a large number of stakeholders was meant to serve the double purpose of improving 
the transparency and democratic legitimacy of the process and of building support for reform -  or 
‘partnerships for reform’ in the Strategy’s somewhat obscure jargon (Council of the European
19 Policy coordination on taxation issues was first proposed by the so-called ‘Primarolo group’ in 1999 and then 
officially called for by the Feira European Council in June 2000 (Laffan and Shaw 2005).
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j  Union, various years). Yet empirical research has shown the EES process to be remarkably closed,
| elitist and arguably even less democratic and accountable than the Community method, as 
parliamentary influence (both national and European) is extremely limited, there is no possibility
!
for judicial review as the guidelines are non-binding and the degree of social partner participation
I
varies widely across member states (Radaelli 2003b; De La Porte and Nanz 2004; Rhodes 2005).
I
The governance of the EES is, thus, best described as the result of the sole interaction 
between the Commission and member state representatives, mostly taking place behind closed 
doors. Final authority over policy-making stays with the member states, while the EU’s task is to 
organise and structure the coordination exercise. EU-level decision-making is in the hands of the 
Council, which approves the guidelines and recommendations by qualified majority voting (QMV). 
The Commission’s institutional position is somewhat weaker than under the Community method -  
its proposals can be amended by the Council with no need for unanimity - , but it is involved in 
almost every step of the process. It drafts the guidelines, organises the exchange of best practices, 
proposes indicators and benchmarks and provides support to the processes of implementation, 
monitoring and peer review. The Commission’s position in relation to member state governments in 
the EES governance system is best illustrated by its role within the Employment Committee 
(EMCO) established by Art. 130 EEC20, which lies at the very heart of the day-to-day functioning 
of the Strategy. The EMCO is the only preparatory body below the Labour and Social Affairs 
Council. The latter’s decisions are often a mere stamp of approval on agreements reached by 
member state representatives -  usually Director Generals in the national Ministries of Labour -  and 
Commission officials within the Committee (Salais 2004; Deganis 2006). The EMCO is, thus, the 
principal setting in which the various actors involved in the EES interact. Discussions within 
EMCO often resemble the prototype of hard-nosed bargaining rather than open-ended deliberation, 
especially when it comes to deciding on politically salient issues like guidelines or indicators21, with 
the Commission acting, alternatively, either as a ‘policy broker’ between different coalitions of 
member states or as a competence-maximiser to the detriment of member states’ control on the 
process (Jacobsson and Vifell 2003; Deganis 2006). Deganis (2006), in particular, has shown that 
the Commission has consistently tried to maximise its influence within EMCO by using to this end 
its hold on the Committee’s Secretariat, which is in charge of drafting minutes and opinions, and by 
establishing a fictitious right of initiative through the practice of starting the Committee’s works 
from the discussion of Commission papers. In his study on the adoption of the 2003 Employment 
Guidelines, moreover, Jobelius (2003) has demonstrated that the Commission tried to push for the 
adoption of a large number of quantitative targets and indicators in order to capitalise on its
20 See above.
:21 See below.
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j monitoring role, but was eventually forced to drop most of them by the necessity to reach 
| agreement within the Council.
| This state of affairs is unlikely to change as the twelve new member states of the EU -  eight
I
central and east European states plus Cyprus and Malta since May 2004, Romania and Bulgaria 
since January 2007 -  start to participate fully in the EES. Starting from 1999, they have been 
involved with the Commission in a preparatory policy review exercise based on country-specific 
Joint Assessment Reports (JAPs) and then produced their first full-blown NAPs in 2004 and 2007 
(Fischer and Tholoniat 2006). Their accession, if anything, further complicated the EES ‘game’, as 
they formed new coalitions with the old members within the Council and EMCO (Deganis 2006), 
and made it more difficult for the Commission to steer the process. Arguably, therefore, the Eastern 
enlargement is likely to change the balance of power between the member states and the 
Commission, by further weakening the latter’s agenda-setting capabilities over time.
The Strategy’s governance framework underwent two major overhauls, as it came under 
considerable attack in recent years for its perceived lack of impact on domestic employment 
policies. In order to improve performance and raise member states’ commitment, the Commission’s 
mid-term evaluation of the EES recommended a drastic simplification of the Employment 
Guidelines (EGs) and greater consistency and complementarity with other relevant EU processes 
(European Commission 2002). As a result, it was decided to synchronise, starting from 2003, the 
employment and the economic policy coordination processes (the above mentioned BEPGs), as 
well as the Cardiff process on product and capital market reform (the so-called ‘Internal Market 
Strategy’, IMS) and the nascent open methods on social inclusion and pensions (Council 2003). The 
format of the guidelines was also thoroughly overhauled22. The latest revamp of the Strategy’s 
governance came on the occasion of the mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy. Based on the 
report of the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok (Kok 2004) and the release of a Commission 
report in February (European Commission 2005) that pointed to a serious implementation ‘gap’ on 
the part of the member governments, the 2005 Spring European Council set up a new simplified 
arrangement relying on three-year coordination ‘cycles’ (European Council 2005). The Council is 
now asked to adopt a set of ‘Integrated Guidelines’ incorporating both the BEPGs and the 
Employment Guidelines (EGs). On this basis, member states shall draw up ‘national reform 
programmes’ (NRPs) and the Commission a ‘Community Lisbon programme’ covering all 
appropriate action to be undertaken at the national and European levels, respectively. National 
reports on the follow-up to the Lisbon Strategy, exhausting in a single document all the previous 
reporting obligations, will be sent to the Commission every year for it to report on and the European
22 See below.
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^Council to discuss. The Integrated Guidelines, the NRPs and the Community Lisbon programme 
.shall then be reviewed at the end of each three-year cycle.
| In both cases the aims were facilitating the identification of priorities, increasing member 
state commitment and streamlining the monitoring procedures. Some positive steps in these 
directions have, indeed, been taken. Reporting and monitoring procedures have been greatly 
simplified. The Strategy’s discourse has been streamlined and inserted more clearly within the 
broader framework of the Lisbon Strategy under the banner of ‘growth and jobs’ . Renewed 
emphasis has been put on participation and ‘ownership’ of national actors, including parliaments, 
social partners, civil society, with a view to mustering their support and exploiting their legitimacy 
to push forward Lisbon’s reform agenda. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Kok report called 
for greater efforts to be made to ‘name and shame’ member states into complying with the terms of 
the Strategy, the emphasis seems to be shifting further away from multilateral surveillance and peer 
pressure. The 2005 Spring European Council conclusions mention neither the Lisbon overall 2010 
goal nor more specific goals like the employment rate targets (European Council 2005). The 2005 
Commission Spring Report openly called for a shift in focus from multilateral surveillance 
involving all member state governments and the Commission to bilateral discussions between the 
, Commission itself and single member states on the structure of the national programmes (European 
Commission 2005). For this purpose, bilateral IMF-like meetings have taken place in June/July 
2005 between Commission and national officials. In addition to this, the Commission decided not to 
propose country-specific recommendations in 2006 (European Commission 2006) as the 2005 
NRPs contained only a forward-looking section specifying the measures they are planning to adopt 
in the next three years and no backward-looking section reporting on what has already been done.24 
In sum, the structure of incentives and sanctions attached to the Strategy’s governance system has 
not substantively changed. As a consequence, it can be argued that what was brought about by the 
reform of the governance framework of EES (and of the broader Lisbon Strategy) is not
95fundamentally different from what was already in existence .
The issue of incentives and sanctions will be analysed in more detail in the last section. 
Meanwhile, the next section illustrates the content of the EGs and traces the policy model behind 
the EES as a strategy for reform.
23 The social inclusion and sustainable development components of the Lisbon Strategy, once presented as equally 
important ‘legs’ of the same quadrilateral, have been increasingly marginalised. Social policy coordination has been 
organised around a new ‘streamlined’ OMC, which looks like a satellite of the process turning around the integrated 
guidelines, while the Sustainable Development Strategy has been re-defined as no more than a long-term complement to 
Lisbon’s medium-term goals (Armstrong 2008).
24 It must be noted, though, that the national reports on the follow-up to the Lisbon strategy to be submitted as of 2006 
include both a forward- and a backward-looking section.
25 This argument is presented in detail in Chiattelli (2006).
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3. The EES: discourse and strategy
The EES has developed in a significant way as a form of centralisation of employment policy 
knowledge and discourse. The EGs have shown considerable stability over the years and common 
indicators based on comparable statistics have been developed as a crucial tool for the monitoring 
and evaluation of policies. In 1999 member states were urged to support the process of defining 
and collecting comparable data in order to implement the Community-wide targets set in the 
guidelines. In 2000, the Commission presented a report on ‘structural indicators’ across four policy 
domains, which was annexed to the conclusions of the Stockholm European Council (European 
Council 2001)26. Country-specific recommendations on the implementation of the guidelines were 
first issued in 2000 and proved to be at first a rather uncomfortable finger-pointing session for 
some member states (De La Porte, Pochet and Room 2001). Yet over time the process became 
considerably less divisive, as member states were consulted by the Commission at an earlier stage 
and more account was taken of the peculiarities of national labour markets (Goetschy 2001). More 
than fifty recommendations were issued by the Council every year. Although the same countries 
tend to receive approximately the same number of recommendations every year, the number of 
recommendations per country varies widely and can be considered as a reflection of good and bad 
performance from the Strategy’s perspective. The Scandinavian member states plus the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal are the only countries to receive, on average, less 
than four recommendations a year. On the contrary, most of the countries with Continental and 
Southern employment policy traditions and the U.K. so far received more than four a year and are 
to be counted among the bad performers.
Table 2. Employment Recommendations 2000-200427
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
The Netherlands 2 2 2 2 3 11
Denmark 2 3 2 2 3 12
Ireland 3 2 3 3 3 14
Sweden 2 3 3 3 3 14
26 The employment indicators are: the employment rate; the female employment rate; employment growth rate; the 
employment rate of older workers; the unemployment rate; the tax rate on low wage earners, lifelong learning (adult 
participation in education and training).
As a consequence of the reform o f the Lisbon Strategy, the Commission decided not to issue recommendations in 
2005. Starting from 2006, the employment recommendations changed format and were merged with the 
recommendations on macro- and microeconomic policy in the context o f the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs 
(see above).
52
Austria 3 3 3 3 3 15
Finland 3 3 3 3 3 15
Luxembourg 3 3 3 3 3 15
Portugal 3 4 3 3 3 16
United Kingdom 4 4 4 4 4 20
Belgium 4 5 5 5 4 23
France 4 5 5 5 4 23
Spain 4 5 5 5 4 23
Germany 5 5 5 5 5 25
Italy 5 5 5 5 5 25
Greece 6 6 6 6 5 29
Total 53 58 57 57 55 280
Source'. Council Recommendations on the implementation of member states’ employment policies (various years).
i Thus, over the years, the EES developed a distinct employment policy model and a specific
|
'way of looking at the problems of European labour markets. This was broadly based on the 
international consensus built in the early 1990s around the causes of Europe’s stagnating growth
i
and rising unemployment (Visser 2005). On the one hand, it was argued, the rigidity of business 
.and labour market regulation made European economies unable to handle economic shocks, so that, 
.after every bout of recession since the 1970s, unemployment stabilised at a higher level than before. 
| The decision to embark on Economic and Monetary Union added further urgency to the perceived 
' need to increase labour market flexibility, as a single monetary policy caused governments and 
observers to look for alternative means to adjust to asymmetric shocks (Talani 2004). On the other 
hand, Europe’s social security systems were deemed unable to handle the structural transformations 
of the economy. Their generosity and method of financing -  especially in those states in which 
benefits are funded by payroll taxes -  had the effect of increasing labour costs and discourage new 
hirings, while no incentives or sanctions were generally provided for those who did not actively 
look for new jobs. The combined effect of the above was a two-speed labour market, stratified 
between an older cohort of mostly male workers and heads of family whose jobs in the industrial or 
public sectors had the full gamut of employment guarantees and social protection, and a newly 
I entering cohort composed mainly by female and younger workers who took up less protected jobs 
in the services sector (Esping-Andersen 1999; Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000).
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This is the normative and cognitive drive behind both the Commission’s 1993 White Paper 
,on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment28 and the OECD Jobs Study (OECD 1994) launched 
around the same time. Both see unemployment as being fundamentally the result of market 
rigidities and both recommend to deal with it by improving the skills of the workforce, removing
i
disincentives to take up paid work, matching demand and supply of labour by reforming!
employment services, making firms more competitive and adaptable to market changes and 
decreasing the cost of hiring new workers. The OECD, however, put much more emphasis than the 
EU on deregulation and flexibility of labour markets and industrial relations, and openly held up the 
experience of the United States and, to a lesser degree, of the U. K. as a model to be followed 
(Casey 2004). The EES, by contrast, has much more warmly embraced the discourse of ‘activating’ 
social and labour market policy and placed great emphasis on the link between employment 
performance and the welfare state and on the contribution of the social partners to policy-making 
and implementation. The EES represent an attempt on the part of the EU to strike a balance between 
| different employment policy regimes and to develop a common definition of the problems of 
 ^European labour markets as well as of the appropriate solutions. The recommended policy measures 
' are based on a compromise between the liberal model of the Anglo-Saxon countries and the social-
j
democratic model of the Scandinavian member states (Bertozzi and Bonoli 2002). On the one hand,
I
| the Strategy seems to have taken from the liberal model the policies that concern labour demand 
| and job creation, with its emphasis on labour market deregulation and tax reductions. On the other 
! hand, the guidelines are much closer to the social-democratic model when it comes to labour 
supply, focusing on training and active labour market policies, as well as on equal opportunities and 
gender mainstreaming. At the same time, fashionable experiences of the 1990s like the 35 hours 
j working week in France did not play any significant role in shaping the content of the guidelines, 
thus showing that the Strategy was not just a minimum common denominator between existing 
welfare models, but a clear attempt to draw from the two which produced the best results in terms 
of employment rates (Bertozzi and Bonoli ibidem).
It is worth noting, however, that the issue of the total volume of employment, which was 
addressed by the 1993 Delors White Paper that recommended, as said above, an increase in public 
and private investments, was completely disregarded by the Strategy launched only four years later. 
The reason for this has to do with the fact that the set-up of EMU, mandating a single monetary 
policy for the whole Euro-area and constraints on public spending, ruled out macroeconomic policy 
as a lever to combat unemployment (Raveaud 2003; Salais 2004; Talani 2004). The EES, in fact, is 
closely linked to the politics and ideologies of the Maastricht process and EMU (Chalmers and
28 See above.
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Lodge 2003; Rhodes 2005). Its very existence and institutionalisation are partly the result of the 
perceived need to gain support for the Monetary Union by showing concern for its effects on 
|employment29. This link helped to make the Strategy stronger than other forms of OMC (Rhodes 
iIbidem). Yet, as a result, the EES was never conceived as a fulsome action plan for employment, 
but rather as a more limited supply-side labour market strategy.
i
The need to compromise and the reliance on vague terms like ‘activation’, moreover, has 
given rise to problems of interpretation. Differences in interpretation and focus may come from the 
ideological orientation of the governments in power or from prevailing national discourses. 
Differences in focus may also arise from existing policy legacies -  some member states, for 
instance, have a more developed system of public employment services and income support policies 
than others - , labour market performance, the identity and preferences of the actors involved in 
employment policy-making. Only in-depth national case studies such as the two presented in this 
work can show the extent and nature of these differences . Broadly speaking, however, at least two 
coalitions of member states can be identified around different perspectives on the Strategy’s 
message (Deganis 2006). On the one hand, a ‘liberal’ coalition, comprising the UK, Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Italy under Berlusconi, Spain under Aznar and new members such as 
Slovakia, Poland, Cyprus and Malta, emphasised labour market flexibility as a fundamental tool to 
retain economic competitiveness and stresses the importance of individual responsibility in a 
residual US-style welfare state. On the other hand, a ‘social model’ coalition, regrouping states like 
Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, Spain (after 2004) and Italy (before 2001 and after 2006), did 
not repudiate the goal of full employment and emphasised the need to provide a measure of security 
and quality at work.
The first set of EGs was issued by a special Council meeting held in Luxembourg in 
November 1997, before the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force. Around twenty guidelines have 
been produced every year until 2003, not all of them corresponding to quantified targets. Since 
Luxembourg, the EGs have been organised under four ‘pillars’ -  dubbed, respectively, 
employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities - , chosen to reflect the main 
perceived weaknesses of European labour markets: the skills gap (mismatch between the capacities 
of the unemployed and employer requirements); the job creation gap (bureaucratic or fiscal barriers 
to establishing new businesses); the adjustment gap (restrictive contractual arrangements that 
prevent firms from expanding employment opportunities); and the gender gap (low employment 
rates among women, the young and the elderly) (Watt 2004). The pillars, though, were never given 
equal weight. ‘Employability’, in fact, was the object of more guidelines and quantified targets and
29 See above.
30 See also the county studies collected by Zeitlin et al. (2005).
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was regarded from the start as the most important pillar by national and EU actors (Barbier and 
Samba Sylla 2001). As the 2002 mid-term review of the Strategy concluded that the pillar structure 
was too complex and there were too many guidelines, in 2003 the EGs were reduced in number to 
10, each containing several sub-sections. In the context of the new Lisbon Strategy’s governance 
arrangement, finally, the EGs have been merged into the Integrated Guidelines for growth and jobs 
for the period 2005-2008 (guidelines 17 to 24). Notwithstanding all these changes in format, 
however, it is contended that the content of the guidelines has been remarkably stable over the 
years.
In the first set of EGs, adopted in 1997 and valid for the year 1998 (Council 1998), the first 
pillar contained 7 guidelines. Member states were asked to ‘develop preventative and employability- 
oriented strategies’ with a view to offering a ‘new start’ before 6 months of unemployment for 
young persons (EG 1) and before 12 months for adults (EG 2) in the form of training, retraining, 
work practice, a job 'or other employability measure’. Member states should ensure the ‘transition 
from passive measures to active measures’ and review their benefit and training systems with a 
view to providing the unemployed with real incentives to take up work. To this end, at least 20% of 
the unemployed should be offered training or any similar measure (EG 3). The social partners were 
encouraged to conclude agreements aimed to increasing the possibilities for training, work 
experience, traineeships or other employability measures (EG 4) as well as to develop possibilities 
for lifelong learning (EG 5). Furthermore, in order to improve the employment prospects of early 
school-leavers, member states were asked to ease ‘the transition from school to work’ by reducing 
school drop-outs substantially (EG 6) and providing young people with skills relevant to the labour 
market (EG 7).
The entrepreneurship pillar contained five guidelines. In order to make it easier to start and 
run new businesses, member governments were advised to reduce overhead costs and 
administrative burdens for firms (EG 8) and to encourage self-employment and the setting up of 
small businesses (EG 9). In order to exploit every opportunity to create jobs, member states should 
look into the social economy and the new activities linked to needs not yet satisfied by the market 
with the aim of reducing any obstacles to their development (EG 10). In addition, in order to make 
the taxation system more employment-friendly, governments were asked to set a target for reducing 
the fiscal pressure on labour and non-wage labour costs, especially on unskilled and low-paid 
labour (EG 11), and to consider the possibility of reducing VAT on labour-intensive services not 
exposed to cross-border competition (EG 12).
The adaptability pillar contained three guidelines. The social partners were called upon to 
negotiate agreements to modernise the organisation of work, covering issues like the management
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a^nd reduction of work time, lifelong learning and career breaks (EG 13). Member states, for their 
part, would examine the possibility of introducing more flexible types of work contracts, provided 
t^hat those involved enjoy an adequate level of security (EG 14). Moreover, the ‘adaptability’ of 
^undertakings should be supported and skill levels within them improved by re-examining the 
existing obstacles, particularly tax-related, to investment in human resources (EG 15).
| Finally, the equal opportunities pillar was composed of four guidelines. Member states were 
asked to reduce the gap in unemployment rates between women and men (EG 16), raise levels of 
access to care services in order to support women’s entry into the labour market (EG 17) and 
facilitate the return to paid work after periods of absence (EG 18). Last but not least, member state 
governments were urged to give special attention to the problems people with disabilities may 
encounter in finding and keeping a job (EG 19).
The EGs kept the same format for the following four years. The 1999 guidelines (Council
1999) introduced a new EG 4 dealing specifically with the reform of tax and benefit systems in 
J  order to provide incentives for the inactive to take up jobs and for firms to hire new people and, for 
the first time, mentioned ‘active ageing’. A new EG 13 invoked the full exploitation of the 
, employment potential of the services sector, and especially of information society and the 
environmental sector, in order to create ‘more and better jobs’. ‘Gender mainstreaming’ in the
i
implementation of all four pillars was introduced by EG 19. The 2001 EGs included five new 
‘horizontal objectives’ (Council 2001), the first of which made explicit reference to the EU-wide 
l employment rate targets set in Lisbon (70% for the labour force as a whole and 60% for women by 
I 2010) and mentioned for the first time the issue of the quality of jobs. Further employment rate 
targets were set in Stockholm (50% for older workers by 2010 and the intermediate targets of 67%!
overall and 57% for women by 2005) (European Council 2001) and then inserted in the EGs for 
2002 (Council 2002).
A major review of the EGs, as said above, was conducted in 2003. As a result, the vague pillar 
structure and the horizontal objectives were replaced by three ‘overarching and interrelated 
objectives full employment, improving quality and productivity at work and strengthening social 
cohesion and inclusion. These were to be achieved through action along ten ‘priorities for action ’ 
(Council 2003):
I • Develop and implement active and preventative measures for the unemployed and the 
inactive;
• Encourage the creation of more and better jobs by fostering entrepreneurship, innovation, 
investment capacity and a favourable business environment;
• Facilitate the adaptability of workers and firms to change;
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• Implement lifelong learning strategies, improve the quality and efficiency of education and 
training systems;
• Increase labour supply and promote active ageing;
• Promote gender equality in employment and pay;
• Combat discrimination against disadvantaged groups;
• Improve financial incentives to make work pay, review tax and benefit systems with a view 
to eliminating unemployment, poverty and inactivity traps;
• Transform undeclared work into regular employment;
• Address regional employment disparities.
The replacement of the four pillars and twenty-odd guidelines with ten ‘priorities’ was a step 
forward in presentational terms. Each guideline now reflected a concrete goal of public policy 
rather than being structured around abstract concepts like ‘employability’. Yet, except for the new 
guidelines on undeclared work and regional disparities, the substance of the Strategy was almost 
intact. Thus the 2003 amendments, it has been argued (Watt 2004), are best described as little more 
than a change in presentation. An interesting addition was the inclusion of new quantitative and 
qualitative targets, which had been a controversial point in the negotiations on the new EGs 
(Jobelius 2003; Biichs 2005). The new set of guidelines contains 13 quantitative and 2 non- 
quantitative targets, most of them to be reached by 2010. The Lisbon employment goals are cited 
under the first ‘overarching objective’. In addition, 25% of the unemployed should be offered active 
measures (instead of the 20% of previous versions) (EG 1) and all job-seekers should be able to 
access information on vacancies through the employment services of all member states (EG 3). At 
least 85% of all 22 year-olds in the EU should have completed upper-secondary education and at 
least 12.5% of the adult working age population should participate in lifelong learning (EG 4). The 
effective average exit age from the labour market should be raised by 5 years (EG 5), childcare 
services should be provided for at least 90 % of children between 3 years of age and the mandatory 
school age and for at least 33% of children under 3 (EG 6) and the average rate of early school 
leavers in the EU should not be above 10% (EG 7). Gender gaps in employment, unemployment 
and pay (EG 6) and the tax burden on low-paid workers (EG 7) should be ‘substantially reduced\  
Finally, member states should set their own national targets for the reduction of unemployment gaps 
for people at a disadvantage as well as between EU and non-EU nationals (EG 7).
The 2005 review further reduced the number of the guidelines from 10 to 8, while keeping 
the three overarching objectives introduced in 2003. Guideline 17 of the ‘Integrated Guidelines for 
Growth and Jobs’ (Council 2005) recalls the Lisbon employment rate targets and requires member 
states (no less) to ‘implement employment policies aimed at achieving full employment, improving
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quality and productivity at work, and strengthening social and territorial cohesion \  Guideline 18 
calls for the promotion of a ‘life-cycle approach to work’ by reducing youth unemployment, 
increasing women’s participation in the labour market and improving the provision of care services, 
supporting active ageing and building modem social protection systems. Guideline 19 requires 
member states to ‘ensure inclusive labour markets, enhance work attractiveness, and make work 
pay for job-seekers’ through the implementation of active and preventative measures for the 
unemployed, periodic reviews of the incentives and disincentives resulting from tax and benefit 
systems, the development of new sources of jobs in the services sector. Guideline 20 emphasises the 
matching of labour market needs through the modernisation of employment services and the 
promotion of the mobility of workers across Europe. Guideline 21 asks for the promotion of 
flexibility, via the adaptation of employment legislation and the dissemination of innovative forms 
of work organisation, combined with employment security via the anticipation and ‘positive 
management’ of economic restructuring. Guideline 22 calls for employment-friendly labour cost 
and wage-setting developments. Finally, member states are required to increase investment in 
human capital and lifelong learning (guideline 23) and adapt education and training systems to new 
needs (guideline 24). The targets and benchmarks agreed in 2003 are reiterated in an annex.
In sum, in less than ten years the format of the guidelines underwent two major changes. 
Objectives and targets were added to reflect the preferences of the Commission and some member 
states. The shift of focus to the employment -  as opposed to unemployment -  rate was made 
apparent after the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. The dominance of right-wing parties in 
government in the early 2000s is the likely cause of the greater emphasis that was gradually put on 
such issues as labour market flexibility, the reform of tax and benefit systems, ‘making work pay’. 
However, these are only changes in emphasis, as the main inspiration of the EES as a supply-side 
strategy focusing on activation, the creation of a better environment for business and the 
modernisation of work organisation was there from the start. The final section of this chapter 
reviews the literature on the EES’ impact on national employment policies with a view to gaining 
further insights into its nature and functioning.
4. Theorising the domestic impact of the EES: incentives and sanctions, policy learning and 
discourse
The domestic impact of the EES and the OMC at large has aroused a considerable amount of 
interest in the scholarly literature. The list of concepts employed by researchers is diverse, ranging
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from policy learning, transfer, diffusion and mimicking to deliberation and participation and peer 
pressure and shaming. The next s
ub-sections will group the existing theoretical approaches, much along the lines of what has already 
been attempted by Borras and Jacobsson (2004), Trubek and Trubek (2005) and Biichs (2005,
2008), with a view to assessing their explanatory power as well as their pitfalls. They will discuss, 
in turn, the notions of incentives and sanctions, policy learning and discourse. The merits and 
shortcomings of each approach will be summed up in the conclusion.
4.1. Incentives and sanctions
The presence or absence of incentives or coercive mechanisms of sorts is generally regarded by 
scholars concerned with issues of international co-operation as a key factor to ensure the 
compliance of sovereign states with internationally agreed rules (Borras and Jacobsson 2004). The 
basic idea is that states are rational, benefit-maximising actors who will only comply with rules if 
there are considerable gains to be reaped or if the costs of free riding are high. Thus, for instance, 
national decision-makers will put in place programmes in line with the EGs in order to receive the 
EU funds that are attached to them. Alternatively, member state governments will try to avoid being 
‘named’ and ‘shamed’ by the EU, other member states or opposition parties for not meeting the 
EES targets in order to avoid incurring reputational costs, which could be damaging in electoral 
terms or diminish the trust of economic investors.
It is worth noting that the EES is, in fact, complemented by some EU financial resources and 
is also, in theory, able to impose sanctions of a certain kind for non-compliance. € 195 billion 
coming from the Community structural funds represented the financial instrument available over the 
2000-2006 period to support the attainment of the employment objectives, of which € 70 billion 
were devoted to human resource development through the European Social Fund (ESF) (Goetschy 
2001). OMC processes, moreover, have their own method of sanctioning, which is comparatively 
strong in the EES. The Strategy does provide its own kind of ‘soft’ sanctions in the form of single­
country recommendations and multilateral surveillance based on benchmarking according to agreed 
indicators and quantified targets. Peer review is strongly institutionalised in the EES through 
procedures that closely resemble those already in use in the OECD (Marcussen 2004). The NAPs, 
whose aim is to report on the implementation of the guidelines as well as on future policy 
developments, are submitted to the Commission for cross-national comparison and evaluation. 
Member state representatives review each other’s performance within the EMCO and are 
encouraged to make particular programmes available for examination under a special peer review
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process organised through the Commission, the so-called ‘Cambridge process’, which consists of 
national experts’ travelling to a host country to study the operation and performance of specific 
programmes (Casey 2004; Casey and Gold 2005). The results of cross-national comparisons are 
published in the Joint Employment Report (JER) approved annually by the Commission and the 
Council, which includes benchmarking of countries and the identification of best practices.
Nevertheless, the incentives provided were arguably too small and the threatened sanctions 
too soft to have significant effects. Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999 incorporated the EES objectives 
under ‘Objective 3’ funding (i.e. human resource development) and created a system of ex ante, 
mid-term and ex post programme evaluations combined with performance rewards and punishments 
in the form of the so-called ‘performance reserve allocations’. However, even though member states 
were encouraged to use structural fund, and especially ESF, finance to support some of the 
initiatives included in their NAPs, the ESF budget was always determined and distributed 
independently of the strategy (Govecor 2004). In addition, the performance reserve allocations 
introduced in 1999 amounted to as little as 4% of the overall funding allocated to each member 
state, which was way too little to influence state behaviour in a significant way (Franzese and Hays 
2006).
By contrast, there is some evidence that peer pressure and associated practices have an 
influence on the behaviour of national governments. The available qualitative studies on this issue 
(Jacobsson and Vifell 2003; Zeitlin 2005b) have concluded that national representatives in EU 
committee and Council meetings do feel the pressure to reach common targets and carry out 
mutually agreed commitments, or at least to be seen to be doing so by the other participants. Also, 
member state governments want to avoid EU recommendations or reprimands as a potential source 
of embarrassment in domestic politics. However, the effectiveness of such a ‘soft’ system of 
sanctioning relies fundamentally on the ability of the relevant EU-level processes to impose 
reputational costs on bad performers and laggards, which, in turn, depends on two further 
conditions. First, all member states must take the coordination procedure seriously, otherwise those 
who decide to comply might experience a competitive disadvantage (Biichs 2008). Yet Franzese 
and Hays (2006) have demonstrated that the adoption of active labour market policies of the kind 
recommended by the Strategy entails significant positive externalities and, therefore, provide 
considerable incentives for member states to free-ride on their neighbours’ willingness to reform. 
Second, the public opinion must be aware of the Strategy and concerned about the results of the 
evaluations and peer reviews carried out in its context. However, it is worth noting that the diffusion 
of information about the strategy nationally has so far been extremely limited. Although the EES 
received a good deal of attention in the first few years of its operation, it has gradually disappeared
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from the main media and is essentially lost on all but those who are directly or indirectly involved 
(Meyer 2005). The conclusion to be drawn from the above, thus, is that the incentives and sanctions 
provided by the Strategy are too ‘soft’ significantly to affect member states’ behaviour. Some other 
mechanism must, therefore, be found to explain its impact on national employment policies.
4.2. Policy learning, transfer and mimicking
In contrast to models that stress the role of coercion in spurring policy change, the literature on 
policy learning assumes that policy-makers’ perceptions -  and, eventually, also policies -  change 
voluntarily as they rationally evaluate past experience and new information. The concept of policy- 
oriented learning offers an alternative view of the policy process to that of purely rationalist 
accounts, which emphasise the role of power and resources and utility-maximising behaviour based 
on pre-determined interests, and assumes that policy-makers are in constant search of new and 
better ways of conceptualising and solving problems. In Heclo’s words, 'politics finds its sources 
not only in power, but also in uncertainty -  men collectively wondering what to do [...]. 
Governments not only “power” [...], they also “puzzle”. Policy-making is a form of collective 
puzzlement on society’s behalf. [...] Much political interaction has constituted a process of social 
learning expressed through policy’ (Heclo 1974: pp.305-306). Learning theories, by placing 
constraints on the informational capacities and motivations of actors, belong to the class of theories 
of bounded rationality: they theorise explicitly that the capacity of individuals and organisations to 
process and evaluate information is limited, and that choice behaviour is driven by routines that 
have developed on the basis of selection and adaptation rather than rational calculation (Hemerjick 
and Visser 2003).
Policy learning is defined as a ‘relatively enduring’ change ‘in thought or behavioural 
intention ’ resulting from experience and/or new information concerned with the attainment or 
revision of policy objectives’ (Heclo 1974: p.306). It should bring about ‘a deliberate attempt to 
adjust the goals or techniques of policy’ and ‘is indicated when policy changes as the result of such 
a process’ (Hall 1993: p.278). In order to count as instances of learning, thus, the observed 
ideational and/or behavioural changes should be ‘relatively enduring’ and policy change should be 
taken as the ultimate proof that a process of learning has occurred. Learning can involve both the 
overarching goals that guide policy in a particular field and the techniques or policy instruments 
used to attain them, down to the precise settings of these instruments (Hall 1993). Policy-makers 
look for new policy ideas and solutions both at home and abroad. The proponents of social
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learning (Heclo 1974; Hall 1993) look at eminently domestic processes. Learning, in their view, is 
mainly inward and backward-looking: policy-makers draw lessons from past failures and apply 
these lessons together with new knowledge when dealing with the future. By contrast, the literature 
on policy transfer and mimicking (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000; Evans and Davies 1999; 
Radaelli 2000; Bomberg and Peterson 2000) suggests that policy-makers examine best practices and 
learn successful lessons from the experience of others. This can be a very efficient learning 
mechanism, especially when uncertainty is accompanied by ambiguous goals and unclear 
technology. Students of organisational sociology have shown that mimicking -  or mimetism, or 
mimicry -  stems from the need to cope with uncertainty by imitating organisations perceived to be 
more legitimate or successful, thus minimising the chance of negative sanctions from various 
stakeholders (Di Maggio and Powell 1991).
Both the EES and the OECD’s Job Study are clearly international procedures set up with a 
view to encouraging the latter kind of learning in the area of employment policy. Both share, 
indeed, several features that could promote policy learning. As highlighted by students of 
governance (Mosher 2000; Trubek and Mosher 2003), these include: (1) mechanisms that bring 
together people with diverse viewpoints and forces them to share information, experience and good 
practices in settings that require sustained deliberation on problem-solving, with the aim to 
destabilise existing understandings; (2) an approach to policy that brings down boundaries between 
policy domains that are traditionally kept separate, requires the involvement of non governmental 
actors and of different levels of government and encourages decentralised experimentation; (3) a 
cyclical, iterative process that obliges (European and national, governmental and non-governmental, 
central and local) actors collectively to redefine objectives and policies. The OECD, however, 
follows a very centralised approach, while the EES explicitly relies on cooperation from the 
member states in the provision of data (through the NAPs) and the organisation of peer review, and 
is therefore more contextualised by domestic concerns and also more binding (Visser 2002). 
Moreover, the EES is a much more politically salient process, characterised by higher visibility and 
a much higher level of participation, involving EU institutions, national governments and various 
other European, national and sub-national actors. For all these reasons, the EES is much more likely 
to be effective than its OECD counterpart.
Empirical work on the EES’ domestic impact does, in fact, show some evidence that it has 
contributed to specific policy changes in individual member states. The Strategy, for example, 
seems to have played a prominent role in the adoption in France of programmes promoting a
31 The term ‘social learning’ is here used to mean a different kind of phenomenon from that referred to by constructivist 
scholars, which is essentially the result of socialisation and deliberation (see, for instance, Checkel 2001).
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preventative and individualised approach to fighting unemployment and was explicitly referred to 
by the Schroder government in Germany as the inspiration and justification for initiatives such as 
the ‘Immediate Programme for the Reduction of Youth Unemployment’ (JUMP), the amendment of 
the Work Promotion Act to incorporate a more preventative and targeted approach and the ‘Hartz 
Laws’ on the reform of labour market regulation and unemployment insurance (Zeitlin 2005b). 
Significant instances of EES influence have also been shown in the area of equal opportunities 
(Rubery 2002, 2005), especially in terms of improved access for women to active labour market and 
lifelong learning schemes, measures to reduce gender segregation and the gender pay gap and the 
adoption of childcare provision targets at both the EU and at the national level. Possibly the most 
easily traceable impact of the EES, though, is its contribution to shifts in governance and policy­
making arrangements (Govecor 2004; Ferrera and Sacchi 2005; Jacobsson and Vifell 2005). 
Member states have generally shown a high degree of compliance with the coordination procedures 
and have been dedicated to fulfilling the monitoring requirements, such as producing the NAPs, 
delivering them on time and so forth. Inter-ministerial coordination has improved in nearly all 
countries. The procedures and requirements attached to the EES seem to have facilitated links 
between policy areas and the erosion of boundaries between policy domains and different 
stakeholders. The Strategy has reportedly spread the use of policy evaluation and impact- 
assessment practices in countries where these did not exist, it has introduced a more long-term 
perspective in employment policy-making and added a common European framework and an 
element of structure with the annual processes of planning and review.
Nevertheless, identifying the precise causal impact of the EES on national policies raises 
difficult problems of interpretation and requires very careful tracing of the process behind relevant 
policy choices. Member governments might try to make selective reference to the Strategy or even 
have their policy preferences included in the guidelines in order to support their own domestic 
agendas (Visser 2005; Biichs 2008). The Strategy, in addition, has not entirely kept the promises 
made by the governance literature in terms of providing a framework conducive to policy learning. 
As said above, the EES has actually developed as a largely inter-governmental process, often 
completely insulated from the day-to-day functioning of domestic employment policy-making 
(Jacobsson and Shmid 2002; Radaelli 2003b; Govecor 2004; De La Porte and Nanz 2004). The 
NAPs are not conceived of as guiding documents, or indeed ‘action plans’, but merely as 
government reports on domestic policy for an international audience. In contrast to what the EGs 
recommend, national parliaments, regional and local governments and civil society actors have not 
been systematically integrated in the NAP drafting process. Even the participation of the social
32 See Chapters 3 and 4.
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partners has proved to be uneven, depending on the presence or absence of previous corporatist 
traditions at the national level. As a result of all this and of the limited diffusion of information 
about the Strategy at the national level, the EES has gradually emerged as a rather ‘top-down’, 
technocratic procedure, mainly targeted at governmental actors and, to some extent, the social 
partners. This relatively low level of participation of non-governmental and sub-national actors, in 
turn, has seriously hampered bottom-up learning, which was one of the Strategy’s main promises 
(Zeitlin 2005b).
Lastly, and more fundamentally, learning theories seem to disregard the importance of 
institutional constraints and the role of political agency. National employment policy regimes are 
embedded in a thick network of social, political and economic institutions, which makes them 
difficult to change and tends to hinder voluntary and ‘rational’ learning (Rhodes 2005). Moreover, 
as argued in Chapter 1, the choice of which problems to concentrate on and where to search for 
effective solutions requires political advocacy and support. The last sub-section focuses on 
ideational factors and the role of discourse.
4.3. Discourse, learning and socialisation
As discussed in Chapter 1, discourse-based approaches emphasise the role of ideas, language and 
communication in the construction of the social world, actors’ identities and behaviour. This 
perspective resonates with those who are persuaded that the main impact of the EES is to be found 
at 'the level of ideas’ (Bertozzi and Bonoli 2002: p. 12) and is consistent with a sociological 
institutionalist approach focusing on the cognitive effects of the strategy. In this view, the EES -  
and the OMC at large -  is best understood as involving a ‘discursive practice \  which ‘suggests a 
particular perspective and a cognitive structure for understanding and describing the labour 
market’ (Jacobsson and Schmid 2002: p.88). Jacobsson (2004) made the argument more explicit 
by pointing to the EES as a ‘discursive regulatory mechanism’ relying on a number of specific 
tools: joint language use (key concepts and discourse); the working out of common classifications 
and operationalisations (indicators); the building of a common knowledge base (including 
collection and standardisation of statistics); the strategic use of comparisons and evaluations; the 
systematic editing and diffusion of knowledge and evaluation of results; all of the above combined 
with social pressure (peer review) and time pressure.
In order to explain how the Strategy impacts on domestic arrangements, the proponents of 
this approach combine a focus on discourse with theories of social interaction and socialisation. In 
a few words, the governmental and non-governmental actors meeting regularly within the
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institutional settings provided by the Strategy are expected to be gradually ‘socialised’ into or 
‘learn’ to adopt the discourse promoted and diffused by the EES through mechanisms similar to 
those sketched out by Jacobsson. The concept of learning used here is very different from the 
rational, voluntary learning outlined in the previous sub-section (see, for instance, Checkel 2001, 
2003). The discourse or language-based notion of learning assumes that actors are much less 
rational and more passive in the face of their environment. Learning of this kind occurs when the 
‘relevant actors accept or become convinced that new concepts or combinations of concepts are 
more suitable as descriptions of a given social reality’ (Nedergaard 2005: p.3), as is the case, for 
instance, when policy-makers in the field of employment come to accept ‘early activation’ as a key 
tool to avoid long-term unemployment or that increasing labour supply will help remedy -  and not 
exacerbate -  the problem of unemployment.
This definition of policy learning captures the fact that discourses are always fluid and 
somewhat precarious and that there is always more than one possible discourse or paradigm in 
every policy sector. The process through which one particular discourse becomes hegemonic and 
assumes a taken-for-granted quality is the ultimate assertion of power33. In Jacobsson’s words 
(2004: p.366), ‘the most effective form of political control is to make one's conception of the world 
hegemonic, to set the political agenda in such a way that ideology becomes conceived of as natural 
or normal \  In this view, the EES is essentially an attempt to diffuse a specific, supply-side 
interpretation of the problems of European labour markets and of their appropriate solutions and 
introduce a different rationality to policy-making, based on the re-definition of policy choices in 
the light of specific challenges rather than in terms of re-distributing resources among societal 
groups (Laffan and Shaw 2005). In so doing, the ultimate aim is to impose the Strategy’s discourse ; 
as hegemonic, thus ‘de-politicising’ employment policy-making and reducing the cost of and 
opposition to domestic reforms.
In sum, discourse-based accounts are of great help in understanding the discursive nature of 
the Strategy and its use as an instrument of power. The diffusion of the Strategy’s discourse across 
the member states is, indeed, one of the most widely attested claims of existing empirical research. 
The most widely cited examples of the incorporation of EU concepts and categories into domestic 
debates concern the shift of emphasis from reducing unemployment to raising employment rates, 
from passive income support to activation of the unemployed and from a curative to a preventative 
approach to fighting unemployment (Zeitlin 2005b). For all its merits, however, this approach, 
much like the previous one, does not take into account the reality of national policy-making and
33 See Chapter 1.
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underestimates the fact that policy change is constrained by the institutional settings in which it 
takes place and that domestic politics and the strategies of political actors play a role.
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Conclusion
The three broad theoretical approaches to the EES’ domestic effects outlined in the last section of 
this chapter provide some useful insights into the Strategy’s nature and operation. They stress the 
fact that the incentives and sanctions attached to it are too weak to force member governments into 
complying with the guidelines and recommendations The analysis of the evidence provided by the 
existing empirical studies shows that, despite the promises of participation and mutual learning 
made by the governance literature, the Strategy has proved to be an essentially closed, inter­
governmental process. Finally, they highlight the EES’ essentially discursive nature and its 
potential as an instrument of power. Nevertheless, it is concluded, none of them pays enough 
attention to the realities of domestic policy-making, that is, to the identity and activities of different 
domestic actors and groups who support or oppose the Strategy’s recommendations and guidelines 
and to the role of domestic institutional settings in facilitating or hampering norm diffusion and, 
eventually, policy change.
The country studies presented in the next part of the thesis seek to fill this gap in the 
literature and test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 1 by tracing the process behind some key 
domestic policy decisions made after the inception of the EES. The present chapter has mapped 
out the functional and political origins of the Strategy in order to provide the necessary empirical 
and theoretical basis for the following.
Two key contentions have been advanced here. First, although it was conceived and 
presented as a new way for the Union to intervene in areas of EU-wide concern based on 
deliberation, participation and learning, the EES process is best depicted as an almost exclusive 
interaction between the Commission and member state representatives, with the EMCO as the 
main setting in which actual decisions concerning guidelines, recommendations and reports are 
made. Second, the Strategy is to be interpreted essentially as an attempt, supported by the 
Commission and pro-integration elites, to re-define the problems of European labour markets and 
impose specific solutions in domestic debates. The guidelines (as well as the single-country 
recommendations that are based on them) have shown considerable stability over the years and 
provided a comprehensive employment policy model. The result is a ‘residual’, supply-side labour 
market strategy that seeks to find a compromise between different employment policy models 
while respecting the macro-economic policy constraints imposed by EMU.
The non-inclusive, government-led character of EES policy-making, the scope for 
interpretation left by the vagueness of some key principles and the absence of clear sanctions and 
incentives encouraging implementation all suggest that adaptation of the Employment Strategy at
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I the national level will essentially depend on the initiative of domestic actors in and around 
government. These are, in turn, likely to be faced by institutional constraints and other actors’ 
resistance. The two case studies presented in the next chapters will show the efforts made by 
domestic actor coalitions to diffuse and promote the EES’ norms and discourse, their identity and 
motivations as well as the degree and type of resistance they met.
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Part II
C a s e  S t u d ie s
CHAPTER III
E m ploym ent  P olicies and  P olicy-M aking  in  P o st-W ar  France: The 
Predom inance  of  the  State and the  E xclusion  of L abour
After the Second World War, French governments pursued a highly dirigiste strategy of state-led 
growth, which was predicated upon the exclusion of organised labour from policy-making. In a 
period of sustained growth and low unemployment, the role of public authorities was confined to 
promoting workers’ mobility and providing orientation and training. Only when the economic 
turmoil of the 1970s hit home, then, did the state begin to intervene more directly in the labour 
market. This chapter seeks to trace the evolution of employment policies and policy-making in 
France. In so doing, it serves a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, the attention paid to outlining 
the features of the French employment policy model as well as to the evolution of public debates 
concerning employment-related issues is meant to sketch out the background against which the 
launch of the EES was set in the late 1990s. Only the careful tracing of existing policies and 
discourses can, indeed, single out instances of change in the Strategy’s direction. On the other hand, 
the following sections identify the main actors of French employment politics and outline their 
strategies, their resources and the institutional framework in which they took action. As indicated by 
the second and fifth hypotheses put forth in Chapter 1, the specificities of national systems of 
policy-making are likely to be crucial determinants of the composition and effectiveness of the 
national coalitions advocating the EES discourse.
Section 1 goes back to the Trente Glorieuses, the thirty glorious years of post-war economic 
expansion, and re-traces the growth strategies of the time, based on central planning and voluntarist 
industrial policies, as well as their consequences on labour market regulation. The first politiques 
publiques de Vemploi were put in place in the wake of the economic slowdown of the mid-1970s, 
with a view to shedding excess labour, protecting workers in core sectors from unemployment and 
loss of income, and subsidising the jobs of particular groups. As slow growth and rising 
unemployment continued into the 1980s and the use of public spending as a recipe was discredited 
once and for all by the Socialist experiment of 1981-82, flexibility, competitiveness and industrial 
dynamism became the imperatives of public policy. The debate concentrated on reducing labour 
market rigidities and compensating the losers from industrial restructuring. Thus some important 
regulatory changes were introduced on decentralised bargaining, hiring and firing rules and the use 
of temporary labour contracts. At the same time, the network of benefits and active policies for the 
unemployed was completed and extended.
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Section 2 focuses on the actors involved in policy-making. The French state enjoys a very 
high level of legitimacy and is remarkably insulated from the demands of social groups. Over the 
post-war years and in the passage between the Fourth and the Fifth Republic, a considerably 
strengthened executive was endowed with a number of important instruments relevant to policy, 
such as a highly professionalized bureaucracy, access to information and expertise and control over 
the destination of funds and capital flows. On the contrary, both the trade unions and the employers’ 
association were weakly organised, divided and often too radical to serve as credible interlocutors. 
As a result, policy initiatives tended to come from within the state machine -  the executive, the high 
civil service, the parties in power -  and were very rarely negotiated with anyone other than a few 
selected industrial managers.
Sections 3 and 4, finally, concentrate on the policies and debates of the 1990s and 2000s.
The 1990s were a period of high political instability and growing unemployment. The repeated 
attempts to reform employment and social policies that were required, inter alia, by the 
consequences of the Single Market programme and by EMU were met with considerable 
opposition. As a result, the social partners, despite their continuing weakness, were increasingly 
involved in policy-making. Unions and employers were consulted regarding the design and 
implementation of policy to an extent that was unprecedented in France and, following an initiative 
of the main employers’ association (the MEDEF), even started a series of inter-professional 
negotiations in order to regulate independently matters (unemployment insurance, complementary 
pensions, vocational training) that were deemed to be within their domain. In this context, some 
new themes now entered French employment policy debates. The activation of the unemployed, 
active ageing, lifelong learning, the reform of tax and benefit systems were somewhat alien to the 
French tradition and were, instead, very much in line with the discourse on employment policy that 
developed at the European level through the EES. These new objectives and catchwords were 
adopted by a wide range of actors (the government, the high civil service, the social partners) and 
formed the basis of a new consensus that produced major policy changes in recent years.
1. French employment policies from the Trente Glorieuses to the politiques publiques de 
Vemploi
In the aftermath of World War II France embarked on a voluntarist strategy of state-led growth 
predicated on the expansion of the nationalised sector, a highly interventionist industrial policy 
toward the private sector and the development of a sophisticated system of national economic 
planning. To this end, several private banks and insurance firms, the gas, electricity and coal
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j industries and the national airline carrier, Air France, were swiftly nationalised. A planning 
! commission, the Commissariat General du Plan, was established in 1946 under the presidency of 
Jean Monnet with the task of drawing up multi-annual plans identifying the industrial sectors on 
which economic growth was most likely to depend. The industrial policy outlined in the plans was 
implemented through the selective allocation of public investment and the control the state 
exercised over the flow of capital in the economy via the nationalised banks and the Banque de 
France (Hall 1986).
The pursuit of the state’s growth strategy was blessed by thirty years of unprecedented 
economic expansion, known in French debates as the Trente Glorieuses. During this period, French 
governments did not produce much by way of public policies to promote employment or fight the 
consequences of unemployment. The first few economic plans were mainly concerned with 
preventing labour shortages in key sectors of the economy and, to this end, envisaged the tasks of 
public authorities essentially in terms of promoting workers’ mobility and providing orientation and 
training to young and adult workers alike34. Some of the cornerstones of French employment 
policies were, nonetheless, created in these years (DARES 1996). A national unemployment 
insurance scheme and the funds in charge of managing it (UNEDIC, ASSEDIC) were set up by an 
inter-industry agreement signed under government pressure by the trade unions and the employers 
in December 1958. The Fonds National de VEmploi (FNE), which was to become the essential 
budgetary tool for public interventions on the labour market, was established in 1963 to support 
workers’ mobility, training and re-training. A new public employment agency (the Agence 
Nationale de VEmploi, ANPE), created in 1967, replaced the old services de la main-d'oeuvre, 
which were widely criticised for being ineffective. The agency was to provide certification of 
employment and unemployment and was put in charge of such tasks as job placement, orientation 
and counselling.
This lack of explicit policies for employment was due to the sustained growth and low 
unemployment rates of the time. Yet it must also be understood in relation to France’s post-war
growth model and to the weakness of its interest organisations that allowed the government largely
«  _
to ignore organised labour and leave the regulation of industrial relations to the market . The 
weakness of France’s labour movement, in fact, permitted the government to keep a very activist 
stance toward the labour market and relegated the system of industrial relations in a state of 
instability and weak institutionalisation (Flanagan et al. 1983; Howell 1992). From the perspective
34 See Plans I to VI (Commissariat General du Plan 1947,1954,1958,1962,1966,1971). The first three plans (1947- 
1961) were almost entirely focused on the necessities of post-war reconstruction, whereas the following three (1962- 
1975) concentrated on industrial competitiveness and development.
35 See below.
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of the state technocrats, social spending was no more than a cost to be contained in order not to 
deter funds from productive investment on critical industrial sectors (Levy 2000). In line with their 
dirigiste approach to industrial policy, French governments intervened both directly as an employer 
in the nationalised sector and indirectly in the private sector through the setting of the minimum 
wage (SMIC, Salaire Minimum de Croissance), the use of price controls and the generalisation of 
wage hikes through the so-called ‘extension’ procedure, which allowed the Minister of Labour to 
widen the applicability of collective agreements to entire sectors and regions where the social 
partners were too weak to negotiate themselves.
The momentous economic growth of the immediate post-war years, though, came to a halt 
as steep increases in commodity and oil prices in 1973-74 followed by a worldwide recession in 
1975 plunged the balance of payments into deficit. The change in the terms of trade, in turn, implied 
reduced unit profitability and international competitiveness and, as a result, unemployment started 
to rise steadily. The initial response to the economic crisis under Prime Minister Jacques Chirac 
(1974-76) was to increase the protection of workers from the loss of purchasing power as well as 
from outright unemployment. The activist use of the SMIC and of the extension procedure greatly 
increased, and the dense network of unemployment compensation schemes and regulations limiting 
layoffs that protected the core segments of the workforce was further extended and completed 
(Howell 1992; DARES 1996). Real wages were allowed to grow by maintaining wage indexation in 
the public and nationalised sectors and repeatedly raising the minimum wage. In January 1975 the 
government enacted a new legislation on dismissals that mandated that the ‘economic rationale’ of 
lay-offs of ten or more workers was to be checked and approved by the inspection du travail of the 
Ministry of Labour. The aim was to use administrative controls to avoid big increases in dismissals, 
even though in practice less than 7% of the requested authorisations were refused (DARES 1996).
In the same year, the government forced the employers’ association (the Confederation Nationale 
du Patronat Frangais, CNPF) to sign with the unions a new convention on unemployment 
insurance setting up a special compensation scheme (the allocation supplementaire d ’attente) that 
brought benefits up to as much as 90% of previous earnings. Profit margins were sustained by 
allowing firms to decrease work-time, but, in order to cushion the effects on workers’ income, it 
was decided that the government and the employers would each pay a certain amount for each 
working hour short of the legal work week of 40 hours (Flanagan et al. 1983).
After 1976, however, it became clear that the crisis was deeper than expected and that large- 
scale industrial restructuring would be necessary. The emphasis was now put on the restoration of 
competitiveness and profitability. Full employment started to be seen less as a goal on its own merit 
and more as an effect of ‘virtuous’ economic policies (DARES 1996). In order to ensure that wages
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would rise strictly in line with inflation, the new Prime Minister Raymond Barre launched a 
politique des revenus (incomes policy) based on the use of price controls and the threat of sanctions 
for firms that did not comply, such as the denial of government contracts and tax breaks. In a 
second phase, after the 1978 parliamentary election, prices were almost completely de-controlled 
and it was decided that state aid to private firms would be given more selectively and that 
redundancies for ‘economic reasons’ would be made easier (Flanagan et al. 1983).
At the same time, the state’s intervention on the labour market took a new course. The goals 
became to get people out of the labour market to limit the growth of unemployment, reduce 
unemployment compensation to limit expenses, facilitate the insertion of specific groups. Thus 
bonuses to persuade immigrants to leave the country, increased family allowances to keep women 
out of the labour force and schemes to compensate older workers who took early retirement all 
aimed to reduce labour force participation. Under pressure from the government, the special 90% 
unemployment scheme was abolished in 1979. Furthermore, an entirely new set of programmes, 
starting with schemes for the disabled in 1975, were created under the banner of politiques 
d ’insertion with a view to facilitating the entry of specific groups into the labour market. Between 
1977 and 1981, the government and the employers negotiated a series of three “youth employment 
pacts”, which stipulated that firms would be absolved of a part of the social security costs of 
employing young workers in return for providing job training (DARES 1996). The politiques 
d ’insertion were the first set of explicit employment policies of their kind, known in national 
debates as politiques publiques de Vemploi, to be launched in France. Their rationale was akin to 
Scandinavian-type ‘activation’, with the state supporting jobs to keep people in employment, 
though with a distinct Republican solidaristic flavour (Barbier and Fargion 2004; Barbier 2005, 
2006).
In 1981, as the economic crisis wore on, the Left was voted into power for the first time 
since the inception of the Fifth Republic with an expansionary fiscal agenda and a mandate to 
revive growth. Gambling on a US-led global recovery beginning in 1982, the new socialist 
President Franfois Mitterrand and his first Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy embarked on an extensive 
reflationary programme designed to boost demand through large-scale nationalisations, a return to 
activist industrial policies and more generous social transfers. Thus, by February 1982, thirteen of 
France’s twenty largest firms and virtually the entire banking sector were placed in public hands. 
Public enterprises received over 60 bF in subsidies between 1982 and 1986 (Levy 2000).The 
minimum wage was increased by 15% and social transfers (pensions, family allowances, housing 
allocations and health insurance benefits) by 12% (Hall 1986).
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These policies proved to be somewhat effective in cutting the rate of growth of 
unemployment and improving the position of the poor, the aged and the low-paid. Nevertheless,
; instead of recovery, the year 1982 brought the worst recession since the war and reflation, at a time 
when France’s trading partners were engaging in fiscal restraint to combat inflation, caused a surge 
in the budget and trade deficits -  the former rose from 0.4% of GDP in 1981 to 3% in 1982 and the 
latter from 56 to 93 bF -, thus bringing pressure on the franc (Hall 1986). At this point the socialists 
chose to change the course of their economic policy radically. A series of severe austerity plans was 
implemented in 1982 and 1983 to eradicate inflation, limit the public sector deficit and improve the 
deteriorating financial situation of firms. All wages, except the SMIC, and most prices were frozen 
until the end of October 1982. Employers’ social security contributions were blocked for a year and 
company tax was reduced by 10%. In 1983 taxes were raised by 40 bF and spending was cut by 24 
bF. At the same time, the government discourse underwent a drastic change. The socialist party 
(Parti Socialiste, PS) had swept into power adopting a post-war Marxian discourse that proposed to 
solve the economic crisis through ‘socialism in one nation’, a ‘break with capitalism’ and the end to 
the class bias in French society. After 1982-83, though, the government switched to justifying 
austerity by reference to economic necessity, the need to remain within the EMS and to re-launch 
growth and fight unemployment in the face of the external constraints imposed by globalisation. 
Flexibility and competitiveness became the new imperatives, with ‘competitive disinflation’, 
industrial dynamism and the disengagement of the state as the new catchwords (Schmidt 2001, 
2002).
In the field of employment policies proper, the policy response to the changed environment 
was mixed. On the one hand, great emphasis was put on ‘socialising’ the costs of unemployment 
{traitement social du chomage), which essentially meant using public expenditure to compensate 
the losers from industrial restructuring and rising joblessness. Thus new sets of active policies -  
training programmes, public internships and subsidies for hard-to-place youths and the long-term 
unemployed -  were launched in order to address the difficulties of specific groups. With a view to 
helping firms to shed excess labour while keeping social peace, the retirement age was lowered to 
60 and massive recourse was made to early retirement schemes financed by the FNE. As many as 
706,000 workers were allowed to retire early in 1983 alone as against 190,000 in 1980 (DARES 
1996). Unemployment benefits remained generous, although conditions of access were tightened 
and the contributions of employers and employees raised. The system of benefits, social minima 
and family allowances was reinforced and expanded, thus turning France into a big spender by 
international standards (Cameron 1991). The greatest innovation in this sector was the creation in 
1988 of a non-contributory universal minimum income scheme, the Revenu Minimum d ’Insertion
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(RMI), designed to guarantee a minimum level of resources to those aged 25 or over with very low 
I or no income . The RMI was also meant to have an important ‘activation’ dimension, as 
beneficiaries were asked to take part in a re-insertion programme consisting of job-seeking, 
internships, vocational training, or various other kinds of activities designed to enhance their social 
autonomy. This dimension of the RMI, however, proved difficult to implement: three years after its 
inception only 40% of recipients had signed a contract detailing the re-insertion actions to be taken 
(<contrat d ’insertion or projet d ’insertion), and the content of the contracts that were signed was 
often reduced to mere formalities. Regardless of this, seven other social minima were launched in 
recent years, so that the overall coverage of these programmes became so wide that it has been 
calculated that about 10% of the entire French population currently benefits from one or the other 
(Palier 2002, 2006).
On the other hand, employment policy debates throughout the 1980s focused also on the 
need to reduce labour market rigidities and cut labour costs. Around the same time as a similar shift 
in thinking was taking place in the OECD and the EU, successive papers and reports in France 
argued for the return to a neo-classical view of labour market equilibrium as an explanation for 
unemployment, focusing on the sets of incentives and constraints facing individual demand and 
supply behaviour (Palier 2000, 2002, 2006; Serre and Palier 2004; Ehrel and Zajdela 2004). As a 
result of the growing concern with flexibility, thus, French policy-makers intervened to relax labour 
regulation. The administrative authorisation on layoffs for ‘economic reasons’ was repealed in 1986 
by the neo-gaullist right, which after the 1981 election loss had adopted a neo-liberal thatcherite 
discourse (Schmidt 2001). An ordonnance of the same year made the recourse to short-term and 
part-time contracts easier for employers, and a law passed in June 1987 introduced incentives to 
enhance flexibility in the management of working time in order to allow firms to adjust more 
promptly to changes in demand (DARES 1996). These innovations marked a significant break in 
the way firms resorted to lay-offs and temporary arrangements to solve their labour adjustment 
needs. The French labour market, however, remained one of the most tightly regulated in Europe. 
The administrative authorisation was never re-instated, but successive legislation partly restricted 
the use of atypical contracts and introduced the requirement for firms to draw up a ‘social plan’ for 
the employees made redundant (Malo et al. 2000).
The cost of labour and the weight of social contributions became a major concern in French 
debates around the late 1980s-early 1990s. The employers’ organisation, many well-known
36 This aim was partially to offset the comparatively high level of income inequality in France. This is largely due to the 
structure o f the taxation system that raises more revenue from social charges on employers and employees and less from 
income taxes than most developed nations and, as a consequence, has very little redistributive effects (Cameron 1991; 
Hall 2006).
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economists as well as virtually every report on the financing of the French social protection system 
underlined the role of the charges sociales in preventing labour creation and the need to lower them 
in order to cut labour costs (Levy 2000; Palier 2000, 2002, 2006). Hence, starting from the late 
1980s, governments of different political colour adopted increasingly wide-ranging contribution 
cuts and exemptions in favour of employers in order to encourage hirings. These measures were 
generally targeted either on some specific groups of workers (the low-paid, the young, the long­
term unemployed) or on small firms, which were thought to be the most affected by the high cost of 
labour. Moreover, in order to generalise the move toward lowering labour costs, successive 
governments have sought to replace contributions with taxation in the financing of non-contributory 
benefits. Thus in 1990 the cabinet led by the socialist Michel Rocard created a new tax, the 
Contribution Sociale Generalisee (CSG), raised on all types of personal income (wages, capital 
revenues and welfare benefits). The CSG was originally levied on 1.1% of income, but it was 
subsequently increased on a number of occasions and currently (at a rate of 7.5%) finances over 
20% of overall social spending and 35% of health care spending (Palier 2006).
2. The actors in French employment policy-making
As hypothesised in Chapter 1, the ease with which new discourses coming from a different level of 
governance might get diffused and adopted is likely to depend on key features of national systems 
of policy-making, notably the degree to which decision-making authority is concentrated in the 
executive and the range of actors and institutions involved in policy formulation, adoption and 
implementation. In this respect, the unusual feature of the public policy process in post-war France 
is its substantial unclassifiability in the comparative literature. The French state was too activist and 
dirigiste, as well as too professionalized and insulated, to compare to either northern or southern 
European experiences (Levy 2000). State/society relations in France resemble very closely the 
ideal-types of Jacobinism and etatisme (Hall 1986), whereby the state -  characteristically a very 
cohesive, centralised unit -  stands somewhat above society and has a recognised ability to speak for 
the public interest. The state has few points of contact with societal institutions and groups and a 
remarkable control over policy-related levers, including access to relevant information and 
expertise, control over capital flows, influence over private income and investment and effective 
recourse to sanctioning mechanisms when necessary.
This ‘state above society’ pattern is characteristic in some measure of many of the regimes 
that ruled France over the last two centuries (Dyson 1980). Yet it is particularly akin to the Fifth 
Republic, with its strong executive, large political parties and highly professionalized bureaucracy.
78
State control over key policy-related resources built on some important institutional innovations that 
were introduced in the post-war period in order to reinforce the state machine’s ability to steer the 
economy. The production and analysis of information relevant to policy, in particular, were 
consistently used as a crucial lever to shape policy debates and narrow the range of options being 
considered. Specialised public agencies like the INSEE were created with the aim to centralise the 
collection and analysis of economic data and, over the years, financed much of the economics 
research that was undertaken in France37. Economic planning itself was a deliberate attempt to 
influence the terms of national policy debates by selecting the options available to policy-makers 
(Hall 1986).
It is worth noting that, although economic planning ended in the 1990s, the government has 
consistently sought to improve its access to policy-related information and analysis in a broad range 
of sectors. A growing number of bodies attached to the Prime Minister’s office have thus been 
created in recent years with functions of policy research, analysis and proposal in specific fields. 
Hence the Conseil d'analyse economique (CAE) was created in 1997 by Prime Minister Lionel
Jospin with the task to ‘clarify, by comparing analyses and points o f view, the government's choices
38on economic matters' . A Conseil d'orientation des retraites (COR) and a Conseil d'orientation de 
Vemploi (COE) were set up, respectively, in 2000 and 2005 to perform similar tasks in the fields of 
pensions and labour policies. Finally, the Commissariat General du Plan was replaced in 2006 by a 
new agency called Conseil d'analyse strategique (CAS), charged with the steering and monitoring 
of the process of economic and social policy reform having to do with the Lisbon strategy39. These 
bodies perform similar functions, but their composition is extremely varied: the CAE is composed 
exclusively of academics, the CAS of civil servants, and the COR and COE by a mix of experts, 
MPs, civil servants and representatives of social partners and local authorities.
In a context in which the state is so centralised, resourceful and insulated from society’s 
demands, the initiatives for policy are likely to come from within the state itself. Thus, in a political 
system such as this, it is within the state apparatus -  in and around the executive, in the political 
parties in power, in the haute administration -  that one must look in order to trace the origin of 
policy initiatives and ideas. The position of trade unions and employers’ organisations is, by 
contrast, somewhat peculiar in France. On the one hand, the ‘social partners’, as they are known in 
national debates, play an important role in the management of social security funds, which affords 
them considerable resources and a strong say on issues concerning welfare reform. On the other
37 Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 2007. Paris.
38 See http://www.cae.gouv.fr/ (own translation).
39 Les Echos, 4 January 2006.
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| hand, interest organisations have long been ideologically divided and organisationally weak, which 
has allowed the state consistently to marginalise them in labour regulation.
The French welfare system, in fact, is mainly based on a set of non-state agencies called la 
| Securite sociale, which was gradually built up after the war. Following a typically bismarckian, 
insurance-based logic, the system is fragmented into a number of different schemes (regimes) 
covering different occupational groups. These are managed by specific funds (caisses), each of 
which is headed by a governing board composed of representatives of employers and employees, 
with a chairman elected from their ranks. Since the system is meant to be managed by those who 
pay for it and have an interest in it, based on a principle called paritarisme or democratic sociale, 
the state’s involvement is formally limited to a supervisory role. In practice, however, the 
conventions between the employers and the unions on unemployment insurance could not be agreed 
without the government’s approval and it was the government that generally decided the level of 
benefits and contributions, especially when these decisions became difficult (Palier 2000, 2002).
Despite its involvement in the management of the welfare state, however, the French labour 
movement was one of the weakest of the industrialised world (Despax and Rojot 1987; Femer and 
Hyman 1992). Throughout the post-war period, barely 15-20% of the labour force was unionised 
and membership was split among five or six major confederations that were bitterly divided along 
ideological lines. In the passage between the Fourth (1946-58) and the Fifth Republic (1958 
onward) French politics was dominated by conservative parties (Christian Democrats, Gaullists), 
whereas the left (the Communist PCF and the Socialist PS) was excluded from government until 
1981. As a result, in France, unlike in countries like Britain or Germany, the unions never had a 
privileged access to the executive (Bergonioux 1983; Bridgford 1991). French governments found it 
easier to by-pass the unions -  as well as the employers’ association, the CNPF, which had to 
grapple with deep internal divisions of its own and was long dominated by small and medium-sized 
companies (Hall 1986) -  and forge alliances directly with the patrons of large industrial firms. 
Economic planning itself, which had started out as a widely participatory process, was quickly 
transformed into one through which the state could forge a series of alliances with selected 
industrial managers, whereas labour unions were systematically excluded. So much so, in fact, that 
two of the country’s largest unions, the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) and Force 
Ouvriere, boycotted the preparations of the Plans until the 1980s (Hall 1986).
In this context, the regulation of industrial relations was by and large left to market forces. 
The French labour market was the most weakly institutionalised in western Europe: collective 
bargaining was virtually non-existent before 1968 and only developed to a limited extent since
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(Flanagan et al. 1983). The reasons for this are several, having to do with the organisational 
weakness of the unions, the strategies they pursued and the incentives provided by public policy.
First of all, trade unions have historically faced tremendous difficulties in France. The 
largest union confederations after the War were the CGT, which had close links with the 
j Communist party, and the Confederation Frangaise des Travailleurs Chretiens (CFTC), which was 
loosely aligned with the Catholic church and the Christian Democratic party. A third confederation 
by the name of Force Ouvriere (FO) was founded in 1947, when the Socialist minority within the 
CGT decided to break away from the rest. A fourth confederation emerged in 1964 when the 
majority of the CFTC decided to sever the link with the Catholic church and to adopt a new name, 
Confederation Frangaise Democratique du Travail (CFDT). The internal minority opted to form a 
new, very small union and to keep the discarded name of CFTC. Two smaller, more sectoral unions 
are also of significance: the Federation d ’Education Nationale (FEN), which groups together the 
teaching unions, and the Confederation Generate des Cadres (CGC), which represents white-collar 
workers (Flanagan et a l 1983; Howell 1992). The main confederations organise in each industry 
and each occupation, but their presence at the firm level is historically weak as the traditional 
predominance of small, family-controlled firms created a deeply hostile environment to any form of 
workers’ organisation. French unions have limited funds and tiny organisational apparatuses, as 
union income from dues is minimal in comparison with other countries. At the peak of union 
density in the 1960s, for instance, the whole CGT had only about eighty full-time employees 
including officers and technical assistants (Flanagan et al. 1983). As a result of all this, the French 
the unions’ ability to mobilise members both in the private and in the public sector was typically 
very low in comparison with other west European countries and, in turn, the unions’ inability to 
control their rank-and-file did not give the employers much of an incentive to enter into agreements 
with them (Flanagan et al. 1983; Femer and Hyman 1992; Howell 1992).
A second reason for the unions’ scarce involvement in policy-making was their ideological 
radicalism and the nature of the political strategies they adopted. The CGT, for instance, stubbornly 
refused to negotiate with the government and the employers in order to go along with the electoral 
interests of the Communist party, which aimed to assert the contradictions of French capitalism and 
the futility of reform from within the system (Bergonioux 1983; Flanagan et al. 1983). Though with 
no formal links to any political party, the other two large confederations, the CFDT and FO, 
adopted a radical syndicalist stance and actively opposed cooperating with the government and the 
employers until the late 1970s.
Third and finally, public policy played an important role in discouraging collective 
bargaining and side-lining the unions. The 1950 law on collective bargaining, which, albeit in much
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: amended form, still forms the basis of the industrial relations system in France, built a somewhat 
permissive regulatory environment which prevented the unions from serious involvement in 
bargaining (Despax and Rojot 1987; Howell 1992). The law provided that industry- and plant-level
!
agreements must be signed by all or some of the ‘most representative’ trade unions and employers’ 
organisations. Yet no real incentives were provided for either side to engage in bargaining. A single 
union signature sufficed for agreements to be valid, so that it was all too easy for the others not to 
follow and to accuse the signatories of giving in too quickly and failing to gain additional 
concessions. If the parties could not arrive at a new agreement, then the previous one continued in 
force even after its period of application had elapsed. Once in force, then, agreements could be (and 
increasingly often were) ‘extended’ to entire industries and sectors by the Minister of Labour.
Weak unions and badly organised workers gave the government in France the option, 
unavailable elsewhere, to step in and regulate the labour market from above, ignore the labour 
movement altogether and then gamble on the consequences. Ignoring labour, however, created a 
very unstable situation, whereby periods of low bargaining power of the workers, when real wages 
grew slowly and grievances accumulated, were occasionally followed by shorter periods of frequent 
strikes. The events of May 1968 were possibly the most extreme case of an accumulation of 
grievances in a context of industry rationalisation, deflation and incomes restraint that, ignited by a 
student revolt, burst into a general strike (Flanagan et al. 1983). The strike wave of 1968 was, then, 
followed by a short-lived attempt to institutionalise collective bargaining as a means to prevent 
labour market instability and industrial strife. Between 1969 and 1972 President Georges Pompidou 
and Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas attempted to develop an effective wage bargaining 
system in the public sector and to push the employers into bargaining with the unions at all levels in 
the private sector. To this end, the framework law on collective bargaining was reformed in 1971 so 
as to make firm-level negotiations more attractive for both unions and employers and to make the 
extension procedure easier by reducing the veto power of union confederations. Chaban-Delmas’ 
programme, dubbed ‘New Society’ in a famous parliamentary speech, aimed at ensuring social 
peace by empowering the unions and involving them in effective bargaining. It did have some 
success to the extent that a large number of agreements were signed and the number of workers 
covered by collective bargaining grew steadily, thanks also to the widespread use of the extension 
procedure (Despax and Rojot 1987; Howell 1992). The ‘New Society’ programme, however, fell 
short of providing a flexible framework for incomes policy in which real wages could be moderated 
to restore profitability as became necessary when international economic turmoil began to affect 
France after 1974. Consequently, collective bargaining was quickly abandoned once again.
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It was only at the end of the decade, after the Right surprisingly retained its majority in the 
general election of March 1978, that Raymond Barre attempted to breathe new life into collective 
bargaining. The aim was to promote a form of labour regulation that was more consistent with the 
new economic realities of the late 1970s, as he understood them. This entailed, above all, a 
withdrawal of the state from labour regulation and an attempt to decentralise bargaining to the level 
of the branch or even the firm, where wages and working conditions could be tailored to the needs 
of particular sectors and companies. In order to magnify the coverage of bargaining, the government 
passed a law that further facilitated the recourse to the extension procedure by removing the veto 
power of ‘representative’ unions (Howell 1992). On 27 April 1978 Barre sent a letter to the social 
partners urging them to begin negotiations on a series of issues including sector-specific minimum 
wages, the reduction and flexibility of work time and unemployment compensation. This initiative 
followed a series of informal discussions between members of the executive and the management of 
the CFDT, which in those years was trying to move away from the radical positions of the past in 
favour of a more open stance that would later be dubbed recentrage (Branciard 1990; Mathiot
2000). In 1978-79, thus, the government engaged in bilateral talks with unions and employers to 
explore the possibility of trading legislation on workers’ rights, the length of the work-week and the 
minimum wage for a measure of wage restraint. No real progress was made before the 1981 
elections, but the adoption of a new strategy on the part of a key union confederation would have 
important consequences in the years to come.
The socialist u-tum of 1982-8340 represents a further example of the fact that, in a system 
like the French one, it is at the restricted circle of cabinet Ministers close to the President, policy 
advisors, party leaders and top civil servants that one must look in order to trace the origin of policy 
choices, whereas the input of the social partners and opposition parties was minimal. The 
conversion of the Socialists to flexibility and fiscal restraint was surprisingly rapid and thorough, 
but it would be too easy to interpret it with hindsight as a necessary step in the light of the failure of 
old recipes. In reality, as shown by previous research (Bauchard 1986; Hall 1986; Howell 1992; 
Schmidt 2002), the opportunity of a policy u-tum was highly disputed. The radical re-direction of 
government policy in 1982-83 was the outcome of a long and at times painful conflict within the 
executive and the PS over the interpretation of the problems at hand and the identification of the 
appropriate solutions. The French socialist party, it is worth noting, was less a unified force than a 
collection of competing tendances or currents loosely gathered into one party in 1972. Mitterrand 
managed to keep a tight leash on the party by forging a series of shifting alliances with the party’s 
currents, and the unevenness of the record of his first years in government reflected this
40 See above.
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ambivalence. Mitterrand’s own 1981 electoral platform had been written by people like Pierre 
Beregovoy and Laurent Fabius, who supported a Keynesian blend of Jacobinism that maintained a 
strong role of the state in stimulating economic growth and re-distributing wealth among the 
population (Parti Socialiste 1981). The ideas of social democrats like the Minister of Finance 
Jacques Delors, who came from the CFDT and as key advisor to Jacques Chaban-Delmas had 
inspired the ‘New Society’ programme in the early 1970s (Howell 1992), had surprisingly little 
influence on government policy. Faced with spiralling inflation and deficits, Mauroy and Delors 
advocated austerity and fiscal restraint, whereas other members of the executive like Beregovoy, 
Fabius and Chevenement argued for France’s exit from the European Monetary System (EMS), the 
imposition of barriers to trade and further public spending to boost domestic production and 
consumption. In the end, the choice was made by Mitterrand alone: after seriously considering 
France’s exit from the EMS, he decided to opt for austerity only after he learnt from the Director 
General of the Treasury Michel Camdessus that the official reserves of the Banque de France were 
not sufficient to defend the franc against massive devaluation (Bauchard 1986).
This abrupt change in policy programme and discourse was not entirely unannounced. Since 
the 1970s more and more scholars and academics had started to question the assumptions behind 
economic dirigisme and the all-intrusive attitude of state authorities. The ranks of the upper civil 
service were slowly being filled with the graduates of the grandes ecoles (especially the Ecole 
Nationale d ’Administration and the Institut d ’Etudes Politiques), who had a solid economics 
background and were imbued with pro-market notions. More and more politicians on the centre and 
the right of the political spectrum decided to embrace the imperatives of neo-liberalism (Schmidt 
2001, 2002). The ‘conversion’ of the socialists themselves was greatly facilitated by the ambiguous 
ideological heritage of the party. When Keynesianism and social democracy started to look like part 
of the problem rather than a possible solution, a different ideological strand was available to justify 
a different agenda. A third current within the PS, in fact, gathered around the notion of autogestion 
(literally, ‘self-management’) and favoured a decentralised form of socialism that was based on the 
direct and unmediated expression of workers’ and citizens’ demands and was wary of intermediary 
bodies like the unions and public authorities. Howell (1992) convincingly argued that it was this 
third strand of PS thinking that formed the nucleus of the Socialist government’s wholesale 
ideological shift to flexibility. The Socialists encouraged flexibility, on the one hand, by passing 
legislation that relaxed labour market regulation and empowered non-state actors and, on the other 
hand, by using employment, social and education policies to promote firms’ adjustment and 
industrial restructuring, while at the same time compensating the losers and keeping social peace.
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Thus the period from the mid-1980s onward saw French governments seek to empower 
^various actors in civil society, especially employers and unions, and disengage the state from the 
choices of companies and individuals (Culpepper 2006). Notwithstanding early attempts to impose 
labour market regulation in a dirigiste fashion, like the statutory reduction of the work-week from 
40 to 39 hours decided by Mitterrand in January 1982, subsequent policy choices went in a different 
direction. A thorough-going reform of industrial relations was adopted with a series of five laws 
pushed through between August 1982 and July 1983, known as ‘Auroux Laws’ after the then 
Labour Minister, which re-wrote about one-third of the Labour Code and touched upon almost 
every aspect of industrial relations, including workers’ liberties, workplace representation, health 
and safety regulations. An obligation to bargain annually (though not necessarily to conclude 
agreements) was introduced both at the branch and at the firm level in all firms with one or more 
union sections. Within the firm, bargaining had to take place on work time and real wages and firm- 
level agreements could now ‘derogate’ from legislation and confederal or branch agreements. The 
extension procedure was made even easier by allowing the Minister of Labour to override 
opposition to a proposed extension under certain circumstances (Despax and Rojot 1987; Femer 
and Hyman 1992; Howell 1992).
The aim of the Auroux Laws was to encourage decentralised decisions by employers and 
workers at the lowest possible level. Yet they were to have far-reaching and largely unintended 
consequences on the structure of French industrial relations. In the following years, a large number 
of agreements was signed both in the public and in the private sector. The CGT and CFDT dropped 
their radical rhetoric and usual suspicion of government initiatives and attempted to make the 
reforms work. Thanks to the generous use of the extension procedure, the effective proportion of 
the workforce covered by collective bargaining grew from 64% in 1980 to 94% in 1985 (Culpepper 
2006). Yet French unions had tiny organisational apparatuses and a very weak presence at the firm 
level. Local union sections had neither the experience nor the resources to perform the type of 
social democratic functions that Auroux had carved out for them (Howell 1992; Hancke 2001). As a 
result, the unions almost collapsed in an attempt to meet the new requirements. In the 1990s barely 
9% of the workforce was unionised (5% in the private sector alone) and France had become a low- 
strike country (Hancke 2001; Lallement 2006).
The employers, on the contrary, were well-placed to make the most of the new opportunities 
that were offered to them by the new legislation to by-pass the unions. As the flow of public 
subsidies gradually dried out, employment and social policies took the place of the industrial 
policies of the past by providing companies with the tools they needed to re-structure their 
workforce. Massive recourse to pre-retirement benefits allowed firms to rid themselves of excess
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labour41, while government policy took care of up-dating the skills of the younger cohorts of 
workers. In the field of education the official goals became to improve the educational attainment of 
the school population and to reorganise the contents of vocational and technical training 
programmes. The first goal was pursued with some success: by 1995 around 75% of the 1977 age 
cohort achieved a high school certificate (the baccalaureat) and almost 50% went into higher 
education (16% chose a technical-commercial degree, the so-called bac +2) (Hancke 2001). As for 
vocational training, which in France is mainly financed by the state and provided by the public 
school system, the curriculum reforms adopted in the 1980s and early 1990s matched very closely 
the needs of large firms. Some firms even managed to have new technical diplomas sanctioned and 
financed for them by the Ministry of Education (Hancke 2001; Culpepper 2001, 2006).
3. The emergence of European constraints and the politics of welfare retrenchment
The previous discussion indicates that, with respect to the hypotheses advanced in Chapter 1,
France looks like an ideal-typical ‘single-actor’ system42, in which policy-making authority is 
concentrated in the executive and policy formulation is in the hands of restricted circles of 
governmental actors (Ministers, advisors, top civil servants)43. Yet the changed conditions of the 
1990s would affect this pattern somewhat. The 1990s, indeed, were a period of relative government 
instability, with six different cabinets (the ones led by Rocard, Cresson, Beregovoy, Balladur, Juppe 
and Jospin) in less than ten years. In spite of the proliferation of the early retirement and make-work 
programmes44, the French labour market was plagued by high unemployment for the best part of the 
decade. After the economy was hit by recession in 1993, the unemployment rate remained 
consistently above 11% and peaked at 12.6% in May 1997. In the same year the number of RMI 
beneficiaries reached 1,000,000 and a further 500,000 received the solidarity allowance (Allocation 
Speciale de Solidarite, ASS) that is granted to the unemployed whose entitlement to the insurance 
scheme has expired.45 At the same time, new sets of external constraints changed the context in 
which employment and social policies were made. The completion of the single market in 1992 
strengthened intra-EU competition, thus making the issues of competitiveness and labour costs even 
more central in policy debates. In addition to this, the criteria agreed in Maastricht for entry into
41 See above.
42 See Chapter 1.
43 See Chapter 4.
44 See above.
45 The above data can be found on the French NAP for 1998: 
http://ec.europa.eu/emplovment social/employment strategy/nap 1998/fr fr.pdf.
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EMU placed tight constraints on public finances, of which social spending was the single largest 
item.
Faced with changing economic conditions and new European constraints, the French state 
gradually modified the ways in which it intervened in the labour market. Although it had 
progressively forsaken the voluntarist approach to economic management of the past, the 
government still intervened heavily in the distribution of employment through selective cuts and 
exemptions in social charges, subsidised jobs for hard-to-place youths, the mandatory reduction of 
working time. All these measures largely completed and extended the policies put in place in 
previous years. The number of beneficiaries of government measures went from 450,000 in 1984 to 
1,900,000 in 1994 and public expenditure for employment policies grew from 0.9% of GDP in 1973 
to around 4% in the mid-1990s (DARES 1996; Hall 2006). This high-spending, pro-active attitude 
of French public authorities would continue in the following years. In the early to mid-1990s, 
though, the attention of policy-makers was mainly directed toward containing welfare expenditure, 
cutting the cost of labour, creating jobs in specific sectors and manage work-time as a means to 
boost employment.
| In 1995 social spending surpassed 30% of GDP and the social security funds ran a 
cumulative deficit of almost 300 bF from 1991 to 1997 (Levy 2000). The option of raising the level 
of social contributions, as was regularly done whenever financing problems arose in the 1970s and 
1980s, was no longer available in the more integrated and competitive. EU markets of the 1990s 
(Palier 2000, 2002, 2006). Welfare retrenchment, thus, became the order of the day. Several 
attempts were made in these years to cut or contain costs in the areas of pensions, health care and 
unemployment benefits, most of which were only partially successful. Changes took a long time to 
be accepted and were introduced only gradually, usually starting from the margins of the system. 
Since the French welfare state enjoyed a very high level of legitimacy, whenever the government 
tried to proceed without consulting all interested parties it met with considerable opposition, as was 
the case, for instance, with the 1995 plan Juppe that included a number of measures concerning 
healthcare and public pensions. Although union density had reached an exceptionally low level by 
the mid-1990s46, union confederations proved to be very effective in opposing change thanks to 
their role in the management of welfare funds and their ability to exploit public protests. Thus, in 
front of the failure of old-style dirigisme, it became necessary to form coalitions with at least some
i
|Of the relevant stakeholders. Great efforts were put into spreading shared interpretations of the 
.existing problems and economic difficulties through the proliferation of expert committees and 
reports. A coalition of senior civil servants played a key role in developing awareness of the need
46 See above.
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|for change, while successive governments, the CNPF and some trade unions all took part in the 
implementation of the reforms (Palier 2006). Political parties, on the contrary, tended to take a step 
back and followed the traditional left-right divide without moving much from the positions of the 
governments they supported. The CFDT was alone among the large union confederations to adopt a
I
cooperative stance on welfare reform building on the strategy of recentrage it had taken on in the 
late 1970s, whereas the CGT and FO remained very defensive and opposed every reform proposal. 
Thus in the 1990s the CFDT became an vocal supporter of work-time reduction, re-insertion 
policies and, later in time, of active policies for the unemployed.
Cutting costs and containing expenditure became the name of the game also in the field of 
employment policy. An important reform of unemployment insurance aiming to cut costs and 
reduce expenditure was agreed with the employers and the CFDT in 1992. The reform mandated the 
replacement of all existing unemployment benefits with a new one, called Allocation Unique 
Degressive (AUD). The amount of the allowance depended on the contribution record of the 
claimant and, as suggested by its name, decreased sharply with time. For instance, someone who 
had worked 14 of the previous 24 months would receive a full benefit for 9 months and then lose
i
17% of it every four months (six months after 1996) for a maximum of 30 months altogether (Palier
i
2000). This reform did bring substantial savings to the funds in charge of managing unemployment 
, insurance (UNEDIC and ASSEDIC), but its beneficial effect for public finances was quickly offset 
I by a more liberal recourse to other benefits. As the AUD started to provide less generous benefits 
I for a shorter period at a time of economic recession and growing unemployment, a bigger role was 
played by means-tested benefits financed by general taxation like the RMI, the number of whose
[
beneficiaries had a remarkable increase (Malo et al. 2000; Palier 2000).
|
[ The reduction of labour costs, especially for the young and the unskilled, became a
I
dominating theme in French employment policy debates around the mid-1990s (Malo et al. 2000). 
Although labour cost reduction was generally accepted as a tool to combat unemployment, though, 
there was no consensus as to how it might be achieved in practice. Wage reduction, in fact, proved 
to be politically difficult. A proposal put forth by the Balladur government in 1994 to introduce a 
lower minimum salary for young employees (a ‘SMIC-jeunes ’) triggered a wave of protests and was
!
promptly withdrawn (Levy 2000). The reduction of payroll taxes, on the contrary, was more widely 
accepted as an option. Thus the move toward cuts in social contributions that started in the 1980s 
was gradually generalised and extended. A plan for the reduction of the charges sociales on the 
salary of unskilled young workers dubbed Exo-jeunes and a 30% cut in employers’ contributions on 
part-time contracts were launched in 1991 and 1992, respectively. A general measure of reduction 
of social contributions on low-paid and newly-employed workers was subsequently enacted in
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1993, following very closely a series of recommendation formulated in the preparations of the 
eleventh plan and by an expert group chaired by the President of the Economic and Social Council, 
Jean Matteoli (Commissariat General du Plan 1993; DARES 1996). The ‘Five-year Law on Labour 
Market Regulation, Employment and Vocational Training’ adopted by the Bahadur government in 
December 199347 introduced generous cuts in employers’ social contributions up to a given wage 
level (1.33 SMIC in 1996) as well as a complete exemption from social charges for workers at their 
first, second and third job contract. Contribution cuts have been further extended by the Aubry laws 
on work-time reduction and again by the right-wing governments that followed the 2002 
parliamentary election. The percentage of the workforce presently affected by some form of 
reduction of social charges is around 60% and is expected to increase further in the years to come, 
which implies that this measure can now be considered as permanent (Barbier and Fargion 2004; 
Barbier 2006).
A further recurrent theme in the debates of this period was the apparent inability of the 
French economy to create jobs in the services sector. Compared with other European countries, in 
fact, the services sector in France was relatively underdeveloped. A major initiative to address this 
problem was launched in 1997 by the cabinet led by the socialist Lionel Jospin. The programme, 
called Nouveaux Services -  Emplois Jeunes, offered a wage-cost subsidy to employers who hired 
young job-seekers in one of a list of service areas. Under its very generous terms, the state paid for 
all social security contributions and 80% of the workers’ wage, leaving only the remaining 20% to 
the charge of the employer. In order to avoid substitution effects in the private sector, the 
programme was confined to public sector employers (mainly local public services) and non-profit 
associations. When the programme expired in 2002, roughly 350,000 contracts had been signed 
under its terms (Le Cacheux and Touya 2004). The right-wing Raffarin government subsequently 
decided to phase it out, but created for similar purposes a new type of contract (the ‘contracts for 
the young’) meant to subsidise jobs for young people in the private services sector.
A last long-standing theme in the French debates of the 1990s was work-time management 
and reduction. The use of work time reduction or ‘work sharing’ as a means both to improve 
working conditions and to boost employment had been debated for nearly two decades. The length 
of the work-week had already been the subject of discussions between the social partners and the 
government in the late 1970s on the basis of a proposal of the CFDT48. The idea that work had 
become a scarce good that should be shared among more people in order to combat unemployment 
quickly became very popular with the social democratic current of the PS and with the group of 
'experts around Jacques Delors (Mathiot 2000). Mitterrand’s election programme promised to bring
47 Loi, 93-1313, 1993-20-12, quinquennale relative au travail, a Vemploi e ta  la formation professionnelle.
48 See above.
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the work-week down to 35 hours by 1985, even though he eventually only managed to reduce it to 
39 and introduce a fifth week of paid holidays. Some provisions for the flexible use of working time 
-  the calculation of working hours on a yearly basis, their distribution throughout the year -  were 
adopted in 1987 and 1993. In 1996 the so-called Robien law49 encouraged the signing of collective 
agreements to reduce working time in firms on a voluntary basis. As soon as the socialists returned 
to government in 1997, however, they changed approach and announced plans to legislate on the 
subject. Two laws adopted in 1998 and 2000, known as Aubry laws after the then Labour 
Minister50, established a 35-hour statutory working week to be enacted as of January 2000 by all 
firms and organisations employing more than 20 people (including public services) and as of 
January 2002 by the smaller ones. Work-time reduction was to be achieved through bargaining at 
the level of the branch and the firm, and a system of incentives and sanctions in the form of 
reductions or increases in social charges was put in place to award good practices and discourage 
laggards51. This initiative was met with great hostility on the part of the right-wing opposition in 
parliament and especially of the employers, on the grounds that the matter should be left to 
collective bargaining without any interference of the state. The president of the CNPF, Jean 
Gandois, resigned in protest and the organisation, under a new name (Mouvement des Entreprises 
de France or MEDEF) and a new chairman, Ernest-Antoine Seilliere, mounted a grand-scale 
campaign against government interference52. Nevertheless, the 35 hour week has proved to be 
popular with French workers and the relevant legislation is still in force even though subsequent 
governments relaxed some of its key provisions, in particular regarding overtime (Le Cacheux and 
Touya 2004).
In sum, most of the major employment policies of the 1990s, such as work-time 
management, labour cost reduction and publicly funded programmes to create jobs in specific 
sectors, have their roots in the decisions and debates of the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, as argued in the 
final section of this chapter, the terms of the debate would change again and some innovative policy 
choices would be made later in the decade reflecting an approach to job supply that was alien to the 
French tradition and was, instead, very much in line with the EES, which was launched around the 
same time.
49 Loi, 96-502, 1996-11-06, tendant a favoriser Vemploi par Vamenagement et la reduction conventionnels du temps de 
travail.
50 Loi, 98-461, 1998-06-13, d'orientation et d'incitation relative a la reduction du temps de travail and Loi, 2000-37, 
2000-01-19, relative a la reduction negociee du temps de travail.
51 Detailed information on the 35-hour working week legislation and the reactions to it is available on 
www.35h.travail.gov.fr and on the website o f the mutual learning programme of the EES: http://www.mutual-learning- 
emplovment.net/peerreviews/2000/04/18-19.
52 See below.
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4. Continuity and change in French employment policies after 1997
By the time the socialist Lionel Jospin became Prime Minister in the Spring of 1997, 
unemployment had crossed the threshold of 12% and reached much higher levels for those at the 
margins of the labour market, such as the young (24.3%) and the long-term unemployed (37.4%)53. 
GDP growth then quickly picked up between 1997 and 2001 and unemployment started to decrease 
steeply, until a new period of slow growth hit the whole euro-area between 2002 and 2005, with 
unemployment on the rise again. The employment rate followed a similar trend, gradually rising 
until 2003 and then falling somewhat in 2004. Be that as it may, both the total employment rate and 
the employment rate of older workers remained considerably below the Lisbon and Stockholm 
targets54. A notable exception to this was the employment rate for women, which in 2006 was 
approaching the 2010 target of 60% (see Table 3).
Table 3. Employment and unemployment rates in France (1997-2006)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Unemployme 
nt rate
11.5% 11.0% 10.4% 9.0% 8.3% 8.6% 9.0% 9.3% 9.2% 9.2%
Employment
rate
59.6% 60.2% 60.9% 62.1% 62.8% 63.0% 64.0% 63.7% 63.9% 63.8%
Employment 
rate (women)
52.4% 53.1% 54.0% 55.2% 56.0% 56.7% 58.2% 58.2% 58.5% 58.8%
Employment 
rate (older 
workers)
29.0% 28.3% 28.8% 29.9% 31.9% 34.7% 37.0% 37.6% 38.7% 38.1%
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu)
In the meantime, the French state kept its traditional interventionist attitude toward the 
labour market. Throughout the 1990s public expenditure on employment policies bordered 4% of 
GDP every year and has not decreased since (DARES 1996; DARES 2006). As a result, in 
particular, of a cobweb of make-work programmes for target groups (the young, the disabled, the 
long-term unemployed) and social charges cuts on low wages, by the end of the 1990s the 
government subsidised over 2 million jobs. Between 1990 and 2001 the number of workers 
employed directly by the state grew by 10% (Hall 2006). At the same time, over 10% of the
53 French NAP for 1998: http://ec.europa.eu/emplovment social/employment strategy/nap 1998/fr fr.pdf.
54 See Chapter 2.
91
population received a minimum income set by the state, not to mention the millions of others who 
received state pensions55.
As the preceding discussion indicates, aside from some differences in style and emphasis, 
the terms of the debate and the proposed policy solutions advanced in the 1990s showed a 
remarkable degree of continuity as governments of different political colour alternated in power. 
The right-wing cabinets of Edouard Balladur (1993-95) and Alain Juppe (1995-97) introduced €6 
billion worth of cuts in employers’ social contributions in order to reduce labour costs on low 
wages. Roughly the same amount of resources was spent every year to subsidise job contracts for 
specific groups of unemployed, the most common of which was the Contrat emploi-solidarite 
(CES) created in 1990 by the socialist government of Michel Rocard. Finally, the so-called loi 
Robien adopted in 1996 provided a series of incentives to encourage firm-level negotiations on the 
reduction of work time, the expectation being that this would allow firms more flexibility in 
organising production and ultimately stimulate them to hire new employees.
The overall direction of employment policy did not change much as a broad left-wing 
coalition composed of socialists, communists and greens swept into power in 1997. Since the 
Right’s repeated attempts to push through an agenda of welfare reforms aimed at retrenching 
expenditure and cutting costs had been met by little success in the face of widespread public 
protests, the newly formed Jospin government chose to put aside highly controversial issues, such 
as pensions, and focused instead on a few high-profile initiatives in the field of employment that 
would show its attachment to a progressive agenda without touching upon the interests of left-wing 
constituents (Levy 2000). As said above, the first was a generous wage-cost subsidy to hire 350,000 
young unemployed in the public or non profit sectors (the Nouveaux Services -  Emplois Jeunes) 
and the second a generalised measure of mandatory work time reduction matched with a new cut of 
the charges on labour (the two lois Aubry). The new cuts amounted to 26% of total charges at the 
level of the minimum wage and then gradually decreased up to a limit of 1.8 times the SMIC 
(DARES 2006).
The Emplois Jeunes and the mandatory reduction of work time were harshly criticised by 
the then right-wing opposition for being too expensive for public finances and too dirigiste. Yet 
both clearly followed and extended measures that were already in place. A greater degree of 
discontinuity with the past, though, was evident in the discourse and policy style chosen by the 
Jospin government. The Left in power, in fact, sought to adopt a more reassuring discourse, seeking 
to persuade the public that reforms could promote both economic efficiency and social equality at 
the same time (Schmidt 2001, 2002). Moreover, despite the controversies raised by the legislation
55 See above.
92
on work-time reduction, the government tried to adopt a more inclusive policy style. Whereas Juppe 
had openly bragged that no more than ten people had seen his pension reform plan before it was 
presented to Parliament, Jospin expressed the intention to involve societal actors in policy-making 
to a greater extent than hitherto. As regards the shortening of the work-week, for instance, the 
government acted by setting a broad objective while leaving it to the social partners to work out the 
best way to achieve it in a decentralised manner. As a result of the obligation to bargain on the 
reduction of work time, collective bargaining reached record levels after 1998 (DARES 2006). In 
other cases, expert reports were commissioned and often used to elicit new policy ideas or receive 
feedback from interested parties before policy decisions were made56. A widely read report written 
for the Prime Minister by the economist Jean Pisani-Ferry, for instance, proposed to establish a 
negative income tax to support the revenue of the low paid, thus giving them real incentives to take 
up jobs (Pisani-Ferry 2000). On the basis of the report’s recommendations, the Jospin government 
decided to create in 2001 a new tax credit called Prime pour Vemploi (‘premium for employment’) 
designed to make work more attractive than social minima and non-employment benefits.
Interest organisations in France are nowadays weaker than ever. Trade unions are gradually 
disappearing from the workplace: the rate of unionisation has gradually come down to around 8% 
of the workforce and is as low as 5.2% in the private sector. The main employers’ association, the 
MEDEF, has had to face problems of its own, as deep divisions between small and large firms 
brought about significant losses in membership and a weakened commitment among activists 
(Lallement 2006). Notwithstanding all this, the social partners have become much more active in 
policy-making, either following a governmental stimulus or on their own initiative. Apart from the 
wave of branch-level negotiations mandated by the new legislation on work time, in fact, the 
MEDEF managed to lure the five major union confederations (CGT, CFDT, FO, CFTC, CGC) and 
two other employers associations (CGPME and UP A) into undertaking an ambitious set of inter­
professional negotiations. This initiative, somewhat boastfully dubbed la refondation sociale 
(literally ‘new social foundation’), was the main outcome of the campaign mounted by the MEDEF 
against the 35-hour work week legislation and represented an attempt to regain some of the ground 
that collective bargaining had allegedly lost to the legislator (Palier 2002; Lallement 2006)57. 
Negotiations were announced in February 2000 on eight different issues, all of them at the core of 
the French system of industrial relations: the reform of collective bargaining; the reform of 
unemployment insurance; health and safety in the workplace; complementary retirement plans;
56 In the field of employment, in particular, the government received reports on the cost of labour and the reform of 
employers’ social charges (Rapport Malinvaud), on equal opportunities between men and women {Rapport Genisson) 
and on how to return to full employment {Rapport Pisani-Ferry).
57 Julien, E. Interview with the author on 7 March 2007. Paris.
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vocational training; equal opportunities; the role of management within firms; and welfare reform 
(pensions, healthcare, family allowances).
The novelty of this initiative, which was strongly pushed for by the new leadership of the 
MEDEF -  especially by its president, Ernest-Antoine Seilliere, and director-general, Denis Kessler 
-  can hardly be overstated, since even inter-professional negotiations in France are generally
ro
sparked off by a government request . The strategy followed by the MEDEF was similar in each 
round of negotiations: it started the discussions by tabling a few radical proposals for reform and 
then tried to back them up with specific threats, such as that it would quit the management of social 
security funds or block the renewal of the convention on unemployment insurance (Palier 2002).
Yet this strategy proved to be only partially successful. It was clear to all interested parties that the 
employers’ bargaining tactics were not entirely credible, as their withdrawal from the social security 
funds would potentially entail enormous losses for them in terms of power and legitimacy 
(Lallement 2006)59. Thus negotiations started on only some of the announced dossiers -  the reform 
of family allowances, the role of management and equal opportunities, for instance, were never 
discussed -  and even fewer agreements were eventually signed. The agreements that were finalised 
were generally signed by the employers and, among the unions, by the CFDT, which since the late 
1970s had gradually adopted a more moderate and open stance toward negotiating with the 
employers60, as well as by the smaller CFTC and CGC. The CGT and FO, instead, consistently 
refused to compromise with the patronat.
The first and most important agreement to be signed was the one on unemployment 
insurance. The employers accepted the abolition of the progressive scaling down of benefits 
introduced in 199261 in exchange for the unions’ agreement that the receipt of benefits be subject to 
the beneficiaries’ participation in personalised back-to-work assistance programmes called PARE 
(plan d ’aide au retour a Vemploi) to be managed by the public employment agency (ANPE). This 
agreement, which marks the advent of the notions of conditionality and activation in the French 
debate, triggered a violent confrontation between the signatories and the Minister of Labour of the 
time, Martine Aubry, and was only ratified by the government in December 2000, nearly a year 
after the previous convention had expired . Two more accords were signed within the framework 
of the refondation sociale, one on health and safety at work and another on the reform of collective
58 Boutroue, M.-F. Interview with the author on 27 March 2007. Paris.
59 The MEDEF temporarily quit the funds in charge of health insurance and family benefits in 2001. Nevertheless this 
was never intended to be a permanent move and Seilliere quickly took care of clarifying the conditions to be met by the 
government so that his organisation would resume its responsibilities.
See above.
61 See above.
62 See Chapter 4.
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bargaining. The latter, in particular, subsequently inspired the 2004 loi Fillon , which established 
the principle, agreed on this occasion, that only collective agreements signed by organisations 
representing the majority of workers would be considered valid (Lallement 2006). Conversely, the 
issues of complementary pensions and health insurance proved to be too controversial to produce an 
agreement. The negotiations on vocational training also proved difficult, especially as regards 
whether training should take place within or without the work time limits set by the law. 
Negotiations of this issue, though, were to be promptly resumed in 2003 at the government’s
,64request .
The refondation sociale kept the social partners busy for most of 2000 and 2001 and only 
came to a halt as the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections approached. Its story is 
interesting not only for its novelty with respect to the practice of industrial relations in France, but 
also because the negotiations that did take place signalled the introduction in the French debate of 
new themes and policy ideas that would have some success in the following years. The concern 
with labour market rigidities as an explanation for unemployment that had established itself since 
the mid-1980s was now complemented by a new interest in the role of public policy in keeping as 
many people as possible in employment, helping the unemployed in their search for a job and 
eliminating the disincentives that might keep them from accepting possible job offers (Serre and 
Palier 2004; Ehrel and Zajdela 2004). This new focus, which was diffused by several reports and 
recommendations produced since the mid-1990s by such international bodies as the OECD and, 
especially, the EU, planted the seeds of some of the more innovative policy choices of recent years.
The employment policies pursued by the right-wing government led by the Gaullist Jean- 
Pierre Raffarin in office between 2002 and 2005 were, again, a mix of continuity and change. Some 
of the main measures taken by the new Labour Minister, Francis Fillon, were anything but new 
with respect to French policy traditions. In an attempt to create lasting jobs for young unemployed 
in the private sector, the Emplois Jeunes were gradually phased out and replaced by a new type of 
contract (the contrats jeunes en entreprise) that was meant to subsidise jobs for young people in 
private firms. The other types of subsidised contracts were rationalised and refocused65 and the 
number of beneficiaries went down by about a third with respect to 1999, though still remaining 
high in absolute terms (about 1,400,000 in 2004) (DARES 2006). The 35-hour work week 
legislation, accused of making work organisation too rigid and being a cause of higher labour costs 
and slower productivity growth, was relaxed by increasing the maximum amount of overtime per
63 Loi, 2004-391, 2004-05-04, relative a la formation professionnelle tout au long de la vie et au dialogue social.
64 See Chapter 4.
65 The number of contrats aides was cut from fourteen to seven in 2005 (Le Monde 24 September 2004; see also the 
2005 French National Reform Programme, p.29).
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worker that firms could have recourse to in one year. Moreover, in order to encourage firms to 
create new jobs, the cuts in employers’ social charges were extended and de-linked from work time 
reduction so that even firms that had not moved to 35 hours could benefit from contribution cuts on 
salaries up to 1.7 SMIC (1.6 from 2005) (DARES 2006). Finally, the Prime pour Vemploi was 
raised every year since 2003 in order to improve the incentives facing the recipients of social 
minima to take up temporary, part-time and low-paid jobs.
Other measures, however, clearly show elements of discontinuity with established policy 
traditions and seem to mirror new concerns. To start with, in order to ‘activate’ RMI beneficiaries 
and increase their incentives to work, the Raffarin government created in 2003 a Revenu Minimum 
d ’Activite (RMA) for those who had received RMI support for over two years, making the receipt of 
benefits conditional on taking up part-time employment. This initiative, which was accused by the 
opposition and by charities dealing with social exclusion of forcing the recipients of social minima 
into conditions of ‘under-employment’66, is still in force even though it was substantially watered 
down after the Right’s defeat in the 2004 regional elections. Francis Fillon had more luck with the 
reform of vocational training, which had been one of the main campaign themes of the 2002 
presidential election, with both Chirac and Jospin promising the reform of the framework law of 
1971. Fillon demanded that the social partners resume the negotiations on this issue that had been 
interrupted in 2001 and threatened that, in the absence of an agreement by the end of 2003, the 
government would push through new legislation on its own terms . As a consequence, an inter­
professional agreement was signed by all social partners except the CGT on 20 September 2003 and
/TO
was eventually transposed into law in May 2004 . The law grants workers on permanent contracts 
an individual right to training of 20 hours a year that can be cumulated over a maximum of six years 
even in case of lay-off or change of employer. The priorities to be pursued by training are to be 
identified by the social partners in the context of ad hoc branch-level negotiations69.
Two further important policy changes were discussed under Fillon, but then only adopted by 
his successor, Jean-Luis Borloo. The first one is the reform of public employment services, with the 
aim to strengthen the services offered to job-seekers and improve the effectiveness of their action to 
prevent long-term unemployment70. Following a widely publicised report written by Jean 
Marimbert, a former Director of the ANPE (Marimbert 2004), which recommended much closer 
coordination between the agency and the UNEDIC, three sets of changes were introduced by law in
66 Les Echos 10 June 2004.
67 Les Echos 4 April 2003.
68 Loi, 2004-391, 2004-05-04, relative a la formation professionnelle tout au long de la vie et au dialogue social.
69 See Chapter 4.
70 See Chapter 4.
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200571: the gradual integration of ANPE and UNEDIC (unified offices at the regional level, unified 
data bases on beneficiaries); the founding of new maisons de I’emploi that would bring together at 
the local level all the services providing support for the unemployed facing the greatest difficulties 
(ANPE, UNEDIC, the State, local charities); the end of the ANPE’s monopoly over job placement 
and the possibility for private companies to offer placement services at no cost for job-seekers. In 
order to tighten control over the recipients of unemployment insurance, a system of gradual
79sanctions was introduced in August 2005 for those refusing more than two relevant job offers . 
Finally, the individualised support offered to the unemployed, already stepped up with the launch of 
the PARE programme in 200173, was further strengthened in 2006 as the unemployed now can 
benefit from monthly interviews starting from their fourth month of unemployment (Republique 
Fran?aise 2006).
The second important development of recent years is the adoption of an action plan for older 
workers agreed by the government and the social partners in 2006 on the basis of a previous accord 
negotiated by the employers and the unions for most of 2005 and finally signed in March 2006 
(Conseil Economique et Social 2006)74. The plan, which was agreed for a period of five years and 
allocated a budget of €10 million, laid out a series of measures aimed at keeping workers over 55 
years of age in employment for longer: the so-called contribution Delalande, a fee to be paid by 
employers who fired workers over 45, was to be gradually abolished; a new temporary contract with 
longer-than-normal time limits (36 rather than 18 months) was launched specifically for the 
unemployed over the age of 57; and a number of financial incentives were introduced for those who 
wish to keep working after having matured the right to a full pension or even whilst receiving a 
pension (Republique Fran9aise 2006). This plan marks a clean break with the practice of facilitating 
the retirement en masse of older cohorts of workers in order to limit the growth of unemployment 
French governments had indulged in since the late 1970s and was hailed by some as a sheer 
‘cultural revolution’ . It is, however, too early to give an assessment of its impact on employment 
rates.
The above changes correspond to a new conception not only of the settings and instruments 
of employment policy, but also of its very goals. In this sense, they entail a change of the 
‘paradigm’ underlying employment policy in France (Hall 1993; Palier 2002, 2006). Moreover, 
their novelty lies not only in their content, but also in the way they were formulated and
71 Loi, 2005-32, 2005-01-18, de programmation pour la cohesion sociale.
72 Decret, 2005-915, 2005-08-02, relatifau sum  de la recherche d'emploi.
73 See above.
74 See Chapter 4.
75 See above.
76 Le Monde, 14 October 2005.
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implemented. All of them were anticipated or followed by agreements between the social partners 
or between them and the State, thus completing and reinforcing a trend initiated with the welfare
HIreforms of the 1990s . What is more, this newfound inclusiveness was given the formal seal of the 
law. The 2004 loi Fillon that reformed vocational training, in fact, contained also an important 
overhaul of the rules governing collective bargaining. Apart from the introduction of the above 
mentioned ‘majority principle’ regarding the signing of agreements, the new norms established that 
recourse must be made to bargaining before any new piece of legislation was passed on issues of
no
concern to the social partners . French governments, to be sure, did not give up completely their 
old statist habits, but when they tried to go it alone they ended up facing some fierce opposition. 
The most evident such case dates back to the beginning of 2006. When Jacques Chirac’s last Prime 
Minister, Dominique de Villepin, tried to introduce without the unions’ assent a new flexible work 
contract for the young (the Contrat premiere embauche) that allowed employers to fire workers 
under the age of 26 without motive, a wave of protests were staged all over the country for months. 
Eventually, first President Chirac and then the Prime Minister were forced to concede and the 
government withdrew the measure79.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to trace French employment policies and debates from the immediate post­
war years. It has told a story of changing growth patterns and changing modes of intervention of 
public policy in the labour market. In doing so it has focused, on the one hand, on the changing 
conception of the problems of the French labour market and of the appropriate solutions and, on the 
other hand, on the evolution of employment policy-making -  i.e. the actors who were involved in 
policy choices, the institutional framework in which they made them and the resources at their 
disposal. The aims were to determine a clear empirical focus for the next chapter -  which policy 
choices of recent years might have been inspired by the EES? -  and to identify relevant actors and 
institutional settings. The next chapter investigates in detail how these policy choices were made 
and whether a link can be established between these and the Strategy.
The first contention this chapter makes is that the ways in which the French state intervenes 
in the labour market have changed over time. The first explicit policies for employment were 
launched in the wake of the economic crisis of the 1970s to protect workers in the core industrial
77 See above.
78 The 2004 reform of collective bargaining provides also that firm-level agreements must no longer be consistent with 
higher-level ones, thereby further reinforcing the trend toward microcorporatism and decentralisation French industrial 
relations had experienced from the 1980s (Howell 1992; Lallement 2006).
79 Le Monde, 8 April 2006.
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sectors and promote the insertion of specific groups (the young, the disabled). In the 1980s the 
network of publicly funded benefits and make-work programmes was extended and the first 
attempts were made to introduce elements of flexibility and de-regulation in an otherwise tightly 
regulated labour market. In the 1990s, in the face of rising unemployment and new European 
constraints, governments of different political colour focused on cutting labour costs, containing 
public expenditure, creating jobs in specific sectors and managing work-time as a means to boost 
employment. Many of the initiatives taken after the launch of the EES stand in continuity with this 
trend (the Emplois Jeunes, the lois Aubry). Yet other policy choices reflected a new interest in 
keeping as many people as possible in employment, helping the unemployed to find new jobs and 
eliminating the disincentives that might keep them from taking up paid employment. Thus the 
reform of public employment services, the reform of the vocational training system and the launch 
of an action plan to promote the employment of older workers all resonate with the EES and 
respond to new themes in the French debate (prevention of long-term unemployment, lifelong 
learning, active ageing).
The second argument advanced by this chapter is that employment policy-making in France 
is characterised by the predominance of public authorities and the marginalisation of interest 
organisations. With respect to the hypotheses advanced in Chapter 1, thus, France looks like a 
typical ‘single-actor’ system (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004) in which only restricted circles of 
governmental actors (Ministers, advisors, top civil servants) are involved in policy-making. Here 
again, however, things have changed over the last fifty years. For most of the post-war period 
collective bargaining was almost non-existent and the state found it easier to manage the labour 
market from above by setting wage levels and extending the few agreements that were signed to 
entire regions and sectors. In the 1990s, though, the need to reform social policies and retrench 
expenditure made it necessary to forge coalitions with the more moderate fringes of the labour 
movement. Efforts were made to spread shared interpretations of the existing problems through the 
proliferation of expert committees and reports. A wave of inter-professional negotiations was 
launched in 2000-01 with the aim of dealing independently with issues that unions and employers 
deemed to be within their domain. Thus, although French employment policy-making is still very 
much the province of governmental initiative, it is today more inclusive than it has ever been. The 
origin of policy choices must, therefore, be searched not only m, but also around government, i.e. in 
the leadership of the trade unions and of the employers’ organisation as well as in the networks of 
experts and civil servants that compose the boards of public agencies (ANPE, UNEDIC) and 
advisory bodies (COE, COR, CAS).
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CHAPTER IV
T h e  E u ro p ea n  E m p lo y m en t S t r a t e g y  and P o l i c y  C h a n g e  in  F ra n ce : T h e  
D iffu s io n  o f  t h e  EES D isc o u r se  a s  an  In s tr u m e n t o f  S t a t e  P o w e r
The previous chapter has charted the evolution of employment policies and policy-making in 
France before and after the launch of the EES. It was shown that the 1990s were a period of high 
political instability and growing unemployment, where repeated attempts to reform employment 
and social policies in the wake of the completion of the Single Market and the run-up to EMU were 
met with considerable opposition. Despite their continuing weakness, unions and employers were 
frequently involved in the design and implementation of policy to an extent that was unprecedented 
in France. The MEDEF and the five major union confederations even started a series of inter­
professional negotiations in order to regulate independently matters such as unemployment 
insurance, complementary pensions and vocational training. Thus some new themes entered French 
employment policy debates. Notions such as the activation of the unemployed, active ageing, 
lifelong learning were somewhat alien to the French tradition and were, instead, very much in line 
with the employment policy discourse promoted by the EES.
The following sections seek to analyse a number of select policy changes identified by the 
previous chapter (the reform of employment services, the action plan for the employment of older 
workers, the reform of vocational training), trace the process behind them and investigate the 
relation between them and the Strategy. Section 1 examines how the drafting of the NAPs was 
conducted in France and the administrative adjustments that had to be made in order to meet the 
coordination requirements. Section 2 analyses these changes in more detail and investigates their 
consequences on French policy-making. It is maintained that, even though the government lost 
interest in the Strategy after the first couple of years of its operation, it was the haute 
administration, traditionally powerful in France, that took charge of it as a means to influence the 
development of policy debates. Great efforts were made to diffuse information on the guidelines 
and to include the social partners in the drafting of the NAPs. However, notwithstanding this and 
despite the fact that the adoption of new analytical tools (especially of the employment rate as a 
headline indicator instead of the unemployment rate) strengthened the position of those who used 
arguments consistent with the Strategy, the coalition advocating the EES discourse always remained 
narrow and secluded within restricted circles. Section 3, finally, analyses in detail three cases of 
policy change in areas that had been highlighted by the EES recommendations as inconsistent with 
the guidelines, so as to show the role that the Strategy played in the process leading to them.
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The analysis investigates the link French actors (the higher civil service, the social partners, 
public agencies like the ANPE) drew between domestic and EU-level arguments and debates and 
how that affected the changes that were made. It is contended here that the specificity of the French 
context, in which few actors are involved in decision-making and an important role is played by 
central state authorities in adopting and implementing policy, allowed the narrow coalition 
advocating the EES discourse to have an influence on policy change. The diffusion of the Strategy’s 
policy model, it is argued, was meant to spread awareness of the need for change and provide a 
language that was acceptable to all, thereby facilitating agreement in a system of industrial relations 
marked by conflict. In so doing, the goal sought by the coalition advocating the EES discourse was 
to increase the power of the state to push through change in a context in which reform had often 
been blocked by popular protests and the opposition of interest organisations. The nature of the 
impact on policy outcomes depended, in turn, on the non-binding and vague character of the 
Employment Guidelines. The EU guidelines and targets, it is contended, had a significant influence 
on the conception of policy problems and goals, but only rarely did they affect the design of specific 
policy provisions and the institutional settings that were meant to deliver them. In the cases of 
reform discussed in this chapter the goals and problems to be addressed have been re-directed and 
given new content, but specific policy provisions and institutional settings have kept some of their 
national specificity.
1. The European Employment Strategy in France
The Jospin government actively pushed for the insertion of an employment title in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam as a means of redressing the perceived imbalance between the economic and social 
dimensions of European integration. Yet, according to the interviews with senior civil servants cited 
by Barbier and Samba Sylla (2001) and Salais et al. (2002), France was less effective in trying to 
influence the content of the strategy. The French delegation is said to have simply supported a pre­
existing project, which had been largely the work of Allan Larsson, then Director General of DG- 
Employment, with the backing of the Council Presidency held by Luxembourg’s Prime Minister 
Jean-Claude Juncker80. The Labour Minister of the time, Martine Aubry, was mainly concerned at 
the time with the grandes lois on the 35-hour work week and the Emplois Jeunes and did not pay 
much attention to the process.
80 In an interview cited in Barbier and Samba Sylla (2004 : pp.47-48) Allan Larsson himself confirms this point:
‘France helped in... building up a “window of opportunity” in the political process by calling fo r  the implementation of 
the EES prior to Treaty ratification, but the content was already there. We were in an exceptional situation, where 
Luxembourg played a crucial role... The UK government wanted to “operationalise” the welfare-to-workprogrammes 
and wanted to see the results o f the Cardiff process’.
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As a result, the employment policy model upheld by the EES appears somewhat distant from 
French traditions and the employment guidelines use a vocabulary that is somewhat alien to the 
French debates of the time at which the Strategy was launched. By way of comparison, the five-year 
law adopted by the Balladur government in 199381, possibly the most developed example of a 
systemic intervention on the French labour market in the 1990s, already reflects some of the 
concerns that would later appear in the guidelines, notably the lowering of labour costs, the 
development of employment in the services sector, the reduction of the administrative burden on 
companies, the involvement of local authorities in the domain of vocational training, the 
modernisation of work time and organisation. Nevertheless, there is still no trace of some of the 
EES’ main catchwords: ‘prevention’ of long-term unemployment, ‘active ageing’, ‘adaptability’ 
and ‘entrepreneurship’. There is no mention of such issues as the transition from assistance to work, 
‘lifelong learning’ or ‘making work pay’. At the same time, such high-profile initiatives of the 
French government of the time as work-time reduction were never taken up in the context of the 
Strategy. On the contrary, in some instances these were openly criticised at the EU level. The 1998 
BEPGs, for instance, warned that ‘a compulsory and across the board reduction in working time..., 
in part prompted by the desire to increase the level of employment, may have adverse consequences 
and should therefore be avoided' (European Commission 1998: p. 19). When the Commission and 
the Council started to adopt single country recommendations in 2000, France was one of the 
member states that received the highest number of them every year82.
The reaction to this was, at least in the early stages, one of resistance. French policy-makers 
resented the use of international English as a lingua franca by the Strategy, arguing that the 
specificity of national policy traditions would be lost. For instance, one of Barbier and Samba 
Sylla’s interviewees mentions the fact that the Strategy’s chosen language disregarded the 
difference between income taxes (impdts) and social charges (cotisations) (Barbier and Samba Sylla 
2001: p.72). Considerable efforts were thus made since the beginning to adapt the Strategy’s 
vocabulary and to make it politically acceptable to the government of the day. Hence 
‘employability’ became ‘capacite d ’insertion professionnelle’ (ability to enter the labour market) 
and ‘flexibility’ became ‘souplesse ’ (suppleness). There is evidence, however, that this resistance 
eased as time went by. For instance, the very word ‘employability’ was at first banned from French 
documents. One of Salais’ interviewees, though, recalls that the word started to circulate in notes 
and briefings between quotation marks and then slowly entered the everyday jargon of the 
administration (Salais etal. 2002: p.27).
81 LOI, 93-1313,1993-12-20, quinquennale relative au travail, a Vemploi et a la formation professionnelle (see Chapter 
3>-82 See below.
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French civil servants now take pride in having always accepted and responded to the 
employment recommendations, and in having never negotiated them beforehand with the 
Commission (Barbier and Samba Sylla 2001). The French contribution to the mid-term evaluation 
of the EES, which was prepared by the Ministry of Labour on the basis of a number of contributions 
written by internal and external experts, expresses a great deal of enthusiasm about the Strategy and 
its positive impact on France’s policies and policy processes (France 2002). The EES is referred to 
as having provided French employment policies with a new frame of reference (the Employment 
Guidelines), changed the content and focus of existing policies (the employment as opposed to the 
unemployment rate, a ‘preventative’ as opposed to a ‘curative’ approach to unemployment), 
involved actors and stakeholders who were not previously involved in employment policy-making 
(the social partners, the Ministries of Finance, Industry, Education). The instances of policy change 
discussed in the last section of this chapter show that EES influence was indeed significant, 
although it took a somewhat indirect route83.
Although the Jospin government was very active in supporting the insertion of a title on 
employment in the Amsterdam Treaty, it took some time for the French administration to adjust to 
the new requirements of the coordination exercise. The drafting of the first two NAPs was slow and 
uncertain, and was met by a degree of resistance from parts of the central administration. The 
Ministry of Labour, which was expected to take charge of the document, was very busy at the time 
with the preparation of the lois Aubry on the reduction of work time and with the implementation of 
the Emplois Jeunes. The Ministry of Finance, which was meant to provide concrete budgetary 
figures to uphold the commitments made in the plan, had considerable reservations regarding the 
multi-annual character of the NAP and was only reassured by the insertion of a statement on the 
‘yearly recurrence of budgetary choices’ (Salais et al. 2002: p. 14). As a result, in 1998 and 1999 the 
process was marred by continuous delays. In both years it was the Prime Minister’s office that was 
eventually forced to take the lead through a service called SGCI (Secretariat General pour la 
Coordination Interministerielle sur les Affaires Europeennes), which took care of coordinating the 
exercise, apportioning the tasks to the Ministries concerned (Labour, Finance, Education) and 
putting together a full draft of the document84. In order to draw attention on the exercise, the NAPs 
were published by the Documentation Frangaise, the government’s official publishing house, and 
prefaced by the Prime Minister himself.
In the first few plans the emphasis was put on the main initiatives of the Jospin government 
in the field of employment. Since some of these had proved to be controversial, the NAP was a
83 See below.
84 Favarel, B. Interview with the author on 21 February 2007. Paris.
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good opportunity to re-package them so as to show that they were ‘in line with Europe’85. Thus the 
statutory reduction of work time was presented as a response to the guidelines regarding the 
modernisation of work organisation (third pillar). The Emplois Jeunes were presented under the 
guidelines on the promotion of new activities in the services sector (second pillar) and the 
programme Nouvelles Chances (a plan of the Ministry of Education to prevent school drop-outs) 
under those on improving workers’ skills and employability (first pillar). Yet the novelty of the 
exercise and the interest shown for it at the highest political level prompted the insertion in the plan 
of innovative measures as well. The 1998 NAP, thus, announced the launch of a new programme 
called, paraphrasing the first Employment Guideline, Nouveau Depart (literally, ‘new start’), which 
was meant to provide individualised support for job-seekers after a given period of 
unemployment . Interestingly, this move caused some friction between the Ministry of Labour and 
the Ministry of Finance, as the former used the announcement of the launch of Nouveau Depart to 
ask for (and obtain) more funds for the public employment agency in the budget negotiations of the 
following autumn. As a consequence, since 1999 the Ministry of Finance took great care to check 
and validate the final version of the plan before it was sent to Brussels, in order to make sure that 
the government would not make spending commitments it had not agreed to (Salais et al. 2002; 
Erhel et al. 2005).
o<7
After 2000, however, the nature of the drafting process changed radically . The lead was 
now taken by the Ministry of Labour, whereas neither the Prime Minister’s office nor other 
Ministries were involved to the same extent as before. The procedure that was followed generally 
started with a meeting at the Hotel de Matignon (the residence of the Prime Minister) where the 
main lines of the new NAP were agreed. The post then passed to the Directorate-General for 
employment and vocational training (DGEFP) and the Direction in charge of research and statistics 
(DARES) of the Ministry of Labour, which did most of the writing and researching. The final draft 
of the document, which included also contributions from the other Ministries involved (mainly 
Finance and Education) as well as of other relevant services like the ANPE and the AFPA (a semi­
public body in charge of providing vocational training for adults), was then circulated again to all 
the concerned parties and to the Prime Minister’s office for validation before being sent off88. The 
drafting process thus gradually became more routinised and bureaucratic and the plans became 
more repetitive, even though they improved in terms of presentation and of the use of data and 
indicators (Barbier and Samba Sylla 2001; Ehrel et al. 2005). Predictably, the NAPs quickly lost
85 Le Figaro, 16 April 1998.
86 See below.
87 Favarel, B. Interview with the author on 21 February 2007. Paris. Julien, E. Interview with the author on 7 March 
2007. Paris. Boutroue, M.-F. Interview with the author on 27 March 2007. Paris.
88 Favarel, B. Interview with the author on 21 February 2007. Paris.
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political salience and the media lost interest in them. Although the adoption of the first few plans 
had been reported by the main quality newspapers, after 2000 the Strategy became practically 
invisible to the public eye.
As the political level lost interest in the Strategy, though, the haute administration was quick 
to grasp its potential. Thus, although the involvement of the Ministers of this period (Martine 
Aubry, Elisabeth Guigou, Francis Fillon, Jean-Luis Borloo) remained somewhat superficial89, the 
Ministry’s bureaucracy became an enthusiastic participant in the coordination exercise, both at the 
EU and at the national level. In the year 2000, as the Labour Ministry acquired a leading role in the 
drafting process of the NAPs, two new Director-Generals were appointed in the two Directions of 
the Ministry that were given the task to deal with it: the DGEFP (Catherine Barbaroux) and the 
DARES (Annie Fouquet). It was the new Directors-General that represented France in the meetings 
of the Employment Committee, and not some lower-ranked officers or experts of labour law or 
European affairs as was the case for other member states (IGAS 2006). French civil servants were 
very active in the process of building the Strategy’s indicators and Mrs. Fouquet even served as 
Vice-President of the Committee and President of the Indicators Group between 2003 and 200590. 
Furthermore, representatives of the Ministry and independent French experts took part in several 
peer review sessions organised by the Commission, and the relevant reports were subsequently the 
object of seminars and meetings organised back home91.
Yet the most considerable efforts were made to attract the interest of the social partners, 
whose involvement in the writing of the first two NAPs had been very limited. In order to consult 
the unions and the employers on all matters concerning the EES, in 1998 it was decided to revive an 
informal committee within the Ministry’s Direction for European and International Affairs (DAEI) 
known as ‘comite Blanchard* after a former Inspector General who had represented France in the 
DLO. The committee was re-named CDSEI (Comite du Dialogue Social pour les Questions 
Europeennes et Internationales) and its composition and functions were re-defined by a ministerial 
decree. The CDSEI was to provide a formal framework for discussion with the five union 
confederations and the main employers’ associations on all European and international issues that 
were of interest to them, but consultation on the NAPs occupied since the beginning a large part of
89 Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 2007. Paris: ‘moi j ’ai eu la plus grande difficulte a interesser 
les Ministres. Aufond ils lisaient lespapiers qu’on preparait, mais il n ’y  avaitpas une reelle implication. Mais ga tient 
aufait qu’en France le Ministre des affaires sociales delegue beaucoup la strategic au Ministre des affaires 
europeennes ou au Ministre des affaires etrangeres et ne passe pas beaucoup de temps sur les questions 
intemationales. Nous n ’avonspas unpays encore culturellement tres ouvert sur Vinternational dans le secteur des 
affaires sociales, je  veux d ire’.
Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 2007. Paris. Charpail, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 
2007. Paris.
91 Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 2007. Paris.
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the Committee’s activities 92. Although in 1998 and 1999 employers and unions were given the 
plans when they were already in their final form and about to be sent to Brussels, from 2000 an 
entirely new procedure was adopted. The social partners were now consulted in the framework of 
the CDSEI from the very early stages of the drafting process, starting from the project for the new 
set of Employment Guidelines for the following year before it was even passed by the Council. 
Furthermore, in order to reach a common interpretation of the guidelines five working groups were 
set up on the issues that were deemed to be the most ‘critical’ for France: lifelong learning; the 
employment of older workers; wages and qualifications; work conditions; and gender equality93. 
Detailed discussions on the NAP were held regularly within the CDSEI, so that, by the time a final 
version was reached, all the interested parties would be aware of its content. The NAP remained a 
fully governmental document in the sense that its text was never negotiated in its entirety with the 
social partners. Yet employers and unions were encouraged to give their original contributions, 
which were first annexed and then (in 2004) included in separate boxes into the body of the plan. In 
addition, the social partners were invited to participate in the bilateral meetings with the 
Commission in Brussels. After an initial period of adjustment in which the representatives of the 
Ministry and those of the social partners were called in to discuss the French NAPs with the 
Commission in separate sessions, it was agreed to hold single meetings with both parties both in 
2003 and in 200494.
With the reform of the Lisbon Strategy’s governance framework and the introduction of new 
reporting obligations in 2005, the drafting process changed radically yet again. The Prime 
Minister’s office took back responsibility for coordinating the process and selecting the priorities to 
be included in the three-year National Reform Programme (NRP). The secretariat in charge of EU 
affairs (the old SGCI), recently re-named Secretariat General aux Affaires Europeennes (SGAE), 
takes care of coordinating the exercise and putting together the contributions of the different 
Ministries involved (Finance, Industry, Labour, Education and Research) into a single document. 
The Ministry of Labour (and the DGEFP within it) is now only in charge of drafting the sections on 
employment, but must follow a blueprint decided a priori. As a result, not all the issues that it 
considered important were included in the plan: equal opportunities and quality of work, for 
instance, are practically absent. Also, the Ministry had to fight to put more emphasis than it had 
originally been established on the employment of older workers95. Moreover, as the highest political 
level took over from the bureaucracy of the Labour Ministry, the process immediately became less
92 Favarel, B. Interview with the author on 21 February 2007. Paris.
93 Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 2007. Paris.
94 Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 2007. Paris. Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 
2007. Paris.
95 Mechin, C. Interview with the author on 22 February 2007. Paris.
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inclusive. The NRP was simply ‘presented’ to the social partners in the CDSEI by Jean-Luis Borloo 
on 21 October, that is, ten days after it was adopted by the Council of Ministers, even though their 
written comments on the plan were duly transmitted to the Commission along with it (Republique 
Fran9aise 2006).
The drafting of the French NAPs on employment, in sum, has so far been a somewhat 
contested process in which the lead was taken, at different times, by the political leadership of the 
government and by the haute administration. At times when the Prime Minister’s office took 
charge, the exercise was conducted mainly through inter-ministerial coordination and remained 
almost entirely impenetrable to non-governmental actors. Then, as the political level lost interest in 
the process and the responsibility of the plan passed almost entirely to the Ministry of Labour, it 
was the very top of the Ministry’s bureaucracy that proved eager to take command. The most 
evident consequence was that the plans became more repetitive and bureaucratic. Yet, at the same 
time, this stimulated a number of administrative adjustments, facilitated the diffusion of information 
and greatly improved the involvement of the social partners. The next section analyses these 
changes in more detail and begins to investigate their consequences.
2. The diffusion of the EES discourse as an instrument of state power
The previous chapter argued that the main attribute of French policy-making is the dirigiste attitude 
of a remarkably powerful and insulated State machine, characterised by a strong executive, large 
political parties and a considerable control over key policy-related resources, such as the control 
over the flow of funds in the economy and access to relevant information and expertise. The high 
civil service, recruited and trained by the grandes ecoles created after the war, always played an 
important role in policy-making and implementation, both in and around government. Unlike in 
Italy, it was the haute administration that always represented the French government in 
international organisations and fora96. It was top-level fonctionnaires who often ran the public- 
sector companies that implemented the State’s industrial and labour policies (Hancke 2001). 
Whereas in Italy the production and analysis of information and the selection of policy options has 
long involved experts and academics external to the administration, following a trend that greatly 
increased in the 1990s97, in France considerable efforts were made to keep it within the State 
apparatus. Thus the practice of economic planning as well as the many reports requested over the 
years from senior civil servants in different policy sectors greatly contributed to setting the terms of
96 Favarel, B. Interview with the author on 21 February 2007. Paris.
97 See Chapters 5 and 6.
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national policy debates . It was the higher civil service, finally, that led the public agencies in 
charge of collecting and treating policy-related information (the INSEE, the Commissariat General 
du Plan) and composed most of the boards of the advisory bodies created in recent years with 
functions of policy research, analysis and proposal in specific fields -  the Conseil d ’orientation des 
retraites (COR) for pensions, the Conseil d ’orientation de Vemploi (COE) for employment and the 
Conseil d ’analyse strategique (CAS) for economic and social policy reform".
In this context, that fact that, faced with the relative indifference of the political level, the 
haute administration in France developed an active interest in the EES becomes significant. This 
seems to confirm the hypothesis (hypothesis 2100) that the composition of domestic coalitions 
advocating the Strategy’s discourse would depend on the specific features of national systems of 
policy-making, such as the role assigned to top civil servants in policy formulation. This also seems 
to validate hypothesis 3, which postulates that, given the non-transparent, bureaucratic nature of the 
NAPs, national coalitions are only likely to involve actors coming from restricted ministerial 
circles101.
It is contended here, in particular, that the EES was seen by the haute administration of the 
Ministry of Labour as a resource, a lever to gain influence over the conduct of employment policy.
1 (19The reasons for this were, as suggested by hypothesis 1 , a mix of normative and strategic
considerations. On the one hand, it is worth noting that the new Directors-General of the DGEFP 
and the DARES appointed in 2000 did not come from the civil service but, respectively, from the 
private corporate sector and academic research103, which implies that they felt less of an attachment 
to the policy models and decisions that were adopted before they took on direct policy 
responsibilities. During their tenure, they spent as much as 15/20% of their time following the 
Strategy’s procedures in Brussels (meetings of the EMCO, bilateral encounters with the 
Commission, peer reviews) on top of the work to be done in Paris to draft the NAPs. They quickly 
became very familiar with the workings and content of the EES, and were persuaded of its potential 
for structuring the national policy debates and introducing new issues on the agenda104. The 
interviews conducted for this work with the French civil servants involved in the coordination 
process reveal that they were personally convinced that the policy model upheld by the Strategy
98 See Chapter 3.
99 See Chapter 3.
100 See Chapter 1.
101 See Chapter 1.
102 See Chapter 1.
103 Catherine Barbaroux had been responsible for human resources at Pinault-Printemps-Redoute and Annie Fouquet 
came from the academia and from a long experience in the INSEE.
104 Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 2007. Paris. In my understanding, it is to this structuring effect 
that the French civil servants interviewed in the impact studies on the Strategy refer to when they speak about the 
‘coherence’ that the EES has brought to French employment policies (Barbier and Samba Sylla 2001; Salais et a l  2002; 
France 2002; IGAS 2006).
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represented a ‘balanced solution’ to the problems of the French labour market105. The fact was also 
mentioned that this model was consistent with a widespread international employment policy 
consensus, which was reflected, with some differences in emphasis, by the recommendations bodies 
like the OECD had repeatedly addressed to France.
On the other hand, this broad normative thrust was complemented by a more strategic 
interest in advocating the EES discourse. As convincingly argued by Smith (2006), the quick 
acceleration of the European integration process has the potential further to strengthen the 
concentration of policy-making authority within the state apparatus. As a result of the growing 
number of sectors in which policy must conform to the acquis communautaire or secure EU 
approval, and of the many others in which the Union structures different forms of coordination 
among member states, the way in which policy is formulated now centres on coordinating among 
Ministries in a quasi-diplomatic fashion a unitary French position to be presented at the EU level. 
The emphasis is now more on forging coalitions across issue-areas in Europe and less on striking 
compromises with the affected interests back home: Consequently, as policy positions are 
formulated within the government and/or at the EU level, policy-making has become even less 
transparent and inclusive than before. On the other hand, the frame of reference of national policy 
debates has shifted to privilege European, rather than just French, lines of argument (Hall 2006; 
Smith 2006). Experts and civil servants have a somewhat vested interest in advocating the adoption 
of EU discourses as these are typically technical and unintelligible by the larger public. This, in 
turn, tends to privilege those who master technical argumentation and have an understanding of the 
modalities of power within European networks. Thus, for those who are familiar with it, the 
diffusion of the EU discourse is inherently an instrument of power. As argued in Chapter 1, power 
here should be understood as an instrument of prise de parole, that is, as the ability to define the 
problems to be addressed and the range of possible courses of action to be taken in response. The 
advocacy and diffusion of the EES discourse, therefore, may be seen in the French case as an 
instrument to reaffirm the centralisation of policy-making authority within the state apparatus106.
A first adjustment prompted by the EES was the upgrading of analytical tools and the 
adoption of new or unused indicators. This was used as a means to highlight the urgency of policy 
change. The main example cited by the existing studies on the Strategy’s impact on French policies 
(Barbier and Samba Sylla 2001; Salais et al. 2002; France 2002; IGAS 2006) is the adoption by the 
2000 Lisbon European Council of the employment rate as a headline indicator for the Strategy. This
105 Favarel, B. Interview with the author on 21 February 2007. Paris. Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 
2007. Paris. Gauvin, A. Interview with the author on 26 March 2007. Paris. Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 
28 March 2007. Paris.
106 See below.
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apparently minor change of focus from the traditional attention paid to the unemployment or the 
activity rates in reality entailed a significant shift in thinking, in particular as regards the definition 
of the problems faced by groups that are underrepresented in the French labour market (especially 
workers under the age of 25 and over the age of 55)107. It is worth nothing that while the exact 
definition of more specific, less visible indicators such as those on the quality of jobs or the weight 
of the working poor triggered some heated discussions within the indicators group of the EMCO, 
the definition of the employment rate proved to be relatively uncontroversial. Even though the 
adoption of the gross rate (instead of the full-time equivalent) and of 15 to 64 as the reference age 
range to calculate it (instead of, for instance, 20 to 59) put France’s situation in a particularly bad 
light, these were accepted by French officials almost without objections (IGAS 2006)108.
In addition to this, in order to make the most of the opportunities offered by the EES, the 
haute administration tried to exploit the adjustments prompted by the NAP drafting process. Great 
importance was attached to the dialogue with the social partners and the work of the CDSEI. As the 
discussion in the previous chapter indicates, even though the State still plays a large role in the 
distribution of resources, France is today a more open and negotiated polity, where it is not 
uncommon that policy-making and implementation might depend on the agreement of non­
governmental actors and local governments (Hall 2006). The social partners, albeit weakly 
organised and scarcely representative, have become influential actors in the politics of employment 
and welfare reform and successive governments have had to gain the support of at least some of 
them for their reform efforts. In this context, the higher civil service found that the EES used a 
language that was acceptable to all and had the potential to diminish the level of conflict that 
characterised French industrial relations. Thus one of the Strategy’s weaknesses according to the 
literature -  i.e. its flexibility and indeterminateness, designed to cater for different interests and 
policy traditions (see Barbier 2005) -  was turned into a resource. Consultation on the NAPs entailed 
discussions between the government and the social partners on a range of issues that was absolutely 
unprecedented in France. Involving them in EU-wide discussions regarding such issues as job 
placement and the services to be offered to the unemployed, lifelong learning, the taxation of labour 
and the employment of older workers was also a means of providing the social partners with 
additional resources (ideas, projects, arguments)109 at a time when their weakness was seen as one 
of the reasons for France’s difficulties to reform its social policies (Palier 2002, 2006).
107 See below.
108 France’s employment rate expressed in full-time equivalent, in fact, is higher than the EU-15 average (58.7% as 
opposed to 58.5% in 2005). Also, the adoption of the 15-64 age range as a reference penalises France’s performance 
given the absence o f a developed apprenticeship system for the 15-19 year olds, on the one hand, and the retirement age 
set at 60, on the other (IGAS 2006: pp.208-209).
109 Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 2007. Paris.
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Hence, in order to add some clout to the CDSEI’s meetings, these were often chaired by the 
Director of the DGEFP, traditionally considered as the most influential Directorate of the Ministry 
of Labour since it is in charge, among other things, of distributing public aid for industrial 
restructuring and of giving advice on the validation of collective agreements110. Remarkably, the 
social partners, who in the first few years of the Strategy had been represented at the CDSEI mainly 
by experts of international affairs of relatively low rank, gradually started to send top-level 
officials111. Notwithstanding the social partners’ continuing mistrust toward the value of the NAP as 
a planning document, the growing interest shown by the haute administration contributed to 
legitimising the exercise, which had been criticised by some at the beginning112. Even the union 
confederations that had shown the biggest reservations like the CGT and FO started to see some 
value in it as a means to modernise French industrial relations113. All the social partner 
representatives interviewed114 report a degree of satisfaction with the modalities with which they 
have been consulted, a good level of awareness of the EES for those at the top of their organisations 
(whereas the activists on the ground ignore it almost without exception), as well as a liking for the 
employment policy model it supports.
An additional consequence of the social partners’ involvement that was also acknowledged 
by all those interviewed is a greater awareness of the policy choices of other member states. A large 
number of seminars and colloquia involving a broad range of stakeholders were organised by the 
DGEFP and the DARES on issues included in the guidelines and recommendations so as to 
improve the diffusion of information thereon. French representatives participated eagerly in a 
number of peer review sessions abroad115. Some of the ensuing reports were the objects of thorough 
discussions back home, such as, for instance, the Finnish dossier on active ageing116. The 
circulation of information regarding the employment policies of France’s partners, in turn, fostered 
a series of bilateral and multilateral contacts outside the framework of the Strategy. Thus the French 
trade unions have started to network with their peers in other member states in order to analyse each
117other’s NAPs in the context of an association called ‘Eurexter’ . In recent years a number of ad 
hoc missions involving representatives of the Ministry and of the social partners were organised in
110 Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 2007. Paris.
111 Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 2007. Paris.
112 Favarel, B. Interview with the author on 21 February 2007. Paris.
113 Dedieu, T. Interview with the author on 8 March 2007. Paris. Boutroue, M.-F. Interview with the author on 27
March 2007. Paris.
114 Julien, E. Interview with the author on 7 March 2007. Paris. Dedieu, T. Interview with the author on 8 March 2007.
Paris. Boutroue, M.-F. Interview with the author on 27 March 2007. Paris.
115 See above.
116 Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 2007. Paris.
117 Boutroue, M.-F. Interview with the author on 27 March 2007. Paris.
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countries like Sweden and Denmark with a view to studying the functioning of the Scandinavian 
welfare states118.
In sum, the haute administration in France promoted the EES as a means of structuring 
national policy debates, highlighting the urgency of policy change and introducing new issues on 
the agenda. The institutional innovations prompted by the NAP drafting process (in particular the 
CDSEI) and the adoption of new analytical tools (new indicators) were used to diffuse information 
regarding the Strategy and strengthen the arguments in line with the guidelines and 
recommendations. Great efforts were made, in particular, to involve the social partners and provide 
them with additional resources (information, ideas, arguments) that their organisational weakness 
made it difficult for them to access otherwise119. The diffusion of the Strategy’s new language 
(activation of the unemployed, active ageing, lifelong learning) was aimed to diminish the level of 
conflict, facilitate agreement among the social partners and between them and the government and, 
ultimately, unblock policy changes that had been opposed in the past. In this sense, the advocacy 
and diffusion of the EES discourse must be seen in the broader framework of the attempts made in 
the 1990s to gain the agreement of at least some interest organisations in order to push through 
social and employment policy reforms. Top civil servants, as discussed in Chapter 3, had long 
played an important role in this strategy, by trying to diffuse shared interpretations of the existing 
problems and of the appropriate solutions via the circulation of high-level reports and the results of 
the work of expert committees120. The active interest taken by the haute administration in the 
diffusion of the EU employment policy discourse, therefore, had the purpose of empowering state 
authorities to introduce changes in the existing policies. As such, it can be said that the advocacy 
and diffusion of the EES discourse was used in France as an instrument of state power.
Yet, as said above, due to the lack of interest of the media and the progressive 
bureaucratisation of the NAPs121, the relevant national coalition always remained narrow and 
secluded within restricted ministerial circles. Awareness of the EES discourse was limited to top 
civil servants in the Ministries involved (mainly Labour), the leadership of the trade unions and of 
the MEDEF, the management of the public bodies dealing with employment policy (ANPE,
AFPA). However, according to the fifth hypothesis advanced by this work, in a system like the 
French one, where policy-making authority is highly concentrated, even this narrow coalition can
118 Le Monde, 11 November 2004 and 25 October 2005.
119 Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 2007. Paris: ‘moi dans toute cette periode Id je  les ai trouves 
tres fragiles [les partenaires sociaux], Ils etaient peu nombreux, ils etaient peu informes, ils n ’avaient pas beaucoup de 
temps, pas beaucoup de moyens. Et done voila il n ’y avait que deuxpersonnes qui s 'occupaient d'affaires 
intemationales au MEDEF. II y  avait un brave gargon (Emmanuel Julien) et il y  avait Mm. Martin. Pour la CFDT il y 
avait un tout petit peu plus d ’investissement... Notre probleme majeur il a ete a un moment donne qu’on etait nous plus 
impliques dans la construction de la Strategie que les partenaires sociaux. ’
120 See Chapter 3.
121 See above.
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be expected to have exercised significant influence. In order to validate these hypotheses, the last 
section of this chapter focuses on some select instances of policy change in areas highlighted by the 
employment recommendations as in need of reform (the reform of employment services, the reform 
of pre-retirement benefits, the reform of vocational training).
3. The EES and employment policy change in France
Despite some long-standing themes of French policy debates, such as the reduction of non-wage 
labour costs, were adopted at the European level since Delors’ 1993 White Paper, the French 
employment policy model remained somewhat distant from the one supported by the EES122. 
Accordingly, from 2000 France was given a consistently high number of single country 
recommendations by the Commission and the Council. As can be deduced from Table 4 below, the 
content of the recommendations was stable over time and focused on some long-standing features 
of the French system.
Table 4. Recommendations to France
Recommendations 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Review early retirement schemes and keep older workers 
longer in employment
yes yes yes yes yes
Reduce the administrative burden on companies yes yes no no no
Reduce fiscal pressure on labour, reform tax and benefit 
systems
yes yes yes no no
Modernise work organisation, monitor the effects of the 35- 
hour work week legislation
yes yes yes no no
Implement individualised and early intervention schemes for 
the unemployed
no yes yes yes yes
Promote lifelong learning no yes yes yes yes
Strengthen the social dialogue yes no no yes no
Avoid labour market segmentation no no no no yes
Reduce early school leaving no no no no yes
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/empiovment social/employment strategy/recomm en.htm.
The most recurrent recommendations -  i.e. the ones on active ageing, preventative 
individualised schemes for the unemployed, lifelong learning -  are linked to issues that the 
Commission seemed to consider as structural, whereas the others make reference to problems that, 
in its view, either have been subsequently tackled (the administrative burden on companies, reform
122 See Chapter 3.
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of tax and benefit systems) or are emerging (labour market segmentation, early school leaving). The 
recommendations on the monitoring of the effects of work time reduction are to be read as a 
critique of one of the mesures phares of the Jospin government and suddenly disappeared as soon as 
the government changed in 2002. Finally, the 2000 and 2003 recommendations on social dialogue 
are suggestions of method that recur over the years in many other specific recommendations, such 
as those on active ageing and lifelong learning.
Interestingly, the areas and issues highlighted by the recommendations are those in which 
the governments of recent years have taken some of their most innovative initiatives with respect to 
the established policy traditions and debates described in the previous chapter: the reform of the 
unemployment insurance and the launch of personalised services for the unemployed; the reform of 
vocational training; the Plan seniors. Whereas the previous section has tried to identify the actors 
who sought to advocate and diffuse the Strategy’s policy model and to investigate their strategies 
and motivations, the following sub-sections look for evidence of discourse diffusion and of its 
impact on policy. They trace the process behind each of these policies with a view to investigating 
the role the Strategy played in their development. Particular attention is paid to the role of the haute 
administration in diffusing information about the Strategy and on that of actors outside the central 
administration, such as the public employment agency and the social partners, in advocating it in 
the context of their interactions with each other and with the government. Great emphasis is put on 
the conditions that make discourse diffusion possible. In particular, hypothesis 5 of this thesis posits 
that discourse diffusion is more likely in ‘single-actor’ systems like France where a limited number 
of actors have a say over policy-making123.
A further hypothesis to be tested (hypothesis 6124) concerns the types of policy impacts one 
should observe. Based on Visser (2005), a distinction is drawn here among various types of 
influence that the EES can have on national policies: on the definition of the problems to be tackled; 
on the overall goals and ambitions to be reached; and on the actual design of policy solutions and 
the institutional settings that are meant to deliver them. A further distinction is drawn between two 
different types of objectives set by the Strategy: specific objectives detailing the policy means to put 
in practice the content of the guidelines and broader targets meant to mobilise the member states in 
the larger context of the Lisbon Strategy, such as the employment rate targets set in Lisbon and 
Stockholm. The hypothesis is that specific objectives play a role in the definition of the problems 
and the actual design of policy, but not of its overall goals and ambitions, whereas the broader 
targets will influence the latter as well as the definition of policy problems, but not the design of 
policy itself.
123 See Chapter 1.
124 See Chapter 1.
3.1. Individualised programmes for the unemployed: from ‘Nouveau Depart3 to PARE and PAP-ND
The EES has since the beginning put a great deal of emphasis on the role of public employment 
services and on the prevention of long-term unemployment. This issue was constantly addressed in 
the first guideline, even after the format of the guidelines changed in 2003, and was always 
complemented by specific quantitative targets. The content of the guideline remained remarkably 
stable since 1998 and reads as follows:
“In order to influence the trend in youth and long-term unemployment the M ember States will develop  
preventive and employability-oriented strategies, building on the early identification o f  individual needs; 
within a period to be determined by each M ember State which may not exceed five years and which may be 
longer in M ember States with particularly high unemployment, M ember States will ensure that:
• every unem ployed young person is offered a new start before reaching six months o f  
unemployment, in the form o f  training, retraining, work practice, a job or other employability measure;
•  unem ployed adults are also offered a fresh start before reaching tw elve months o f  unemployment 
by one o f  the aforementioned means or, more generally, by accompanying individual vocational guidance.”
This certainly constituted a great challenge for France, which by the late 1990s faced considerable
1problems of long-term and youth unemployment . The public employment agency (ANPE) has 
long been considered ineffective. The agency, which was created in 1967 as a relatively small 
organisation with limited funds and staff and with the task to deal with job placement in a period of 
full employment, was utterly unprepared to deal with the quick progression of unemployment that 
started the mid-1970s (1 million unemployed in 1976, 2 million in 1982). A few adjustments 
introducing result-oriented criteria of management were introduced in 1990, as a new device called 
contrat de progres regulated the relationship between the ANPE and the State linking the supply of 
funds to the achievement of specific targets (Marimbert 2004). A new offre de services was put in 
place in 1996, extending the range of services offered by the agency from access to relevant 
information and orientation, expert support (skills appraisals, CV building, interview practice etc.) 
and individual advice on the part of professional counsellors, to the so-called ‘social support’
(iaccompagnement social) for those who are in need of help with accommodation, health-related 
issues and the like. Yet all available surveys still showed that users had a negative opinion of the 
ANPE’s work (Tuchszirer 2002).
It was against this background that the 1998 French NAP announced the launch of the 
Nouveau Depart (literally, ‘fresh start’) programme, or, as its full name goes, the Service 
Personnalise pour un Nouveau Depart vers VEmploi (SPNDE):
125 See Chapter 3.
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“France has decided to put together the prevention and treatment o f  long-term  unem ploym ent and social 
exclu sion . In practice, our goal is to offer a ‘fresh start’ to the young as w ell as the adult job-seekers before  
they slide into long-term  unem ploym ent. [. . . ]  it is ob viously  im possible to ensure that everybody w ill find a 
new  jo b  before 6 or 12 m onths o f  being registered with the em ploym ent services. In order to speed up the 
process, this Nouveau D epart is based on regular interview s and on individualised initiatives geared toward 
m eeting the sp ecific  d ifficu lties o f  each job-seeker [ . . . ]  (France, 1998: p. 5).”
Under the terms of the new programme, all those who had been registered with the ANPE for a 
given period of time must be proposed a ‘fresh start’ suited for their specific needs. The goal was to 
come up with an individual plan aimed to help specific groups of unemployed to re-enter the labour 
market. The SPNDE was addressed to three types of beneficiaries: the young (less than 25 years of 
age) starting from their sixth month of unemployment; the unemployed adults during their twelfth 
month of unemployment; and job-seekers at risk of social exclusion (the young unemployed for 
longer than one year, the adults unemployed for longer than two years, RMI beneficiaries). The 
services offered encompassed the full range of instruments available to the ANPE as upgraded in 
1996, as well as the means and financial resources mobilised for a new support programme for 
youths in difficulty launched in 1998 and called TRACE126.
The main lines of Nouveau Depart, along with its name, were taken literally from guideline 
1 of 1998. Its launch represented a radical innovation with respect to the traditional French attitude 
toward the unemployed, which focused on the treatment of social exclusion rather than on getting 
people back into the labour market127. The intended timing of the agency’s interventions (6 and 12 
months, and then 18 and 24 in case of ongoing failure to find employment) was explicitly drawn 
from the Strategy. The third contrat de progres between the ANPE and the state, which covered the 
period between 1999 and 2003, re-focused the agency’s goals and targets to suit the new 
programme and detailed the specific policy instruments at its disposal. These belonged to the 
French tradition and, in particular, to the toolkit introduced by the nouvelle ojfre de services before 
the inception of the Strategy. Above all, however, a clear link between the SPNDE and the EES was 
drawn by the Labour Ministry, which deliberately referred to the Employment Guidelines to 
demand a considerable increase of the ANPE’s means. The management of the agency requested a 
short consultancy paper that showed that, to undertake comparable tasks, the German, British and 
Swedish employment services were given much more funds. This paper was submitted to Martine 
Aubry and subsequently formed the basis of the negotiations of that autumn between the DGEFP 
and the Ministry of the budget as a result of which the agency’s financial resources were 
substantially increased (Salais et a l 2002). On account of the ANPE’s new tasks a gradual 
augmentation of its staff was planned and included in the NAPs from 1998 to 2002. As a further
126 See the description o f TRACE on the website o f the mutual learning programme of the EES: http://www.mutual- 
leaming-emplovment.net/peerreviews/2001/10/2-3.
127 Gauvin, A. Interview with the author on 26 March 2007. Paris.
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illustration of the nexus between the Strategy and the agency’s improved resources, within the 
administration these additional jobs were often dubbed ‘emplois Luxembourg’128.
In 1999 about 800,000 job-seekers entered the SPNDE, and the number rose to about 
1,100,000 in 2000 (DARES 2006). Yet in these early stages the programme focused in particular on 
those who were already experiencing long-term unemployment (around 70% of beneficiaries), thus 
privileging a ‘curative’ rather than a ‘preventative’ approach in the Strategy’s jargon. The 
Commission harshly criticised this choice, arguing that if the employment services only treated the 
‘stock’ of unemployment rather than tackling the ‘flux’ (i.e. job-seekers in their first few months 
without work) then the former would constantly re-generate itself and ultimately never decrease129. 
It is for this reason that, notwithstanding the launch of the SPNDE was overtly inspired by the EES, 
France received several country-specific recommendations concerning the implementation of early 
intervention schemes for the unemployed.
Compliance with the Employment Guidelines improved in 2000/2001 as the SNPDE was 
extended to all job-seekers and coupled with the reform of unemployment insurance. This was the 
result of an initiative launched by the MEDEF in the framework of the refondation sociale130. The 
employers insisted that unemployment benefits should not only compensate for income losses, but 
also encourage people to find new jobs. For these purposes, the 2000 agreement on the reform of 
unemployment insurance created a new programme, the Plan d ’aide au retour a Vemploi (PARE), 
which effectively made unemployment benefits conditional on the beneficiaries’ actively looking 
for new employment. The unemployment benefit (now called Allocation d ’aide au retour a 
Vemploi) no longer decreased over time as agreed in 1992131 and its coverage was extended. In 
exchange for this, all job-seekers are now asked to participate in individual ‘roadmaps’ {Plans 
d ’action personnalises pour un nouveau depart, PAP-ND) drawn up by the employment agency 
and updated at least every six months. As a consequence of PARE entering into force, thus, the 
number of beneficiaries being sanctioned for not abiding by the job search commitments detailed in 
their PAP increased sharply. In 2002/2003 the number of radiations, i.e. cases of withdrawal of 
unemployment insurance support, averaged at 35,000 per month for a total of 340,000 people 
forfeiting their claim a year. By way of comparison, in 1991, in similar labour market conditions, 
the number of radiations reached no more than 50,000 in the whole year (Barbier and Fargion 
2004).
128 Favarel, B. Interview with the author on 21 February 2007. Paris. Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 
2007. Paris. Gauvin, A. Interview with the author 26 March 2007. Paris.
129 Favarel, B. Interview with the author on 21 February 2007. Paris. Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 
2007. Paris.
130 See Chapter 3.
131 See Chapter 3.
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IThe adoption of PARE was the outcome of a long and tormented process. All the periodic 
conventions d ’assurance-chdmage that regulate the French unemployment insurance system since 
1958 must first be agreed by the social partners that participate in the management of the insurance 
fund (UNEDIC) ad then be ratified by the government, otherwise they cannot formally come into 
force. Generally the conventions introduce minimal changes to the regime and are quickly agreed 
by the interested parties. However, the convention negotiated in 2000, denominated ‘Convention 
relative a I’aide au retour a Vemploi et a Vindemnisation du chomage ’ (agreement on the aid to re­
gain employment and unemployment insurance) and agreed by the employers and three of the five 
union confederations (CFDT, CFTC and CGC), was initially met by the staunch opposition of the 
government of the time and eventually only signed in October 2000 after a few previous versions 
had been openly rejected. What, then, made it possible finally to come to an agreement?
The conditionality of unemployment benefits had long been a major point in the agenda of 
the employers’ association132. The novelty of PARE/PAP was that it coupled conditionality with the 
supply of personalised services for the unemployed, which proceeded directly from the French 
reaction to the first set of Employment Guidelines and the launch of Nouveau Depart, of which 
PARE was essentially an extension (Tuchszirer 2002). Although the Employment Guidelines were 
not put explicitly on the table, the influence of foreign experiences was always present in the 
negotiations. For instance, one of the main promoters of the refondation sociale, the director- 
general of the MEDEF Denis Kessler, tried to steer the debate by organising well-attended 
conferences where the policy choices of other EU member states were presented in order to support 
arguments for reform in different sectors, among which, obviously, the treatment of the 
unemployed. Since, the MEDEF lacked significant organisational resources133, it is reasonable to 
expect that they exploited the information that was circulated in the context of the Strategy and 
discussed within the CDSEI.
The French trade unions had for a long time refused the notion of conditionality, which was 
accused of hurting the dignity of the unemployed, and only accepted to negotiate the proposals of 
the MEDEF once a link was established between unemployment insurance and the ‘activation’ of 
the unemployed through individualised activation services134. Eventually, only the more moderate 
union confederations decided to uphold the new convention. Unlike the CGT and FO, in fact, the 
CFDT had forsaken the radical syndicalism of the past and developed over the years a more 
moderate stance and accepted to negotiate with the government and the employers on employment
132 Julien, E. Interview with the author on 7 March 2007. Paris.
133 See above.
134 he Monde, 20 March 2000.
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and welfare reform135. Thus the attempts made to diffuse the EES discourse found fertile ground in 
the leadership of the CFDT, which was already persuaded of the necessity of coupling income 
support with the fight against unemployment136.
The notion of conditionality had long been met with strong resistance within the state 
apparatus as well137. Yet, crucially, the government did not dispute the main lines of the convention 
launching PARE. This proves the hypothesis, confirmed by all the civil servants interviewed for 
this work, that the notions of ‘employability’ and ‘activation’, which entered the vocabulary of the
1 IQadministration via the EES, enjoyed by 2000 an unprecedented degree of legitimacy . Thus the 
contrast between the signatories and the government did not concern the content of the agreement, 
but rather the modalities of its application. The government did not object to the conditionality of 
benefits, but demanded that a public body, the ANPE, be put in charge of deciding and 
implementing the sanctions. The government never disputed the goal of ‘activating’ the 
unemployed by putting in place a system of ad hoc individualised services, but insisted that these be 
offered to all job-seekers and not just to those covered by the unemployment insurance. Finally, the 
government accepted a significant cut of employers’ contributions, but asked for the UNEDIC to 
contribute to the financing of the new programme and the additional services to be provided by the 
ANPE.
It is worth noting, in the end, that the entry into force of PARE was a turning point in the life 
of the employment agency. Its launch magnified the ANPE’s tasks as well as its budget, which 
swelled from €180 million in 2001 to over €500 million in 2005, €267 million of which provided by 
the UNEDIC139. The implementation of SPNDE and PARE triggered a process that ultimately led 
to the momentous institutional changes of recent years, from the rapprochement of ANPE and 
UNEDIC to the end of the latter’s monopoly on job placement140. PARE/PAP also seems to have 
had an impact on the lives of job-seekers, as recent opinion surveys show that the agency is now 
considered to be more effective and successful than before. Moreover, the existing studies on the
135 See Chapter 3.
136 Dedieu, T. Interview with the author on 8 March 2007. Paris.
137 Annie Fouquet (interview with the author on 9 March 2007, Paris), for instance, recalls that her predecessor as the 
Director of DARES was virulently opposed to the notions o f ‘profiling’ -  that is, the drawing up o f a profile o f the job­
seeker identifying his/her strengths and weaknesses as well as the future actions to be taken to address them -  and even 
o f ‘employability’. Apparently, he accused them o f being a way of forcing the unemployed into paths decided 
deterministically by others and, thus, as forms o f ‘totalitarianism’.
138 See above on the resistance o f the French administration to the notion o f employability. Favarel, B. Interview with 
the author on 21 February 2007. Paris. Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 2007. Paris. Gauvin, A. 
Interview with the author 26 March 2007. Paris. Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 2007. Paris.
139 See the website o f the mutual learning programme of the EES: http://www.mutual-learning- 
emplovment.net/peerreviews/2004/10/18-19.
140 See Chapter 3. Gauvin, A. Interview with the author on 26 March 2007. Paris.
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impact of personalised assistance programmes prove that they have had positive effects on the 
duration of unemployment spells (DARES 2006).
3.2. Active ageing and the reform of pre-retirement benefits
The issue of active ageing is present in the Employment Guidelines since 1999. Guideline 4 asked 
member states to ‘develop, in the context of a policy for active ageing, measures such as 
maintaining working capacity, lifelong learning and other flexible working arrangements, so that 
older workers are also able to participate actively in working life \  After the re-focusing of the 
Strategy around the employment rate targets set in Lisbon and Stockholm, the emphasis on active 
ageing increased. Guideline 3 of 2001 and 2002 read as follows:
‘M ember states, if  appropriate with the social partners, w ill [...]d evelop  policies for active ageing with the 
aim o f  enhancing the capacity of, and incentives for, older workers to remain in the labour force as long as 
possible, in particular by:
•  adopting positive measures to maintain working capacity and skills o f  older workers, [ ...]  in 
particular through sufficient access to education and training, to introduce flexible working 
arrangements including, for exam ple, part-time work if  workers so choose, and to raise employers' 
awareness o f  the potential o f  older workers; and
•  reviewing tax and benefit system s in order to reduce disincentives and make it more attractive for 
older workers to continue participating in the labour market.’
France’s employment rate was (and still is) one of the lowest in the EU as far as the 55-64 age 
cohort is concerned. With an employment rate of 28.8% in 1999, it was only treaded by Italy and 
Belgium on this indicator among the EU-15 member states. Even though some improvements were 
made over the years, it consistently under-performed when compared to the EU average (37% in 
2003 as against an EU-15 average of 40%). Unsurprisingly, thus, France received country-specific 
recommendations on active ageing every year since 2000. Recommendation 1 of 2000, for instance, 
provides that *France should review existing benefit schemes, particularly those facilitating early 
retirement, in order to keep older workers longer in active life*.
Notwithstanding this, the numbers of those benefiting from early retirement measures 
showed no significant drop in recent years, hi 2001 204,000 workers took part in various early 
retirement schemes and a further 365,000 assisted unemployed over 55 years of age were allowed 
not to seek new jobs. In 1994 the corresponding figures were 210,000 and 284,000 respectively 
(Barbier and Fargion 2004; Barbier 2006). These numbers point to the considerable endurance of 
inherited practices in this field, which is to be explained by reference to a widespread social and 
political consensus around early retirement (Ehrel et al. 2005). French firms have long used these
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schemes as a tool to modernise work organisation and renew the labour force. Trade unions tended 
to see them as a matter of social justice and as a means of compensating workers for difficult 
working conditions. Governments, finally, never really abandoned the logic of traitement social du 
chomage and kept on making recourse to early retirement to fight unemployment and keep social 
peace. The existence of such a consensus, mixing economic efficiency, social justice and political 
considerations, has made reform attempts extremely difficult for a long time.
Against this background, the French NAPs seem to show a gradual process of prise de 
conscience. Whereas the 1998 NAP focuses almost exclusively on the fight against unemployment 
and on offering a Nouveau Depart to those at risk of long-term unemployment, the issue of the 
employment of older workers appears for the first time in 1999. The plans written under the Jospin 
government, i.e. those until 2002, put growing emphasis on the issue and list a first series of 
measures taken to address it: the increase of the fee to be paid by firms that choose to fire workers 
over the age of 50 (contribution Delalande); the gradual decrease and re-focusing of public pre­
retirement schemes; measures encouraging a gradual transition from work to retirement. No explicit 
employment rate target is set for the 55-64 year olds, but reference is made to the efforts made to 
reach a ‘shared interpretation’ of the problem with the social partners both within the CDSEI and 
the Conseil d ’orientation des retraites (COR). The NAPs for 2003 and 2004 and the 2005 NRP, 
then, confirm the diagnosis of the problems caused by the low participation of older workers, 
especially with reference to labour shortages in several sectors and the future retirement en masse of 
the baby boomers’ generation. The 2003 NAP fixes for the first time some quantitative targets: 
increase by 5 percentage points the employment rate of older workers and increase of the average 
age of retirement to 59 by 2008. Mention is made of the 2003 pension reform that raised to forty the 
years of contributions necessary to access a full pension and raised taxes on firms’ pre-retirement 
schemes. The 2004 NAP mentions the reform of vocational training141, saying that the action in 
favour of lifelong learning would benefit older workers, who are generally those who participate the 
least in training activities. Finally, the NRP puts great emphasis on the social partners’ agreement 
on the employment of older workers negotiated in 2005 and announces for 2006 an action plan on 
the issue (the Plan seniors) with a view to reforming all the existing measures to keep older workers 
in employment or encourage their return to the labour market. The plan (Conseil Economique et 
Social 2006) provides for the gradual demise of the contribution Delalande, which had proved to 
work as a disincentive for firms to hire workers approaching the age of 50, introduces a new
141 See below.
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temporary contract destined to the unemployed over the age of 57 and financial incentives for those 
who wish to keep working after having matured the right to a full pension142.
The problems linked to the employment of older workers were discussed in France as early 
as in 1960, when a commission chaired by Pierre Laroque, the father of the French welfare state, 
was set up to study the issues of population ageing and the sustainability of retirement systems 
(IGAS 2006). Yet they have clearly become the focus of renewed attention around the year 2000, 
and the discussions and debates conducted since make explicit reference to EU objectives and 
recommendations. The emphasis put on the employment rate as a major component of the European 
employment discourse seems to have played an important role in developing an new awareness of 
the problems of specific segments of the workforce: women, the young and, especially, workers 
over 55 years of age. The EU is not the only international body that refers frequently to the 
employment rate -  the OECD adopted it years before - , but the Lisbon targets gave it a visibility 
and a political saliency it never had before. Unsurprisingly, this shift was met by some resistance. 
For instance, when Allan Larsson paid a visit to Paris to plead for the use of the employment rate as 
early as in March 1998 the civil servants that were present were reportedly somewhat shocked to 
hear for the first time that pre-retirement benefits were the source of macro-economic imbalances 
(Salais et al. 2002: p.33). Yet French policy-makers became quickly familiar with it. So much so 
that, as the previous discussion indicates, the French representatives in the EMCO deliberately 
accepted definition of the employment rate that put their labour market performance in a 
particularly bad light. According to the interviews conducted for this work143, the discussions that 
took place within the CDSEI and the circulation of information on the topic played an important 
role in the emergence of a consensus among a wide range of interested parties, which was apparent 
in the discussions in Brussels on pre-retirement benefits between the European Commission, on one 
side, and the French government and social partners, on the other. This consensus is also evident in 
a series of reports produced by bodies in which the social partners are represented alongside the 
government. The COR consistently made reference to the Lisbon and Stockholm objectives since its 
first report (COR 2001), and so does the 2001 report of the Conseil economique et social on age and 
employment (Conseil Economique et Social 2001). Finally, both the inter-professional agreement 
and the Plan seniors cite the target set in Stockholm of a 50% employment rate for older workers by 
2010 as their main goal. The former, in particular, mentions since the introduction the weakness of 
the French employment rate when compared to the European average and spells out the social 
partners’ commitment to pursuing the Lisbon and Stockholm objectives: 'by the present accord, the
142 See Chapter 3.
143 Favarel, B. Interview with the author on 21 February 2007. Paris. Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 
2007. Paris. Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 2007. Paris.
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signatories intend to partake, in their respective domains, in the achievement of this objective by 
contributing to the defence and increase of the employment of older workers’144.
The reform of pre-retirement benefits, thus, is an area where diffusion of information 
regarding the EES and the adoption of the analytical tools and targets it promotes brought about a 
significant shift in the conception of policy problems and policy goals. Even though it is too early to 
gauge the effects of the Plan seniors, however, the studies conducted by the DARES leave little 
room for optimism. The rise in the employment rate of 55-64 year olds recorded in recent years, in 
fact, is said to be the effect of the entry in this age cohort of the generation of baby boomers. Once 
they will reach the age of retirement, the present progression of the employment rate is likely to 
slow down and eventually stop around 2011 (DARES 2006; IGAS 2006).
3.3. Lifelong learning and the reform of vocational training
Lifelong learning was present in the Employment Guidelines since the first set was adopted in 1998. 
The emphasis put on it increased over the years: lifelong learning was first mentioned in the 
guidelines on active ageing and the modernisation of work organisation, then it was made the object 
of a specific guideline since 1999 and, starting from 2001, of a specific horizontal objective. 
Guideline 4 of the new format of the guidelines adopted in 2003 is entitled *Promote the 
Development of Human Capital and Lifelong Learning’'.
‘M ember States w ill implement lifelong learning strategies, including through improving the quality and 
efficiency o f  education and training system s, in order to equip all individuals with the skills required for a 
m odem  workforce in a knowledge-based society, to permit their career developm ent and to reduce skills 
mismatch and bottlenecks in the labour market.
In accordance with national priorities, policies will aim in particular to achieve the follow ing outcom es by 
2010:
•  [ . . . ]  the European Union average level o f participation in lifelong learning should be at least
12.5% o f  the adult working-age population (25 to 64 age group).
P olicies w ill aim  in particular to achieve an increase in investment in human resources. In this context, it is 
important that there is a significant increase in investment by enterprises in the training o f  adults with a 
view  to promoting productivity, com petitiveness and active ageing. Efficient investment in human capital 
by em ployers and individuals will be facilitated.’
Despite organisational reforms and substantial amounts of public spending (0.31% of GDP in
2003), the French system of vocational training has long suffered from some serious shortcomings: 
inequalities are very strong (the most skilled get the most training) and the lifelong learning 
perspective is almost completely missing, which is partly explained by the preference French firms 
and workers developed since the 1980s for early retirement instead of investment on workers’ skills
144 Cited in IGAS (2006: p.216), own translation.
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as a means to restructure and adapt the workforce. In order to leave the organisation of vocational 
training for adults closer to local needs, the relative competence was given to the regions in 1993. 
However, in the absence of well-organised local interest organisations capable of transmitting 
information on the needs of firms, the results of decentralisation were never satisfactory (Culpepper 
2001, 2006). More recently the Aubry laws on work time reduction encouraged bargaining on the 
possibility for workers to take time off work to train or re-train through individual ‘training 
accounts’. This measure, however, had little success (Ehrel et al 2005).
It is for such reasons that France was addressed recommendations on lifelong learning every 
year since 2001. Recommendation 5 of 2002, for instance, asked France to *pursue efforts within 
the framework of the social dialogue to improve the efficiency of the continuous training system and 
to promote a comprehensive lifelong learning strategy \  Since then lifelong learning or, as it is 
known in domestic parlance, formation tout au long de la vie has become one of the main 
catchwords of French employment policy debates. After the inter-professional negotiations started 
in 2001 at the initiative of the MEDEF failed on the issue of whether training should take place 
within or without working time145, the reform of vocational training became one of the main themes 
of the election campaign of 2002. Jospin made lifelong learning the centrepiece of its promised 
strategy to cut unemployment by 900,000 units in 5 years. He announced the establishment of a 
public training agency and the introduction of individual ‘training accounts’ to be used over the 
entire course of a person’s working life146. Chirac’s campaign manifesto, which focused primarily 
on social charges’ cuts as a means of fighting unemployment, made strikingly similar promises on 
vocational training: individual training accounts, profiling and individual counselling and 
orientation services for workers147. After the election, the new Labour Minister, Fran?ois Fillon, 
asked the social partners to resume the negotiations and an inter-professional accord was eventually 
signed by all the parties involved except the CGT in September 2003. The law of May 2004 that 
transposed the main lines of the accord148 introduced an individual right to training of 20 hours a 
year and provided that the priorities to be pursued by training be defined by branch-level 
bargaining149.
The 2004 reform of the French system of vocational training is a very complex device that 
overhauls specific measures, bodies and funds set up by a framework law that dates back to 1971150. 
Yet the adoption of the language of lifelong learning, which was alien to the French tradition, helped
145 See Chapter 3.
146 Les Echos, 22 Febmary 2002.
147 Le Figaro, 23 February 2002.
148 Loi, 2004-391,2004-05-04, relative a la formation professionnelle tout au long de la vie et au dialogue social.
149 See Chapter 3.
150 Dedieu, T. Interview with the author on 8 March 2007. Paris. Boutroue, M.-F. Interview with the author on 27 
March 2007. Paris.
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unblock negotiations that were stuck on relatively minor details and contributed to shaping, under 
government impulse, some key parts of the reform151. Important provisions, for instance, were made 
to safeguard the access to training of women and older workers. As suggested in the guidelines, the 
contribution of employers to the financing of vocational training was increased: the contribution of 
firms with more than 10 employees was raised from 1.5% to 1.6% of gross wages, that of firms with 
less than 10 employees from 0.25% to 0.55%. Finally, the importance given to branch-level 
negotiations reflected to a great extent several pronouncements on the issue by the European 
Commission152. As a result, branch-level negotiations received an sheer boost: as many as 102 
accords were signed in one year in application of the law of May 2004 (DARES 2006).
The reform of vocational training is, therefore, an example of a policy area in which the 
adoption of the Strategy’s language and the diffusion of information thereon among a wide range of 
interested actors contributed to re-frame and unblock a reform process as well as to introduce new 
policy goals. Even though the EES was never explicitly mentioned, the terms of the negotiations and 
the issues on the agenda were set by the government153 much along the same lines as the 
Employment Guidelines. The social partners never disputed them as such, since they had had the 
opportunity to discuss them at length within the CDSEI and in Brussels with the Commission. Once 
lifelong learning had entered the social partner’s language and had been accepted as a goal154, such 
items as the necessity to improve access of older workers to training or raising firm’s contributions 
were put on the agenda without meeting resistance.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to trace the process behind three instances of employment policy change in 
France in order to find out whether the EES provided the actors involved with resources and 
cognitive drives, or else was irrelevant. It has been argued that the EES discourse was advocated by 
a group of actors coming from the haute administration of the Labour Ministry, who made great 
efforts to diffuse information concerning the Strategy and to involve the social partners. As predicted 
by hypothesis 1, these actors were motivated by a mix of normative and strategic considerations. On 
the one hand, the Strategy’s policy model was accepted as a balanced solution to some of the 
problems of the French labour market, a solution consistent with a widespread international 
employment policy consensus. On the other hand, the adoption and diffusion of the EU discourse at
151 Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 2007. Paris. Barbaroux, C. Interview with the author on 28 March 
2007. Paris.
152 Mechin, C. Interview with the author on 22 February 2007. Paris.
153 Boutroue, M.-F. Interview with the author on 27 March 2007. Paris.
154 Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 2007. Paris.
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a time in which governments’ attempts to reform social and employment policies faced great 
opposition, it is argued, was used as an instrument to reaffirm the authority of the state. By providing 
a language that was acceptable to all, it served to diminish the level of conflict and helped the 
government push through long-awaited reforms. Hence the attempt to involve the trade unions and 
the employers’ organisation, which in France are traditionally weak but often effective in blocking 
policy change, and provide them with resources (information, ideas, arguments) that their scant 
organisational apparatuses made it difficult for them to access. Thus a new consensus could be 
reached around arguments borrowed from the EES involving the state, the employers and the more 
moderate unions. Although the national coalition advocating the EES discourse always remained 
narrow due to the bureaucratic nature of the NAP-drafting process and the lack of public interest in 
the Strategy (hypotheses 2 and 3), the specificities of the French system, in which few actors are 
involved in policy-making arid the state has a preponderant role in the adoption and implementation 
of policy decisions, allowed them to have significant influence (hypothesis 5). By contrast, 
hypothesis 4 (the success of national coalitions depended on the extent to which their members’ 
participation in the drafting of the NAPs strengthened their positions within their organisations) does 
not seem to be relevant to the French case, as coalition members were already at the top of the state 
administration.
The three cases of policy change presented here prove these points. First, the adoption of the 
principles of conditionality in the reform of unemployment insurance had long been demanded by 
the employers, but only became acceptable to part of the labour movement (in particular the CFDT) 
and to the government when it was coupled with the reform of public employment services under the 
umbrella of ‘activation’. The Labour Ministry only ratified the convention on unemployment 
insurance on the conditions that the public employment agency be put in charge of deciding on 
sanctions and that the new services financed by the unemployment insurance fund be offered not 
only to the beneficiaries of income support, but to all unemployed. Second, the reform of pre­
retirement benefits ran against a diffuse social and political consensus. The adoption of an action 
plan for the employment of older workers is the outcome of a long process of prise de conscience of 
the problems of a specific segment of the workforce that is evident in successive French NAPs and 
seemed to turn around the adoption of the employment rate as a headline indicator of the EES. Thus 
a new consensus has been forming among a wide range of actors (unions, employers, the state) on 
the need to keep workers longer in active life. Third, the reform of the vocational training system 
provides a further example of how the reframing of a long-debated issue created the space for a wide 
agreement. The introduction of the language of lifelong learning, in fact, helped unblock inter­
professional negotiations that in the past had been stuck on relatively minor details -  training should
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take place within or without the legal work-time? -  and led to an agreement which was signed by all 
but the most hard-nosed union (the CGT) and subsequently turned into law.
Finally, as was hypothesised (hypothesis 6), in all three cases the level at which the EES’ 
impact was visible depended on the degree of specificity of the relevant guidelines and targets. 
Where the relevant guidelines sketched out specific policy means these seemed to play a role in the 
actual design of policy, as was the case, for instance, for the main lines of the Nouveau Depart 
programme, which were modelled on guideline 1 of 1998. In the (more frequent) cases in which the 
Strategy provides only broad targets its influence can be noticed in the definition of the problems to 
be tackled and of the goals to be reached by policy. The details of policy choices and the institutional 
settings that are meant to deliver them, by contrast, kept their national specificities, such as the 
continuing use of the ANPE’s traditional means of intervention, the gradual phasing out of pre­
retirement schemes, the resilience of existing arrangements in the field of vocational training.
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CHAPTER V
E m ploym ent  P olicies and  Policy-M aking  in  Po st-W ar  Italy: W eak  
G overnm ent and the  P olitics of Consensus
The Italian labour market has long been one of the most tightly regulated in the industrialised world 
(Samek Lodovici 2000), especially as regards hiring and firing rules, placement services and the 
limits placed on the recourse to temporary and part-time contracts. Legal guarantees surrounding the 
individual employment relationship and the design of income support policies were geared toward 
the protection of workers in the public sector and large firms, whereas much greater flexibility was 
allowed in smaller undertakings and expenditure on labour market programmes remained 
consistently low by European standards. A measure of flexibility in the use of the labour force 
within firms and a first set of active policies were introduced as economic growth slowed down and 
unemployment started to rise since the mid-1970s. Yet it was only in the 1990s that, in the face of 
the new constraints imposed by European market and monetary integration and of the deep crisis of 
public finances, a new consensus began to form around the need to increase external flexibility and 
to create a more balanced and efficient system of employment policies. As was done for the French 
case155, this chapter serves a double purpose. It, first, reconstructs the evolution of employment 
policies and debates in order to identify instances of change in line with the EES. Second, it analyses 
the key features of employment policy-making in post-war Italy in order to situate the Italian case 
with respect to the hypotheses regarding the institutional conditions for discourse diffusion set out in 
Chapter 1 (hypotheses 2 and 5). The main contention made here is that employment policy-making 
in Italy was characterised by a weak governmental machine that consistently needed the agreement 
of relatively powerful interest organisations before adopting major pieces of legislation. Despite the 
often high level of conflict among the social partners and between them and the state, the 
development of employment and welfare policies has followed a remarkably consensual pattern. 
Unlike in France, policy-making and implementation always involved a large number of 
governmental and non-governmental actors and different levels of government.
Section 1 traces the model of labour market regulation that was adopted in Italy, resting upon 
the extensive protection of the individual employment relationship, an over-bureaucratic network of 
public employment services and a system of non-employment benefits built around low ordinary 
wage subsidies and a generous system of support for temporary job loss in large firms. As the 
impetuous economic growth of the immediate post-war years came to a halt in the mid-1970s and 
unemployment started to grow quickly, the first wave of neo-corporatist agreements in Italian history
155 See Chapter 3.
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introduced wage restraint, cuts to the wage indexation system and a measure of flexibility in the use 
of labour within firms in exchange for fiscal compensations for workers and a first, timid set of 
active employment policies.
Section 2 investigates the role of the state and the social partners in employment policy­
making as well as the functioning of the industrial relations system. The striking feature of the 
Italian case, in stark contrast to France, is the weakness and permeability of the state apparatus and 
the relative strength of interest organisations. The post-war Italian state combined a highly 
interventionist stance, either as an employer via its holding companies or through its extensive 
reliance on direct transfers to firms or categories of workers, with a tradition of weak and indecisive 
government relying on an ineffective bureaucracy in which power was dispersed among several 
centres of authority at the national and local level. This lack of centralised authority offered ample 
opportunities to block policy changes that touched upon particularistic interests and meant, again 
unlike France, that major pieces of legislation had to gain the acceptance of the social partners. Until 
the early 1990s, industrial relations remained relatively unistitutionalised, but, regardless of the level 
of conflict between unions and employers and with the state, the pattern of welfare and employment 
policy development was highly consensual.
Sections 3 and 4 deal with the radically changed conditions of the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
shifts in employment policy discourse that ensued and the series of reforms that were introduced as a 
result. In the throes of a serious crisis of traditional political parties in the 1990s, the imperative to 
qualify for EMU was met through an unprecedented season of neo-corporatist agreements that 
ensured wage moderation and helped to curb inflation. After the emergenza occupazionale 
(employment emergency) of the years 1993-95, in which the unemployment rate grew relentlessly 
and the employment rate decreased for the first time in over thirty years, the centre-left cabinet led 
by Romano Prodi introduced a number of policy reforms aimed at dealing with some of the long­
standing features of the Italian labour market. Thus recourse to non-permanent job contracts was 
made easier, employment services were liberalised and new policies for local development based on 
the principle of negotiated planning were introduced. Subsequently, entry into Economic and 
Monetary Union and the re-consolidation of the party system weakened the need for consensus on 
the part of all stakeholders. Hence, the centre-right Berlusconi government, voted in power in 2001 
with a large parliamentary majority, was in a position to adopt a more unilateral policy style and pass 
controversial pieces of legislation further expanding recourse to atypical labour contracts and raising 
the retirement age without seeking the support of all social partners.
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1. The Italian ‘model’ of labour market regulation and income support policies
The long economic ‘miracle’ of the first thirty years after the Second World War turned Italy from 
the most industrially backward member of the EEC into a successful modem economy. In 1950 
more than 40% of the labour force was employed in the agricultural sector. By 1990 this proportion 
had gone down to 9%, even though the labour force continued to display some traditional traits, such 
as a comparatively low female participation rate and a high incidence (around 20%) of the self- 
employed (Femer and Hyman 1992; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). Internal inequalities are among the 
most extreme in western Europe. On the one hand, the structure of production is markedly bi-polar, 
with a small number of large manufacturing firms traditionally concentrated in the north-west and a 
very large number of smaller undertakings, some of them integrated in so-called ‘industrial districts’. 
On the other hand, notwithstanding decades of public investment, southern Italy remains 
comparatively under-developed, with unemployment rates averaging over twice the rate in the rest of 
the country.
The Italian labour market is governed by a complex web of legal regulations that has evolved 
over the years in an incremental, case-by-case fashion rather than being shaped -  with the striking 
exception of the 1970 Workers’ Statute156 -  by comprehensive legislative initiatives. The post-war 
system provided for as many as ten different modes of hiring, five or six forms of unemployment 
insurance and eight or nine tripartite commissions (comprising representatives of the unions, the 
employers and the state) with the task to oversee specific aspects of labour market regulation (Femer 
and Hyman 1992). A large number of legal constraints were placed on the individual employment 
relationship. Part-time and short-term contracts were permitted only under narrowly specified 
circumstances. ‘Protective’ restrictions, such as the prohibition of night-work, applied to women 
workers. No specific minimum wage legislation was ever enacted, but a constitutional provision 
mandating ‘proportionate’ and ‘decent’ wages (Art. 36) was interpreted by law courts as requiring 
adherence to the minima contained in collective agreements. Most importantly, perhaps, private 
employment agencies were illegal and firms were required to recruit labour via the system of public 
employment services set up in 1949. The unemployed had to register on compulsory lists and 
periodically confirm their availability for work. In a typically bureaucratic fashion, employers were 
then asked to notify the placement offices (uffici di collocamento) of the skills they needed and the 
workers were automatically assigned to them, depending on their position on the list and the 
qualifications required (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004).
156 See below.
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Considerable protection of individual employment was provided by law 604 of 1966157, 
which allowed lay-offs in firms with more than 35 employees only for ‘just’ (i.e. demonstrable) 
cause. If a lay-off was declared illegal, then the employer could choose whether to re-hire the worker 
or pay a substitutive allowance corresponding to between 5 and 12 months pay. Employee rights 
were further extended by the introduction of the so-called Workers’ Statute (Statuto dei
1SRlavoratori) . The Statute, which reflected the dramatic rise in union power following the ‘hot 
autumn’ of 1969 (see below) and is still in force today, introduced rules for the defence of union 
political activities and for the exercise of a rich set of individual and collective rights connected to 
the working life. With regard to the regulation of lay-offs, in particular, the Statute introduced one of 
the most restrictive regimes in Europe. Art. 18 of the Statute amended the 1966 law and provided for 
compulsory re-hiring in case of dismissals without just cause, thus abolishing the option of paying 
the penalty instead.
Non-employment benefits were built around low ordinary wage subsidies and a generous 
system of support for temporary job loss in large firms. The ordinary unemployment insurance 
scheme was first introduced in 1919 and was addressed to private sector workers with at least two 
years of contributions. The allowance was based on a flat daily rate and, even though the amount 
was adjusted on numerous occasions, it always remained very low in comparison to wages159. A 
Cassa integrazione guadagni (CIG) scheme was introduced between 1945 and 1947 in order to 
protect workers temporarily hit by working time reductions and whose re-entry into the firm was 
deemed to be certain. The allowance required a minimum period of contributions, but was linked to 
previous earnings (60-65%). The CIG was complemented in 1968 with the introduction of an 
‘extraordinary’ wage integration scheme, the Cassa integrazione guadagni straordinaria (CIGS)160, 
which was based on the same logic, but was meant to guarantee workers in cases of industrial 
restructuring, reorganisation or conversion. The benefits, which were partly financed through 
employers’ and workers’ contributions, amounted to up to 80% of the pay161. Over time, other 
schemes were introduced to cope with more specific issues. Early retirement measures were used 
since the late 1960s to ease industrial restructuring. A generous ‘mobility benefit’ (Indennitd di 
mobilita) was established in favour of workers who had an employment record of at least 12 months
157 Law of 15 July 1966, n. 604.
158 Law of 20 May 1970, n. 300.
159 The ratio of the ordinary unemployment benefit to the average industrial wage was 9% in 1974 (Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2004).
160 Law of 5 November 1968, n. 1115.
161 After an agreement struck in 1975 between the trade unions and Confindustria (the main employers’ association) the 
replacement rates if both CIG and CIGS were unified at the level o f 80%, a record high for temporary wage subsidies in 
Europe (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004).
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and had been laid off within collective dismissals162. Even disability pensions were frequently used 
as assistance benefits for workers in long-term unemployment, especially in the poorer southern 
regions (Dell’ Aringa and Samek Lodovici 1997)163.
The model of employment policies adopted in Italy, therefore, based as it was on a high 
degree of fragmentation and significant disparities in coverage between sectors and categories of 
workers, a low and unbalanced pattern of expenditure and an inefficient and bureaucratised network 
of public employment services, represents in many ways a paradigm of what Ferrera (1996) called 
the ‘southern model’ of welfare state. In the early 1990s, Italy had the lowest level of expenditure on 
labour programmes in the EU (1.8% of GDP as against a European average of 2.9% and a figure of 
nearly 4% for France164) and a comparatively low percentage of the working population with access 
to income support during spells of unemployment (only 20% compared with an average of 40% in 
the EU) (Dell’Aringa and Samek Lodovici 1997). Neither the extensive protection afforded by the 
Workers’ Statute nor the generous support of the CIG, early retirement and mobility benefits applied 
to the public sector (where firings, anyway, are extremely rare) or to private firms with less than 15 
employees, thus leaving out a large chunk of the workforce employed in small firms. The latter were 
left with relatively low ordinary unemployment benefits, whereas no assistance whatsoever was 
provided for the long-term unemployed, new entrants in the labour market with no or little 
contribution record and the self-employed (Dell’Aringa and Samek Lodovici 1997; Gualmini 1998; 
Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). Last but not least, the procedures for placement had a strong bias 
toward those who were already in employment, as the rule of the ‘numerical call’ (i.e. the numerical 
order of the list) was only applicable to first-time job seekers and produced a clear incentive to hire 
the former to the disadvantage of the latter (Ichino 1982).
The overprotection of workers in the public and ‘core’ industrial sectors (generally middle- 
aged men) to the disadvantage of other groups (especially women and young job seekers) was 
consistent with the political cultures of the Christian Democrat {Democrazia cristiana, DC) and 
Communist (Partito comunista italiano, PCI) parties that dominated Italian politics in the post-war 
era (Ferrera and Gualmini 1999, 2004). It was also consistent with the preferences of the trade 
unions, whose membership was concentrated in the public sector and in large manufacturing firms. 
Such a strong orientation of social protection in favour of the ‘insiders’ reflected the traditional goal 
of public intervention in this sector, i.e. the protection of the existing levels of employment. In Italy, 
unlike France, this was never balanced by a system of active policies and measures geared to
162 Law o f 23 July 1991, n. 223.
163 In the 1970s it was decided that the ‘degree’ of disability -  and thus the amount of the pension allowance -  was to be 
determined taking into account the claimant’s ‘social and economic environment’.
164 See Chapter 3.
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support the outsiders’ entry into the labour market. This, nevertheless, was not the case. The most 
significant active measure available before the 1990s was the system of work-and-training contracts 
(contratti di formazione e lavoro) introduced in 1984, combining work experience and vocational 
training for young workers aged between 15 and 29 in firms that benefited from a substantial 
discount in social contributions. Part-time work and ‘solidarity contracts’ -  an interesting attempt at 
preventing employment reductions in industrial and large-scale commercial firms through forms of 
job-sharing -  were also introduced in 1984, but were hardly used at all by employers. Vocational 
training was the object of a framework law adopted in 1978165 with the aim to provide guidelines 
for the regions, which had been assigned all responsibilities in this area since their creation in 1970. 
However, the deficiency of financial resources and the lack of coordination between different 
regions and with the public education system impacted negatively on the quality and effectiveness 
of programmes (Gualmini 1998).
The shortcomings of Italian employment policies, which had been mostly created during the 
thirty years of virtually uninterrupted economic growth after the end of the war, became apparent as 
the performance of the labour market substantially worsened since the mid-1970s in the wake of 
stagnating growth and floating inflation. The economic consequences of international monetary 
instability and rising energy prices, indeed, hit Italy harder than other major European countries. 
Inflation rates averaged over 13% in the 1970-78 period (17.2% in 1974-78) and productivity 
growth decreased dramatically (from 6.1% in 1965-70 to 0.8% in 1974-78), while unemployment 
approached 8% of the workforce by the end of the decade (Flanagan et al. 1983)166.
The first attempts to make adjustments were made through a series of neo-corporatist 
agreements, the first ever in Italy, which culminated in the so-called ‘EUR’ assembly of February 
1978, after the neighbourhood in Rome where it took place, where the union confederations agreed 
for the first time to take into account macro-economic constraints167. In January 1977 unions and 
employers subscribed a patto sociale that allowed greater flexibility in the use of labour as a 
substitute for more employment. The patto covered an increase in shift work, greater use of 
overtime, the end of restrictions on internal mobility within factories and a more production- 
friendly distribution of workers’ holidays through the year. In its part, the government announced a 
partial fiscalisation of employers’ social contributions that was meant to cut labour costs by nearly 
5% (Flanagan et al. 1983) and negotiated with the unions a number of legislative measures intended 
to find novel ways to combat unemployment. These leggi contrattate (negotiated laws) represent
165 Law o f 21 December 1978, n. 845.
166 See also AMECO Database:
http://ec.europa.eu/economv finance/indicators/annual macro economic database/ameco en.htm.
167 See below.
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the first explicit attempt to introduce a set of active employment policies in Italy. Apart from the 
already mentioned law on vocational training and an unsuccessful bill to reform the pension system, 
parliament passed a law on youth employment168, which provided the regions with special funds 
for organising vocational training and job creation initiatives for young people, and one on 
industrial restructuring169, introducing measures that allowed the transfer of redundant workers from 
one firm or even one region to another (the so-called mobilita esterna) (Ferrera and Gualmini
2004). This first set of active employment policies, though, was never fully implemented as the 
public service was often unwilling or unable to adopt the innovative practices they required and the 
executive frequently failed to adopt the necessary implementation measures (Regalia and Regini 
1998). Instead, in the face of a continuing haemorrhage of jobs in large firms in the early 1980s, the 
government found it easier to resort to such traditional kinds of passive support measures as early 
retirement benefits or CIG support.
As unemployment continued to rise, partly due to demographic trends and to the entry into 
the labour market of growing numbers of women, it became clear that it was no longer possible to 
rely solely on short-term interventions based on income subsidies. The idea of a new ‘anti- 
inflationary’ agreement between the government and the social partners started being widely 
debated, the aim being not only to protect the existing levels of employment, but also to restrain 
wage costs and introduce new active labour policies so as to expand the productive capacity of 
firms and foster job creation (Regini 1997; Regini and Regalia 1997; Regalia and Regini 1998). In 
this way, the words ‘deregulation’ and ‘flexibility’ officially entered the political discourse. The 
employers’ organisation Confmdustria (Confederazione generate dell’industria italiana) had started 
to complain vociferously about the rigidity of Italian labour markets and found scientific support in 
the well-known academics whose opinions were published almost daily by the country’s most 
prestigious economic newspaper, 7/ Sole-24 Ore \  Initially proposed by the government in 1981, a 
new tripartite accord (known as lodo Scotti after the then Labour Minister) was signed in January 
1983. The lodo Scotti was the result of a complex political exchange involving a 15% cut to the
17 nwage indexation system -  known in the Italian debate as scala mobile (literally ‘the escalator’) -  
to curb inflation, the unions’ consent to a more flexible use of the labour force within firms and a 
reform of the collective bargaining system imposing strict limits on firm-level bargaining. In return, 
the government offered a partial transfer of employers’ social contributions to general taxation, a 
reform of income tax and an increase in family allowances to support the workers’ purchasing
168 Law of 1 June 1977, n. 285.
169 Law of 12 August 1977, n. 675.
170 It was agreed on that occasion that 100% indexation for the average wage earner would be phased in by February 
1977. All workers were to be given the same absolute amount for every point increase in the cost-of-living index, 
thereby adding a clearly egalitarian emphasis to the system first agreed in 1956 (Flanagan et al. 1983).
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power (CNEL 1983). In addition, a new set of active policy instruments -  the above mentioned 
solidarity contracts, work-and-training contracts and the re-regulation of part-time -, all belonging
171to the family of de-regulative policies, were introduced by law in 1984 with a view to favouring 
higher labour market flexibility and the creation of employment for the outsiders of the labour 
market, especially women and the young unemployed (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004).
This short-lived season of neo-corporatism abruptly ended when a new anti-inflationary pact 
including a substantial cut to the scala mobile (CNEL 1984) was adopted by the executive by 
decree disregarding the opposition of part of the labour movement172. Further attempts introduce 
active employment policies were made at the end of the decade. In 1986 a set of financial incentives 
were made available for young employers residing in the South173. A 1987 law174 reorganised the 
structure of the Ministry of Labour, established new regional agencies with the task of promoting 
active policies and modified the procedures for placement. This law, whose goals were to give the 
Ministry the ability to monitor occupational trends and evaluate the impact of policy as well as to 
convert the old placement offices from mere bureaucratic loci of certification into structures able to 
plan and implement active job-creation policies, was the first step toward the reform of employment 
services that would be passed in the following decade (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). A new body, 
called Observatory of the Labour Market, was established within the Ministry with the task to 
produce data and analysis and the old Directorate General for Workforce Placement was replaced 
by a Directorate General for Employment that was entrusted with a rage of new responsibilities in 
the field of active policies. Special committees for employment were set up at the local level in 
order to coordinate and implement active policies for mobility. Finally, placement procedures were 
modified so as to allow employment services to disregard the automatic rule of the numerical call 
for new recruitment, particularly in the presence of specific sectoral agreements.
The 1980s, in sum, were an ambiguous decade for Italian employment policies. An element 
of flexibility was introduced in an otherwise highly regulated labour market and a first set of active 
job creation policies was put in place so as to support the weaker segments of the labour force. 
Expenditure on active policies rose, thereby improving the balance between these and passive 
policies in financing terms: between 1985 and 1989 active policies expenditure increased from 
0.45% to 0.77% of GDP, whereas spending on passive measures decreased from 1.33% to 0.9% 
(Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). Yet these figures remained relatively small when compared, for 
instance, to France and the state bureaucracy generally proved unable to adopt the innovative
171 Law of 19 December 1984, n. 863
172 See below.
173 Law of 28 February 1986, n. 44.
174 Law of 28 February 1987, n. 56.
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attitudes necessary to implement them (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000, 2004). The performance of the 
Italian labour market worsened considerably through most of the following decade and became 
intertwined with the crisis of the political system and the emergence of pressing European 
constraints. Before turning to these issues, however, the next section investigates the role of the 
actors involved in employment policy-making.
2. The role of the state and interest organisations in employment policy-making
According to the hypotheses put forth in Chapter 1, the range and identity of the actors involved in 
employment policy-making and the institutional settings in which they interact are likely to 
determine the ease with which new policy discourses are diffused and adopted. How does the Italian 
case fare in this respect? The distinctive feature of employment policy-making in post-war Italy is 
the seemingly contradictory combination of a tradition of state interventionism in the economy and 
a history of weak and indecisive government (Femer and Hyman 1992). On the one hand, through 
its huge holding companies -  the most important of which were IRI (Istituto per la ricostruzione 
industriale) and ENI (Ente nazionale idrocarburi) -  the Italian state controlled large parts of the 
country’s industrial and banking sectors. This allowed it extensive leverage to steer industrial 
development as well as to intervene directly in industrial relations as an employer. The state also 
had for a long time a considerable capacity to allocate resources directly thanks to a style of public 
spending that gave priority to monetary transfers rather than public services and its extensive 
recourse to debt as a means of financing (Regini and Regalia 1998). On the other hand, unlike 
France, Italy lacked an effective centralised state apparatus. Power was dispersed among several 
centres of authority at the national and local level, which had not changed much since fascist times 
and were highly permeable to non-state interests. Particularistic relationships with economic actors 
and the use of public employment as a means of furthering the influence of the parties in power 
resulted into widespread clientelism and corruption, particularly at the regional and local level.
This, in turn, offered ample opportunities to block legislation that touched upon particularistic 
interests, weakened the authority of the central government and tarnished its legitimacy. In the field 
of employment policy and industrial relations, this lack of authority and legitimacy has meant, again 
unlike France, that all major pieces of legislation adopted in the last thirty years had to gain the 
acceptance of the social partners (Flanagan et al. 1983; Femer and Hyman 1992), either covertly 
and informally or, less often, overtly through social pacts.
Italian workers’ organisations are overwhelmingly grouped under the banner of three large 
union confederations. In line with the tradition of continental European unionism, they are divided
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along ideological and.party-political lines and aspire to organise all the country’s workers rather 
than to provide representation for specific occupational groups or sectors (Golden 1988; Regalia 
and Regini 1998). The largest confederation, CGIL (Confederazione generate italiana del lavoro), 
was founded when free trade unionism, illegal in the fascist period, was reinstated in 1944. CGIL 
initially contained all the political factions that were represented in government in the immediate 
post-war years. However, soon after the eviction of Communists and Socialists from the executive 
in May 1947, unity of action began to fall apart. In 1948-49 two new, smaller confederations -  
CISL (Confederazione italiana sindacati lavoratori) and UEL (JJnione italiana del lavoro) -  were 
formed by the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic and Republican wings of the former 
unitary organisation, respectively. Union density was always higher than in France, averaging 35% 
in the late 1960s, reaching a record high of over 49% in 1980 and then going back to around 35% 
only in the late 1990s (Femer and Hyman 1992; Baccaro et al 2003). Inter-confederal relations 
swung from heated ideological confrontation during the peak years of the Cold War to increasing 
unity of action in the late 1960s and 1970s175. Regardless of the level of conflict among the unions 
and between these and the employers, however, the major national organisations on each side have 
long adhered to mutually agreed norms of conduct and functioned as a source of national stability 
and order (Femer and Hyman 1992; Regini and Regalia 1997). The attitudes of interest 
organisations together with the state’s need for legitimacy help to explain why major changes in 
public policy and in the organisation of production have been achieved with a high degree of 
consensus.
By far the largest employer organisation in Italy is Confindustria176, which was founded 
after the First World War and supported Fascism in the 1920s and 1930s, but was reconstituted on a 
more ‘apolitical’ basis after 1945. In 1990 it had some 110,000 affiliated firms with some 4.2 
million employees a further enlargement of its membership took place after 1993-94 with the 
privatisation of publicly owned enterprises (Regalia and Regini 1998). Yet due to the peculiar 
structure of the Italian economy, characterised by the coexistence of a small number of large firms 
and large numbers of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) relative to France, Germany and 
the UK, Confindustria has been unable to impose itself as an encompassing organisation. Many 
SMEs are affiliated to CONFAPI (Confederazione della piccola e media industria), which counted 
around 30,000 member firms in 1987 (Regalia and Regini 1998), whereas firms in the artisan, 
agricultural and services sectors are organised in smaller sectoral organisations, such as 
Confesercenti, Confcommercio, Confagricoltura, Coldiretti. Confindustria has, thus, long been 
dominated by few large companies, such as Montedison, Olivetti, Pirelli and especially Fiat,
175 A short-lived attempt to return to organisational unity was made between 1972 and 1984 (Regalia and Regini 1998).
176 See above.
producing consumer goods in labour-intensive sectors. These employed large work forces 
concentrated in relatively few establishments and were faced with a strong union presence. Their 
need to reduce labour conflict and institutionalise industrial relations, in turn, explains 
Confindustria’s cooperative stance toward the unions, which culminated in the presidency of Fiat’s 
Giovanni Agnelli between 1972 and 1975 (Flanagan et al 1983; Golden 1988; Femer and Hyman
1992).
In contrast with its elaborate system of individual labour law, industrial relations in Italy are 
less regulated than elsewhere in Europe. The 1948 Constitution (Art. 39 and 40) states that workers 
are entitled to organise collectively and to strike, but unions have very few specific rights and 
obligations of their own. Their internal organisation and objectives are subject to hardly any 
external regulation and, at least until legislation on disputes in essential public services was passed 
in 1990, strike action was virtually unconstrained by law (Golden 1988). In the 1950s and early 
1960s the system of industrial relations closely resembled that of France: weak and ideologically 
divided unions were unable to articulate rank-and-file demands and were constrained by the 
employers’ and the government’s unwillingness to compromise. Plant and industry-level bargaining 
were virtually non-existent and, although a number of inter-confederal agreements were struck on 
such items as collective and individual dismissals, works councils, wage indexation and minimum 
wages, they were often disregarded by employers, who were generally left free to determine hiring 
and firing rules, conditions of work and rates of pay (Flanagan et al 1983). The government 
allowed business to minimise union pressure by suppressing industrial action and enacting 
restrictive macroeconomic policies that kept real wages low and unemployment relatively high.
Like in France, the low level of institutionalisation of industrial relations produced an unstable 
situation in which the unrestrained accumulation of grievances gave way to successive waves of 
strikes, which were followed by deflation and wage restraint in order to restore competitiveness and 
profitability and, in turn, by new waves of strikes (Flanagan et al 1983).
It was, in fact, the wage explosion of the mid-1960s and the subsequent strong deflation that 
led to the unprecedented industrial confrontation of 1968 and 1969, during which the strike volume 
reached a level three times higher than that of the entire period 1959-67 (Regalia and Regini 1998). 
The intensity of the strike wave in Italy, which was even higher than in other continental European 
countries (including France), had to do with the problems caused by the mass migration of unskilled 
or semi-skilled workers from the south to the industrialised north of the country and the inability of 
public authorities to provide adequate services, healthcare, housing, education and transport, 
especially in the metropolitan areas of Turin and Milan (Flanagan et al 1983). The outcome was a 
dramatic power shift in favour of the unions, which skilfully exploited the mobilisation to organise
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more effectively at the plant level, loosen their ties with political parties and include semi-skilled 
industrial workers. In keeping with the interests of the latter, an agenda of new ‘egalitarian’ union 
demands was pursued, claiming workers’ control over the organisation of production, employment 
security and the reduction of inequalities of pay and status (Flanagan et al 1983; Golden 1988; 
Femer and Hyman 1992). Greater union effectiveness at the plant and industry level was 
symbolised by the 1969 Metalworkers’ agreement, which provided for flat increases in pay, the 
reduction of the work-week to 40 hours, the limitation of overtime and the removal of constraints 
on plant-level bargaining. The 1970 Workers’ Statute was agreed with the unions before it was 
turned into law and contained, inter alia, a sweeping prohibition of any obstacle to union activity at
177the plant level . At the inter-confederal level, Confidustria was forced into negotiating 
exceedingly favourable terms with the union confederations in order to curb the uncontrolled wage 
expansion of the early 1970s. As union power mled out deflation as a policy option, the employers 
led by Agnelli agreed in 1975 to a marked upgrade of the scala mobile178 in exchange for a measure 
of wage restraint (Flanagan et al 1983; Ferrera and Gualmini 1999, 2004).
The 1975 inter-confederal agreement is generally regarded as the peak of union success. 
Soon after, though, the agenda of the government and the social partners had to change radically. In 
a context of economic turmoil and of the security threat posed by terrorist groups, a striking success 
obtained by the PCI at the 1976 general election convinced the DC to accept the former’s 
parliamentary support for a ‘national solidarity’ cabinet led by the conservative Catholic Giulio 
Andreotti. In exchange for its involvement in government, the PCI was prepared to use its links 
with the unions, and especially the CGIL, to enforce wage restraint and support the deflationary 
policies of the executive. The unions, on their part, were concerned with retaining their hard-fought 
influence and started advocating the maintenance of industrial competitiveness as a condition for 
the preservation of the jobs of their members (Flanagan et al 1983; Regalia and Regini 1998). The 
result of this convergence of strategies were the neo-corporatist agreements of the late 1970s and 
union acceptance of wage moderation and of a policy of deflation that had the effect to increase 
unemployment by half a million by the end of 1977.
This first wave of tripartite agreements continued into the early 1980s. The 1983 lodo Scotti 
allowed a cut in wage indexation and the introduction of a measure of flexibility in the use of labour
170within firms in exchange for fiscal transfers and a first set of active employment policies . Hailed 
by some as a breakthrough in the relationship with the social partners, the lodo was harshly
177 See above.
178 It was agreed on that occasion that 100% indexation for the average wage earner would be phased in by February 
1977. All workers were to be given the same absolute amount for every point increase in the cost-of-living index, 
thereby adding a clearly egalitarian emphasis to the system first agreed in 1956 (Flanagan et al. 1983).
179 See above.
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criticised by others for the lavish use of public expenditure to gain agreement at a time of growing 
budget deficits (Regini and Regalia 1997; Regalia and Regini 1998). In any case, fresh negotiations 
started in earnest for a new anti-inflationary social pact. This time, however, the government was 
unable to draw on further financial resources, but could only stress the general benefits of reduced 
inflation as an incentive for the unions and employers to concur. Yet this proved to be too little as a 
proposed accord including a substantial cut to the scala mobile (CNEL 1984) was accepted by the 
Confindustria and the two smaller confederations, but refused by the Communist-dominated CGIL. 
The cabinet led by the Socialist Bettino Craxi, then, decided to disregard the CGIL’s opposition and 
adopted the main part of the accord by decree, thus breaking the unwritten rule whereby major 
policy decisions were made by consensus. Although a popular referendum against the decree 
promoted by the PCI and CGIL resulted in a narrow defeat in June 1985, this bitter confrontation 
put an end to the short-lived season of anti-inflationary social pacts (Golden 1988; Regalia and 
Regini 1998; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004; Talani 2004).
The eventual collapse of tripartite agreements in the 1980s was due to a new change in the 
balance of power between the actors involved (Regini 1984; Regini and Regalia 1997; Regalia and 
Regini 1998). The government, faced with huge public deficits, found it increasingly difficult to 
offer compensation to the social partners for the sacrifices required of them. After suffering a 
burning defeat in 1980, when a strike lasted thirty-three days at the Fiat plants in Turin was resolved 
in terms very favourable to the company (Flanagan et al 1983), the unions underwent a crisis of 
representation and became very vulnerable to the internal splits created by the divergent strategies 
pursued by the political parties to which they were affiliated. Yet, notwithstanding the renewed 
level of antagonism shown at the central and official level, new forms of cooperation arose in the 
workplace and in industrial districts based on the acknowledgement that firms were compelled to 
restructure in order to compete in increasingly open international markets. The executive kept on 
consulting the union confederations informally before the adoption of important policy measures 
like the annual budget.
3. The emergence of European constraints, institutional innovation and ‘marginal’ flexibility 
in the 1990s
The previous section showed that, with regard to the hypotheses put forth in Chapter 1, Italy 
resembles a typical ‘multi-actor’ system180, where a weak executive needed to negotiate -  either 
formally through social pacts or (more often) informally -  major pieces of employment legislation
180 See Chapter 1..
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with relatively powerful interest organisations. Interestingly, however, whereas French 
unilateralism had to be tempered in a context of economic difficulties and emerging European 
constraints181, the Italian attitude toward consensual decision-making would be, if anything, 
reinforced and further institutionalised.
The Italian labour market entered the 1990s in alarming conditions. After a bout of recession 
in 1992-93 the unemployment rate spiralled out of control, eventually crossing the threshold of 11% 
in 1995. More worryingly still, the employment rate started to decrease in 1993 after 20 years of 
uninterrupted growth and reached a record low of 50.6% in 1995. Despite a slight recovery toward 
the end of the decade -  the unemployment rate dropped to 9.1% by 2001, the most positive figure 
since 1989 - , some deeply rooted features of the Italian labour market, such as long-term 
unemployment (the highest in the EU at 61% of total unemployed in 2000 compared to 48% in
1993), youth unemployment (which rose from 30.4% in 1993 to 31.1% in 2000) and the north-south 
divide (in 2000 the unemployment rate reached 27.6% in the south against 4.9% in the north), 
remained substantially unaffected (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004).
Much like in France, employment policy debates were framed by the emergence of new 
constraints coming from the European level. The completion of the Single Market in 1992 and the 
need to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria for EMU forced Italian firms to operate in an 
integrated European market without relying on frequent currency devaluations to shore up their 
competitiveness. The issue of labour flexibility came to the fore once again. Until the mid-1980s the 
Italian approach to regulation, based as it was on the protection of core industrial workers by the 
strict regulation of employment relations and the use of targeted income support schemes (the CIG, 
in particular), had generally been accepted by both unions and employers, who did not have to bear 
the cost of industrial restructuring and could rely on high internal flexibility. Governments were not 
keen on greater flexibility either, as the public monopoly on placement and the practice of 
discussing and agreeing collective dismissals in large firms with the social partners were important 
political instruments (Samek Lodovici 2000). Now, faced with growing international competition 
and tight constraints on public spending, the social partners’ attitudes toward flexibility began to 
change. The British strategy of deregulation, the massive flexibilisation of employment contracts 
attempted in Spain, the ‘Dutch miracle’ based on concerted flexibility and the widespread reliance 
on temporary work were presented as experiences to be imitated (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000; 
Giuliani 2000). Trade unions and workers came to accept more flexibility as a necessary evil to 
fight high unemployment, but called for rules to prevent a totally unregulated market. Employers 
demanded unanimously more freedom to hire and fire workers and the set-up of an adequate system
181 See Chapter 3.
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of income support (ammortizzatori sociali in the Italian parlance) to buffer the likely social 
consequences. At the same time, as growing competition made it more difficult for firms to 
compete only on flexibility or product quality, curbing labour costs and cutting the rate of inflation 
became again a major concern for policy-makers and employers alike. Growing emphasis was put 
on cutting public spending, alleviating the fiscal burden on companies and improving the quality of 
public services (Regini and Regalia 1997).
The increasing pressure exercised by the European context and the shift in policy debates 
took place in the context of a double crisis of legitimacy: that of the political parties that, in various 
guises, had led the country since the war and that of public, and particularly welfare, spending. In 
1992-93 a pool of Milan magistrates started to uncover a widespread network of kickbacks and 
illegal party financing that involved the highest spheres of the government. The public outcry 
caused by the investigation, known in the press as Tangentopoli (literally ‘kickback town’), deeply 
affected the parties in power -  especially the seemingly all-mighty Christian Democrats and 
Socialists -, which collapsed virtually overnight. This produced an extremely fluid political 
landscape and left room for the emergence of new political formations and alliances often based on 
the personalities of their leaders (Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, for instance) rather than the glue 
of ideology (Radaelli 1998).
The collapse of the old political system happened at the same time, and was probably 
accelerated by, a deep crisis of public finances. Public deficits had stayed consistently above 10% 
of GDP almost every year since 1975 and public debt, after crossing the threshold of 100% of GDP 
in 1991, reached the staggering height of 122.7% in 1995 (Della Sala 1997). Notwithstanding its 
relatively moderate aggregate value -  25.8% of GDP in 1993 as against an EU average of 27.7% -, 
social spending (especially the burdensome pension system) was commonly indicted as one of the 
main culprits for the country’s severe financial problems (Ferrera 1997). Even though Italy’s
10 9
expenditure on employment policies was (and still is) one of the lowest in Europe , these were 
generally deemed to be ineffective, uneven across social groups and regions and inadequate to 
address the new international context. All this contributed to creating a climate of diffuse 
‘negativism’ against welfare and employment policies, thus offering an important source of 
legitimacy to the reformist efforts of the governments of the period.
Against this background, the effort put into employment policy reform was remarkable, 
especially when compared to the little that had been done in previous years. In the course of the 
decade, the public discourse centred mainly around two areas of intervention, with some overlaps 
between the two: institutional innovation, concerning in particular the structure of collective
182 See above.
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bargaining and the organisation of employment services; and the flexibility of labour contracts and 
work organisation183. Policy changes were publicly and formally negotiated with the social partners. 
After the partial failure of tripartite bargaining in 1977-84, a new wave of neo-corporatist 
agreements was struck starting from 1992. These were no longer based on a political exchange 
between the participants, but were motivated instead by the need to solve specific policy problems, 
such as inflation, the structure of collective bargaining, pension reform.
Recourse to peak-level agreements between the government and interest organisations 
became widespread in most west European countries in the 1990s (France184 and Great Britain 
being the most notable exceptions to this) as a means to grapple with the need to rein in labour costs 
and reform their welfare states (Pochet and Fajertag 2000). The choice for tripartite agreements, 
though, was especially surprising for a country like Italy, which had few, if any at all, of the 
institutional preconditions outlined by the literature on neo-corporatism (stable governments, 
peaceful relations between unions and employers, centralised and hierarchically organised interest 
organisations) (Dell’Aringa and Samek Lodovici 1992; Regini 1997, Baccaro 2002). Nevertheless, 
social pacts in the 1990s became an almost yearly occurrence due to two reasons. First, the diffuse 
perception of economic vulnerability provided a powerful incentive for domestic actors to cooperate 
(Baccaro 2002; Biagioli 2003). Second, the weakness of the governments of the 1990s created the 
need to share the responsibility of potentially unpopular choices with workers’ and employers’ 
organisations. In the midst of the crisis of political parties, tripartite bargaining was a way for the 
technocrats coming from the academia or branches of the public service (especially the Treasury 
and the Bank of Italy) who had been given direct government responsibilities to gain extra- 
parliamentary legitimacy (Regini 1997; Regini and Regalia 1997). These agreements devolved a 
significant degree of policy-making authority to collective bargaining and some of them were even 
put to workers’ referendums (as was the case for the 1993 Accordo Ciampi and the 1995 pension 
reform) (Regini and Regalia 1997; Baccaro 2002). The influence of parliament was hardly 
noticeable in this phase and its role consisted mainly of approving measures agreed outside its 
walls. The political parties’ ability to set the policy agenda weakened considerably, their positions 
being stuck on the traditional left-right cleavage ‘pro or against flexibility’ or ‘pro or against cuts in 
social spending’. Policy initiatives were by and large left to the Minister of Labour and his staff and 
to interest organisations (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000).
As far as institutional innovation is concerned, two major social pacts agreed in 1992 and 
1993 (dubbed, respectively, Accordo Amato (CNEL 1992) and Accordo Ciampi (CNEL 1993) after
183 This intuition has been confirmed by Paolo Sestito of the Bank of Italy. Sestito, P. Interview with the author on 27
March 2006. Rome.
184 See Chapter 3.
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the two Prime Ministers who negotiated them) finally abolished the scala mobile, which had long 
been criticised as an inflation-maximiser, and reformed the collective bargaining system. The 1993 
Accordo Ciampi established a two-level hierarchical system, with the national level fixing the 
general standards with regard to wage-setting and the territorial or plant level dealing with the 
regulation of more specific aspects. In order to keep inflation under control, wage dynamics were to 
follow the planned rate of inflation agreed annually by the government and the social partners. 
Although this system is commonly regarded as having played a fundamental role in curbing 
inflation and helping Italy to qualify for EMU, a further reform of collective bargaining, providing 
for a stronger role of the territorial level and greater wage flexibility to suit the existing disparities 
between regions and sectors, was discussed well into the 2006 general election campaign, with the 
centre-right coalition, Confindustria and two of the main union confederations (CISL and UIL) 
making the case for reform and CGIL staunchly opposing it.
The reform of employment services has also been a long-standing theme in the Italian 
employment policy discourse of recent years. The public monopoly on placement was for many 
years virtually undisputed in Italian policy debates. When in 1982 the sociologist Pietro Ichino, then 
a young Communist MP, published a book that openly criticised the public placement system for its 
inefficiency (Ichino 1982) he was immediately banned from his party. Placement offices were 
allowed for the first time to deviate from the automatic numerical call rule in 1987185. The 
numerical call was finally abolished by Law n. 223 of 1991186, which introduced the principle of 
free choice for all categories of workers. More radical reforms, though, were to come only a few 
years later. In 1993 the above mentioned Accordo Ciampi called for a ‘reorganisation of the 
peripheral offices of the Ministry of Labour so as to enable them to perform tasks of active 
employment policy’ (CNEL 1993: p.9). Three years later, a new ‘Pact for Labour’ signed by the 
social partners and a centre-left cabinet led by Romano Prodi, an economics professor who had 
served in the 1980s as President of IRI, announced a reform of employment services based on 
institutional decentralisation and an opening of the sector to private providers (CNEL 1996). This 
part of the pact was turned into law in December 1997187. The responsibility for placement was 
transferred from the Ministry to the regions and the running of placement offices (now called centri 
per rimpiego, employment centres) to the provinces. After almost fifty years of public monopoly, 
private providers such as unions, employers’ associations, non-profit organisations were allowed 
into the sector, although they were not permitted to offer services other than simple placement. 
Finally, it was provided that public employment services should go beyond the mere bureaucratic
185 See above.
186 Law of 23 July 1991, n. 223.
187 Decreto legislativo of 23 December 1997, n. 469.
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certification of unemployment, but instead should actively help the unemployed to find new jobs by 
offering services ranging from consultancy and orientation to training and pre-selection. The aim 
was to introduce a brand new approach to placement, more in line with the experience of northern 
European countries. As shown in the next chapter, though, the reform of employment services is 
still ongoing and poses a great challenge to the traditional attitudes of Italian bureaucracies, 
especially in the southern parts of the country where labour market conditions are more 
problematic.
The promotion of flexible work contracts and the reduction of working time were presented 
throughout the 1990s as a way to prevent unemployment and create new jobs for the weaker 
segments of the labour force, thus further developing a process that had already begun with the 
introduction of the first set of ‘atypical’ contracts in 1984188. As said, this suited both the employers 
and the trade unions, which were concerned about the widespread disregard for the existing rules 
and had long argued for the introduction of forms of work-sharing. ‘Work less to let all work’
( ‘Lavorare meno per lavorare tuttV) was the title of an essay by the French philosopher Guy Aznar 
that was published in Italian in 1994 and immediately became widely read (Gualmini 1998). 
However, since the generous regulation of permanent contracts, including compulsory re-hiring in 
case of firing without ‘just cause’, was left almost untouched, the approach that was chosen in Italy, 
as in other southern European countries, consisted of expanding the opportunities for flexibility ‘at 
the margins’ of the labour market (Sestito 2002; Molina and Rhodes 2007a). Over time, this has 
brought about a growing segmentation in the labour market, with the bulk of workers on permanent 
contracts (mainly middle-aged males working in the public sector and in large firms) on one side, 
and growing numbers of workers on temporary or part-time contracts (typically younger workers 
and women) on the other.
A first important step in the direction of greater ‘external’ flexibility of employment 
relations (i.e. hiring and firing) was taken with the introduction in 1991 of new legislation
1 RQregulating collective dismissals , which had hitherto been dealt with by collective agreements on a 
case-by-case basis. Although the regulation of individual dismissals remained extremely restrictive, 
the new legislation provided that groups of workers in the industrial sector, large commercial firms 
and other small sectors in crisis could be made redundant and placed on ‘mobility lists’, which 
entitled them to mobility benefits and re-employment facilities (Samek Lodovici 2000; Barbier and 
Fargion 2004). Yet the most important developments concerned the extension of atypical contracts. 
The introduction of agency work (lavoro interinale in Italian), that is, the possibility for employers
188 In Italy, like in France, the ‘typical’ labour contract is deemed to be permanent and full-time, with full entitlement to 
benefits and to the protection offered to workers by the Workers’ Statute.
189 Law of 23 July 1991, n. 223.
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to rent workers from specialised agencies, had been announced by the Accordo Ciampi and was 
eventually regulated by Law n. 196 of 1997 (the so-called Pacchetto Treu after the Labour Minister 
of the time, Tiziano Treu). Agency work was progressively extended to various branches of the 
private sector and subsequently even to the public sector, for both skilled and unskilled jobs. The 
Pacchetto Treu also provided for greater flexibility in the use of temporary contracts by increasing 
the number of times these are renewable and reducing sanctions in case of breach of contract 
regulations. Subsequently, the automatic conversion of temporary into permanent contracts was 
abolished, the need for employers to demonstrate their reasons for fixing the term of a contract was 
eliminated and the role of collective bargaining in establishing the maximum number of workers a 
firm could employ on temporary contracts was weakened190. In order to favour the diffusion of part- 
time, tax credits were offered to employers who hired new staff on part-time contracts, overtime 
payments were reduced and the period of notice required for working time changes was shortened 
from ten days to 48 hours191. Finally, the so-called ‘quasi-employment contracts’ (lavoro 
parasubordinato) experienced a remarkable expansion. These types of contracts (the best-known of 
which are the so-called Collaborazioni coordinate e continuative, co. co. co.) allowed forms of 
cooperation between a firm and a worker for specific tasks or projects that did not involve a 
traditional employer-employee relation. The fact that their regulation was extremely vague and that 
they were relatively inexpensive in terms of social contributions (around 12% of the gross salary as 
opposed to 33% for a permanent contract) made them very popular with employers192.
It is widely recognised that the promotion of flexible contracts has contributed to the good 
labour market performance of the late 1990s. Around 1.5 million jobs were created between 1995 
and 2001 and unemployment started to go down again (Sestito 2002). At the end of the decade, the 
diffusion of labour flexibility seemed to be an incontrovertible trend, even though the risk of job 
insecurity (precarieta) and the bad quality of the jobs created were pointed to with growing 
insistence in public debates. Nevertheless, the emphasis on flexibility intensified with the advent of 
a centre-right coalition in government in 2001.
A last notable development of the mid-1990s was the introduction of new active measures of 
employment promotion, comprising a reform of the vocational training system and new policies for 
local development. The main novelties of the reform of vocational training sketched out by the 1996 
Pact for Labour were the link with the public education system and the overhaul of work contracts 
with a training content. The 1997 Pacchetto Treu devised a new model of work-and-training and 
apprenticeship contracts that raised the age limit of potential users from 29 to 32 and provided for
190 Decreto legislativo of 6 September 2001, n. 368.
191 Decreto legislativo of 26 February 2001, n. 100.
192 Tavemese, G. Interview with the author on 28 March 2006. Rome.
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longer contract duration. Special provisions aimed at improving their training content and (in the 
case of apprenticeship contracts) made it possible to lower entry wages (Samek Lodovici 2000). 
New policies to attract investment and create new employment in less developed areas were 
introduced under the heading of ‘negotiated planning’ (programmazione negoziata) between 1995 
and 1997. These policies can hardly be considered as labour policies only, as they incorporate wider 
goals of social, urban and industrial development with a view to re-vitalising depressed areas as a 
whole (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). The most significant such policies -  area contracts193 and 
territorial pacts194 -  provide for state financing of local development or industrial restructuring 
projects agreed and partially funded by public and private actors: not only social partners and local 
authorities, but also banks, chambers of commerce, charities. In consideration of the special needs 
of the area, the parties are allowed to deviate from national contractual standards and agree to 
measures of wage and regulatory flexibility. Negotiated planning proved to be an immediate 
success -  more than 100 territorial pacts had been submitted by 2000 and 15 area contracts 
corresponding to 16,328 new jobs were in operation in the same year (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). 
However, the available resources were substantially cut after 2001. As for vocational training, the 
data concerning Italy remain substantially under the EU average both in terms on funding (0.23% in 
2004 against an EU average of 0.27% and a peak of 0.54% in Denmark) and employee participation 
(26% compared to around 40%) (Ciccarone and Raitano 2006), thus pointing to the low impact of 
the reforms undertaken in the 1990s.
4. Continuity and change in Italian employment policies and policy-making after 1997
Labour market trends in France195 and Italy show some remarkably similar features, though perhaps 
in the case of Italy these assume an even more extreme character. Much like in France, the Italian 
labour market approached the year 2000 in dire conditions. The unemployment rate peaked at 
11.3% in 1997, but then started a remarkable descent. The employment rate rose steadily over the 
same period in a context of slow -  for most of the early 2000s even stagnating -  GDP growth (see 
Table 5).
193 Law of 8 August 1995, n. 341.
194 Law of 24 June 1997, n. 196.
195 See Chapter 3.
147
Table 5. Employment and unemployment rates in Italy (1997-2006)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Unemployment
rate
11.3% 11.3% 10.9% 10.1% 9.1% 8.6% 8.4% 8.0% 7.7% 6.8%
Employment 
rate (total)
51.3% 51.9% 52.7% 53.7% 54.8% 55.5% 56.1% 57.6% 57.6% 58.4%
Employment 
rate (women)
36.4% 37.3% 38.3% 39.6% 41.1% 42.0% 42.7% 45.2% 45.3% 46.3%
Employment 
rate (older 
workers)
27.9% 27.6% 27.7% 27.7% 28.0% 28.9% 30.3% 30.5% 31.4% 32.5%
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
Notwithstanding this positive trend, Italy’s unemployment rate was above the EU-15 average until 
2004. The Italian employment rate, like the French one, was below the EU-15 average (66.9% in 
2006196) and still very far from the Lisbon 70% target. Yet, at 58.4% in 2006, Italy’s employment 
rate was by far the lowest among the EU-15 member states. The employment rate for older workers 
was, again, lower than the EU average in both countries, although it was even lower in Italy than in 
France (32.5% in 2006 against 38.1% in France). Two noticeable differences must, however, be 
highlighted. First, whereas France has a comparatively high employment rate for women (58.8% in 
2006 against an EU-15 average of 58.7%), the figure for Italy is the lowest in the EU-15 (46.3%). 
Second, wide regional differentials persist in Italy: the total employment rate in 2003 was 64.9% in 
the north-east of the country and only 43.2% in the south (Signorelli 2004). Finally, in both 
countries the number of workers on fixed-term and quasi-subordinate contracts is growing quickly. 
In Italy the share of fixed-term contracts increased by 20% between 2000 and 2004 and the number 
of quasi-subordinate contracts doubled between 1996 and 2006 (Ciccarone and Raitano 2006).
The Italian government contributed very little to the original design of the EES, probably 
due to the fact that all the attention was concentrated at the time on the last efforts to qualify for 
EMU (Ferrera and Gualmini 2002). This resulted in the Italian ‘model’ looking very distant from 
the European guidelines and recommendations. Whereas the Strategy focused on active and 
preventative measures, the traditional goal of Italian employment policies was the protection of the 
existing levels of employment, to be achieved through state-funded passive policies and a rich set of 
legal guarantees in favour of workers on permanent contracts. Public employment services 
performed only bureaucratic functions of intermediation between demand and supply of labour and 
active policies were virtually non-existent. Fresh ‘activation’ initiatives and discourses appeared
196 Eurostat website:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page? pageid= 1996,39140985& dad=portal& schema=PORTAL&screen=detai 
lref&language=en&produet=STRIND EMPLOI&root=STRIND EMPLOI/emploi/emOl 1.
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only with the centre-left governments of 1996-2001. The emphasis placed by Prodi’s Pact for
107Labour on active policies and the aim of raising the employment rate (as opposed to protecting 
existing employment or fighting unemployment) was unprecedented in the Italian scenario. The 
commitment to an ‘active management of employment dynamics’ was subsequently reaffirmed by 
the so-called ‘Christmas Pact’ signed in December 1998 by the government and over thirty interest 
organisations (CNEL 1998: p.2). The Pact confirmed the two-level bargaining structure introduced 
by the Ciampi accord of 1993 and restated the principles of de-centralisation and privatisation 
guiding the reform of employment services and the provision of active policies.
Employment policy debates in the late 1990s and early 2000s focused broadly on the same 
big themes as the previous period, that is, institutional innovation (collective bargaining, 
employment services) and the flexibility of labour relations and work organisation. Aside from 
some differences in style and emphasis, the terms of the debate and the proposed policy solutions 
showed a remarkable degree of continuity as different party coalitions alternated in power. The 
most noticeable change concerned the policy style that was adopted. After the country qualified for 
EMU, the neo-corporatist bargaining (concertazione in the Italian jargon) which had underpinned 
all the major policy changes of the 1990s was increasingly blamed for Italy’s lacklustre economic 
performance and, eventually, was outright rejected by the centre-right government that followed the 
2001 general election (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004; Molina and Rhodes 2007b). At the same time, 
the party system started a long and difficult process of realignment after the crisis of the early 1990s 
and this restricted the space for union involvement in policy-making. Unity of action among the 
union confederations foundered as differences re-emerged between CGIL, on one side, and CISL 
and UIL, on the other, regarding key issues such as union democracy, collective bargaining and the 
flexibilisation of wages and working conditions (Baccaro et al. 2003). Party alignments also played 
a role as CGIL placed itself firmly on the centre-left camp in the run-up to the 2001 general 
election, whereas CISL and UIL maintained a more neutral position. At the same time, 
Confindustria assumed a less cooperative stance as a shift in the internal balance of power brought 
Antonio D’Amato, the candidate of SMEs, to the presidency in 2000. During his tenure the 
employers’ organisation broke with its strategy of dialogue with the unions and broadly aligned 
itself with the centre-right government of Silvio Berlusconi, thus abandoning its traditional 
‘equidistance’ from political parties.
Thus the 1998 Christmas Pact was the highest point (but also, as it turned out, the last 
episode) of this phase of concertazione. The Pact aimed to institutionalise tripartism and further 
extend its remit by introducing a contractual obligation for the government to consult the social
197 See above.
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partners on all social and employment policy matters and even to devolve regulatory authority 
directly to them over issues that did not involve public spending. The Pact gave a mandate to the 
executive to introduce measures of administrative simplification, invest in infrastructures and 
reform social shock-absorbers and the education and training systems. Employers pledged to boost 
productive investment in return for the executive to cut taxes on firms and for the unions to ensure 
wage moderation. In the end, however, the Pact delivered little. Its ambitious attempt to 
institutionalise a model of neo-corporatism all'italiana remained largely unimplemented due to 
fundamental disagreements on policy options both between unions and employers and within the 
labour movement itself, as well as by the executive’s reluctance to enter into long-term 
commitments (Molina and Rhodes 2007b). Trade union unity was eventually formally broken by 
CGIL’s refusal in February 2000 to sign a local pact for employment in the city of Milan (Milano 
lavoro), which extended the use of flexible employment contracts for specific categories of workers 
(Baccaro et al 2003)198.
During the dying years of the centre-left governments the employment policy discourse 
became utterly fragmented. Romano Prodi was forced to resign within a few months of qualifying 
for EMU and the two Prime Ministers (Massimo D’Alema and Giuliano Amato) that succeeded him 
were supported by increasingly fraught parliamentary majorities. As the concerns over inflation and 
the state of public finances became less pressing, the problems of competitiveness, sluggish growth 
and persistently high unemployment became the main focus of public discourse (Radaelli 2002). 
D’Alema and Amato repeatedly called for the introduction of greater labour market flexibility, 
investments in education and training, the improvement of employment services and, especially 
after the March 2000 Lisbon European Council, a shift of focus toward raising employment rates. A 
few days before Lisbon, Prime Minister D’Alema signed a joint document with his British 
counterpart Tony Blair advocating the adoption of workfare policies for the activation of the 
unemployed and the strengthening of local or firm-level bargaining199. Other members of the 
government, however, raised rather different concerns. Cesare Salvi, a left-wing Senator who was 
appointed Labour Minister in 1999, declared that ‘the government will not go down the road of 
savage flexibility'200 and proposed ‘a European-wide plan of investments'201 to raise employment 
levels, thus reviving an old idea of the Delors White Paper. The voices of interest organisations 
were equally cacophonic. They all lamented the ineffectiveness of the government’s employment 
policies, but their recipes for the future diverged radically. Confindustria and CISL asked for
198 See Chapter 6.
199 La Stampa, 21 March 2000.
200 Corriere della Sera, 17 September 1999.
201 Corriere della Sera, 25 June 1999.
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I greater wage and regulatory flexibility, while CGIL opposed it and called, instead, for a new wave 
of public investments to foster job creation and active policies for the unemployed. Only as the 
2001 general election drew closer the divisions within the centre-left seemed to recompose around 
the new candidate for Palazzo Chigi202, the Mayor of Rome Francesco Rutelli, who promised that 
employment would be the priority of the next term of parliament and chose for his campaign some 
(vague) slogans clearly borrowed from the EES jargon, such as ‘more and better jobs’, ‘quality in 
work’, ‘flexicurity’ and ‘lifelong learning’.
Yet little was achieved by way of policy innovation until after the 2001 general election.
The vetoes posed by CGIL and the more left-wing components of the parliamentary majority 
proved too high a hurdle for the weak cabinets that followed Prodi’s demise (Treu 2001). The 2001 
general election, then, resulted in a landslide victory for a centre-right coalition led by the media 
tycoon Silvio Berlusconi on a markedly neo-liberal platform. Given what he saw as the abject 
failure of the previous governments in delivering growth and promoting employment, Berlusconi 
proposed a seemingly straightforward formula based on lower taxes on individuals and firms, 
massive investments in infrastructure and greater labour market flexibility203. The new Labour 
Minister, Roberto Maroni, repeatedly stated that getting more people into employment and raising 
the employment rate was to be the primary goal of employment policy and that ‘there should be no 
taboos regarding flexibility,204, that is, firms should be granted more freedom to hire and fire 
workers.
The government’s plans with regard to employment policy were set out in a White Paper on 
the Labour Market that was circulated in October 2001 (Ministero del lavoro 2001). The White 
Paper was meant to trigger a debate around the government’s proposals, some of which were 
anticipated as being unpopular with the trade unions. The Lisbon and Stockholm objectives and the 
EES guidelines and recommendations were mentioned throughout the document, be it to outline the 
objectives of governmental action, be it to emphasise the failure of past policy:
‘Italy is the European country with the low est overall em ploym ent rate, the low est fem ale employment rate, 
the highest long-term unemployment rate, the largest regional unbalances. The recommendations addressed 
to Italy by the European Union within the framework o f  the Luxembourg Process [ . . . ]  have emphasised the 
ineffectiveness o f  the policies adopted so far and the lack o f  interventions able substantially to improve the 
performance o f  its labour market’ (M inistero del lavoro 2001: p.5).
Against this background, the White Paper puts forth a comprehensive reform programme aimed to 
promote an ‘active society ’ providing more employment opportunities for all and more modem
202 Palazzo Chigi is the main seat of the Prime Minister’s office in Rome.
203 In Berlusconi’s own words, ‘we will apply the recipe o f Reagan, Thatcher and Aznar: lower taxes fo r  families and 
firms; less laws, less regulations, less prohibitions; less unproductive public spending; more investments in 
infrastructures, less rigidities in the labour market’ (ANSA 1 May 2001).
204 Corriere della Sera, 15 June 2001.
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rules presiding over work relations. The policy innovations that were proposed concerned, 
variously, boosting the role of employment services (improving the efficiency of public services, 
allowing private providers to compete with them), investing in vocational training (supporting the 
demand for lifelong learning, reforming work contracts with a training component), reforming 
social shock-absorbers (improving coverage, providing recipients with incentives to get back into 
employment) and, last but not least, an extension of the use of flexible labour contracts. The White 
Paper also contained a critique of the method of concertazione, deemed to be cumbersome and 
ineffective, and advocated in its stead a looser *social dialogue ’, a term explicitly borrowed from 
the EU jargon, as a more appropriate mode of interaction with the social partners. Under the aegis 
of social dialogue, the social partners would be consulted on all matters that could be of interest to 
them, but they would hold no power of veto as the executive would retain the ultimate 
responsibility to decide.
Union reactions were, again, varied. CGIL kept a militant stance and staunchly refused to 
discuss the White Paper’s content, whereas CISL and UIL agreed to hold talks with the executive. 
Discussions, however, broke down at the end of 2001 due to a governmental proposal, unannounced 
in the White Paper, to relax the protection against unfair dismissals granted by Art. 18 of the Statuto
90Sdei lavoratori . Negotiations were resumed after a general strike was called in march 2002. The 
government sought to exploit the divisions within the labour movement in order to isolate CGIL 
and gain as much support as it could from the other confederations (Molina and Rhodes 2007b).
The result of this strategy was the signing of a new social pact in July between the government and 
over thirty interest organisations (but not CGIL). The so-called ‘Pact for Italy’ (Patto per VItalia) 
(CNEL 2002) included a watered-down version of the proposed changes to Art. 18 of the Workers’
9 0  f\Statute and essentially reiterated many of the policy ideas already outlined in the 2001 White 
Paper (reform of employment services, reform of work-and-training contracts, upgrading of 
ordinary unemployment benefits, introduction of flexible work contracts). In addition to this, the 
government promised to cut taxes on low incomes and to implement various initiatives for the 
development of the Mezzogiomo (the traditional jargon name of southern Italy).
Having gained the consensus of most interest organisations on its reform plans, the
907government was now free to turn them into law. Law n. 30 of 2003 , also known as legge Biagi
after the Minister’s consultant who had first drafted it, included the reform of employment contracts 
and that of placement services, while the long-awaited reform of social shock absorbers and the
205 See above.
206 Art. 18 of the Statuto dei lavoratori was not to be applied for a period of three years to those firms which, by hiring 
new workers, had crossed the threshold of 15 employees beyond which the Statute applies.
207 Law of 14 February 2003, n. 30.
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planned changes to Art. 18 were postponed and have not as yet been accomplished208. Employment 
services were fully liberalised: private employment agencies, chambers of commerce, trade unions, 
universities are now allowed to offer the full gamut of employment services, from placement to 
training and orientation. A new national placement information system (Borsa continua nazionale 
del lavoro) was established so as to facilitate the matching of labour demand and supply. New types 
of contracts were introduced -  job on call, job-sharing, staff leasing -  and other types that were 
already allowed (part-time, work and training, apprenticeship, co. co. co.) were thoroughly 
reformed. The new contract rules were meant to make it easier for employers to hire new workers 
while improving the regulation of the more flexible contracts in order to avoid abuse: the infamous 
co. co. co.209, for instance, were regulated more restrictively and their contributory weight raised 
from around 12% to nearly 18% of the gross salary.
This law was admittedly the highest point of the reformist endeavours of the Berlusconi 
government in the field of employment and triggered a heated debate that is still ongoing. Its 
explicit aims were to raise employment levels, increase the number of workers in stable 
employment and facilitate the access of disadvantaged groups to the labour market (Tiraboschi 
2004, 2005). Be that as it may, academic commentators divided between those who held that Law n. 
30 made the Italian labour market more transparent and efficient (Signorelli 2004) and those who 
reckoned, instead, that it did not even get close to solving its real problems, i.e. high segmentation 
between groups and sectors and large regional imbalances (Rodano 2004). CGIL, which had never
accepted to negotiate with the government, repeatedly called for the law to be repealed in all its
010parts , whereas CISL, UIL and Confindustria, with different degrees of enthusiasm, defended it 
and asked that it be complemented with a reformed system of social buffers so as to compensate
911workers on temporary contracts for the income losses suffered during spells of unemployment .
As for politicians, the confrontation between centre-right and centre-left on the legge Biagi 
continued into the 2006 election campaign. The former pointed to the positive trend shown by
919labour market indicators as evidence of the law’s positive effects, while the latter were divided 
between those who called for its outright abrogation and those who proposed to modify it in order
208 See Chapter 6.
209 See above.
210 Treves, C. Interview with the author on 4 April 2006. Rome.
211 Tavemese, G. Interview with the author on 28 March 2006. Rome. Marchetti, M. Interview with the author on 11 
April 2006. Rome. Rossi, S. Interview with the author on 11 April 2006. Rome.
212 See Table 5.
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to tame the potentially perverse effects of the widespread recourse to flexible contracts in terms of 
labour market segmentation and constant job insecurity for disadvantaged groups213.
In the final years of the centre-right’s term in government, deteriorating economic 
conditions helped to restore unity of action among the union confederations and seemed to re-create 
the conditions for cooperation with the employers (Molina and Rhodes 2007b). The three union 
confederations jointly called a general strike in November 2004 in protest against the Berlusconi 
government’s financial and tax policies. Similar criticism came from Confindustria, whose newly- 
elected president, Fiat’s and Ferrari’s chairman Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, called for a new 
season of cooperation between employers and workers. Notwithstanding a series of inter-confederal 
agreements signed between 2003 and 2005214, however, old divisions between the social partners 
persisted, especially regarding thorny issues like the reform of collective bargaining. Meanwhile, 
the government continued to disregard union views on important issues of their concern. The 
unilateral introduction in 2004 of a pension reform that raised the minimum retirement age from 57 
to 60 and the minimum number of years of contributions from 35 to 40 from 2008 is the most 
striking example of the government’s attitude toward a renewal of concertazione.
Thus the politics of Italian employment policies changed considerably after the country’s 
entry into EMU. As the external constraint provided by the prospect of euro membership 
disappeared, social and political actors felt free to pursue their own agendas and the neo-corporatist 
bargaining that had formed the basis of economic and social policy-making for most of the 1990s 
quickly faded. Concurrently, as the party system started to re-gain its strength and legitimacy, the 
executive felt increasingly entitled to act without seeking the consensus of all. The Berlusconi 
government enjoyed a large parliamentary majority and an uncommon (for Italy’s standards) degree 
of internal cohesion that allowed it to claim a primacy over parliament and the social partners that 
had no precedent in post-war Italian history (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). Beyond the stark 
differences in rhetoric and policy style, however, the employment policy discourse in the years of 
the centre-right shows important elements of continuity with its predecessors. The government’s 
public discourse was much less fragmented than hitherto. The main focus of policy changed -  
raising employment rates instead of protecting the existing employment levels or fighting 
unemployment -  and the executive’s policy agenda was made public from the very beginning with 
explicit numerical targets -  the Lisbon employment rate targets and the specific targets set in a
213 For instance, the leader of the centre-left coalition, Romano Prodi, claimed that it was necessary to make 'partial, 
but substantial, changes [to the legge Biagi] ...flexibility is useful to help young people to enter the labour market, but 
today we are falling into a cotidition o f permanent insecurity (precarieta)’ (// Sole-24 Ore, 13 March 2005).
214 The Pact for Employment, Competitiveness and Development (June 2003), the Agreement to Re-launch the 
Development and Competitiveness of the South of Italy (November 2004) and the Manifesto for the Development of 
Italy’s Mezzogiomo (December 2005) (Molina and Rhodes 2007b).
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document added to the 2001 NAP215 -  against which its performance could be judged. The adoption 
of a White Paper on labour market reform was itself an innovation in terms of policy style, this too 
borrowed from an established EU practice. However, when one considers the policy content of the 
White Paper the continuity with the past is more evident. The legge Biagi can be interpreted as a 
further step in the direction traced by the Pacchetto Treu, insofar as both seek to increase flexibility 
of labour relations without touching upon the generous protection afforded to workers on permanent 
contracts. Berlusconi’s controversial attempt to abolish the obligatory reinstatement in case of 
unfair dismissal under Art. 18 of the Workers’ Statute was a long-standing employers’ request and 
had been the object of a popular referendum in 2000 (Baccaro and Simoni 2004).
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to trace Italian employment policies and debates before and after the launch 
of the EES. In doing so, it focused, on the one hand, on the evolution of employment policy-making 
and, on the other hand, on the changing conception of labour market problems and of the 
appropriate solutions. In order to serve this thesis’ comparative purpose, constant reference has 
been made to the points of similarity and difference with France, as well as with other member 
states or EU average data on specific aspects. As in Chapter 3 as regards the French case study, the 
aims here were to determine a clear empirical focus for the next chapter -  which policy choices of 
recent years might have been inspired by the EES? -  and to identify relevant actors and institutional 
settings -  who was involved in relevant policy choices? What was the institutional framework in 
which these were made? What kind of resources did they have at their disposal?
As far as employment policies and discourses are concerned, it has been argued that the 
Italian ‘model’, much like the French one, is based on the tight regulation of the individual 
employment relationship and a network of public employment services performing eminently 
bureaucratic functions. Unlike France, though, Italy never had a generous and developed system of 
social shock absorbers, nor a significant set of active policies for the insertion of specific groups of 
unemployed. Public expenditure on labour market programmes and vocational training always 
remained comparatively low. Employment policy discourses changed radically in the 1990s, in the 
context of more integrated European markets and growing constraints on public spending. New 
demands arose for greater flexibility of employment relations, lower labour costs, better public 
services and a more effective system of income support policies. A remarkable number of reforms 
were put in place by a series of centre-left executives amidst deteriorating labour market conditions:
215 See Chapter 6.
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the collective bargaining system was reorganised and automatic wage indexation abolished; 
employment services were de-centralised and liberalised; recourse to temporary and part-time 
contracts was extended and facilitated. New themes entered employment policy discourses around 
the time the EES was launched: a more active role of employment services, lifelong learning, 
getting more people into employment for longer. Notwithstanding some stark differences in 
rhetoric, the interventions of the centre-right cabinet that took power in 2001 followed the same 
broad lines as its predecessors: the liberalisation of employment services was completed; recourse 
to atypical labour contracts was further extended. The attempts that were made to relax the 
protective regulation of permanent contracts were staunchly opposed by the unions, whereas the 
promises made to develop the system of social shock-absorbers were never kept.
The second contention put forth in this chapter is that employment policy-making in Italy is 
characterised by the weakness of public authorities and the constant involvement, either formally or 
informally, of interest organisations in decision-making. Thus, with respect to the hypotheses 
advanced in Chapter 1, Italy looks like a ‘multi-actor’ system, in which a large number of actors 
coming from different institutional settings have a say over policy-making. State authorities have 
long been weak and highly permeable to outside interests, and responsibility over decision-making 
and implementation diffused among a number of national and local centres of authority. Union 
power, by contrast, grew relentlessly after the 1968 strike wave. As a result, when the need came to 
adjust to the economic slowdown of the mid-1970s, this was done in accord with both unions and 
employers. Although the first attempts to strike tripartite agreements foundered in the 1980s, the 
social partners kept on being consulted before the adoption of new employment legislation. Neo- 
corporatist bargaining was then resumed in the early 1990s, in the midst of a deep crisis both of 
public finances and of the political parties that had governed the country since the war. Some of the 
reforms agreed in the social pacts of the 1990s (the new policies for local development, the reform 
of employment services) entailed the active participation of social partners and local authorities, 
thus reinforcing the existing tendencies to de-centralised and inclusive governance. After entry into 
EMU, however, the concerns over public finance and inflation became less pressing. Thus the 
Berlusconi government, in power with a large parliamentary majority since 2001, felt free to adopt 
a more unilateral policy style and disregard at least part of the labour movement (notably CGIL). 
Union opposition, though, still proved strong enough as to block attempts to pass controversial 
reforms, such as the relaxation of the rules on firing.
In sum, the recent history of Italian employment policies is a mix of continuity and change. 
New themes entered policy debates -  issues like the reform of employment services and of social 
shock-absorbers, for instance, acquired an ‘activation’ bias after the launch of the EES that was
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alien to the Italian tradition -, but the complexity of policy-making made adopting and 
implementing policy more difficult than elsewhere. The next chapter looks into how Italy 
participated in the EES, whether and how new themes entered domestic policy debates and, finally, 
whether the change in the terms of the debate ever actually led to changes in policy.
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CHAPTER VI
Th e  European  Employment Strategy  and Policy  Change  in  Ita ly : 
D iscourse Change , Continuity  and  the  R ole o f  E xperts
The previous chapter has traced the evolution of employment policies and policy-making in Italy 
since the immediate post-war years. It was shown that Italian employment policies were going 
through a lively process of reform at the time when the EES was launched. The Italian 
government’s employment policy discourse was broadly in line with the EES since the Prodi years 
(1996-98), as new themes like the activation of the unemployed, prevention of long-term 
unemployment and lifelong learning entered public debates. These new themes continued to inhabit 
governmental discourses even after the centre-right Berlusconi government came into power in 
2001. Notwithstanding clear differences in rhetoric and policy style, indeed, there was a striking 
continuity both in policy discourse and in policy choices between the centre-left and centre-right 
cabinets that governed the country in recent years. The discussion in the present chapter, however, 
indicates that policy change and implementation did not necessarily follow.
The following sections investigate the relation between Italy’s participation in the EES and 
the appearance of these new themes in employment policy debates. Particular emphasis is put on 
two policy areas that the EES recommendations identified as in need of reform (public employment 
services and social shock-absorbers) in order to observe possible instances of discourse or policy 
change. Sections 1 and 2 analyse the way in which Italy participated in the coordination process, the 
adjustments that Italian ministerial structures had to make in order to comply with the new reporting 
obligations of the Strategy and how this played into the internal politics of the Labour Ministry. It is 
argued that the policy model advocated by the Strategy was brokered into the Italian Labour 
Ministry by a group of experts and technocrats who were close to EU institutions and discourses 
and who, as in most other sectors, had came to occupy an influential position in policy-making in 
the wake of the political crisis of the 1990s. The NAP-drafting process and the measure of 
institutional upgrading it demanded from the ministerial bureaucracy further institutionalised the 
position of this expert coalition and provided it with tools and evidence to support their arguments. 
Thus, apart from a short period in which the post of Labour Minister was occupied by Cesare Salvi, 
a left-winger close to the positions of CGIL, these actors came to dominate the government’s 
employment policy discourse.
A second major contention this chapter makes is that this coalition always remained 
somewhat narrow and confined to ministerial circles. The case studies presented in Section 3 show 
that the complexity of Italian*policy-making made it difficult for the EES discourse to become
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diffused and remain relevant outside the limited competence of the Labour Ministry. In the case of 
the reform of public employment services, the old hyper-bureaucratic uffici di collocamento were 
redesigned to perform the active and preventative tasks prescribed by the Strategy, but the inaction 
of regional authorities (particularly in the south) and the lack of adequate skills on the part of the 
Ministry’s peripheral staff slowed the pace of implementation. The reform of the system of 
ammortizzatori sociali, announced by the 2002 Pact for Italy along the lines of conditionality and 
activation advocated by the employment guidelines, had to be repeatedly postponed due to the 
opposition to expenditure rises on the part of the powerful Ministry of the Economy as well as to 
the social partners’ continuing attachment to the existing arrangements. Thus, in spite of significant 
shifts in discourse, the complexity of Italian policy-making hindered policy innovation and, even 
when new policy in line with the Strategy was passed, implementation proved slow and difficult.
1. The European Employment Strategy in Italy
Italy was, along with France, one of the member states that supported the insertion of a Title on 
employment in the Amsterdam Treaty (Ferrera and Gualmini 2002; Fantacone 2004). The explicit 
aim was, for both, to strike a balance between social and economic issues on the European agenda 
after the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact. Neither, though, were able substantially to 
influence the content of the Strategy, which turned out to be especially alien to the Italian 
tradition216. Italy, like France, had a low employment rate, particularly for women and older 
workers, and an inefficient network of public employment services. Yet, unlike France, it did not 
spend much on vocational training and labour market programmes and had no significant 
experience of active ‘insertion’ policies for specific groups of unemployed . Thus, unsurprisingly, 
the EES was at times criticised for being too biased toward northern European and Anglo-Saxon 
policy models and ultimately unsuited for the needs of the Italian labour market. The most explicit 
such case was a report prepared by ISFOL, a public policy research centre attached to the Ministry 
of Labour, for the 2002 impact evaluation of the Strategy. Referring to Italian unemployment as a 
cause, mainly, of economic backwardness and public order issues in the south of the country, the 
report pointed out that ‘while the emphasis on the active and preventative approach cannot be 
contested as such, [the EES]has neglected the fact that active employment policies are important 
but not sufficient in a context like the Italian one, where many of the parties and matters involved 
have to be dealt with outside the labour market first’ (ISFOL 2002: p.4).
216 See Chapters 4 and 5.
217 See Chapter 5.
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Notwithstanding this, all the major employment policy documents produced around and
after the time at which the Strategy was launched made constant references to EU-level
developments. The Pact for Labour recalls that *the government and the social partners confirm the
priorities set in Essen’ and states that 'the main lines of employment policy are inspired by the
content of Delors’ White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment, especially where it
emphasises the importance of infrastructure, vocational training and research, services for small
and medium-sized enterprises, on opportunities for employment in new sectors’ (CNEL 1996: p.3).
The 1998 Christmas Pact openly mentions the EES, launched only a year earlier, and calls for ‘...a
European initiative for employment that should exploit the remaining margins for manoeuvre after
the completion of EMU and should give employment a standing equal to that attributed in recent
years to budgetary convergence’ (CNEL 1998: p.3). The 2001 White Paper on the labour market, as
said above, refers extensively to the EES, and so does the 2002 Pact for Italy. For instance, the
preliminary agreement subscribed in June by the government and the social partners announced that
'[the Accordo Ciampi] allowed Italy to meet the Maastricht criteria, just like the one agreed today
218[the Pact for Italy] will accompany the attainment of the Lisbon and Barcelona objectives’ .
All these documents were the product of eminently domestic processes and debates and it is 
difficult to tell how far they have been influenced by contextual European developments. The 
quotes listed above may, thus, mean very little, especially considering that references to European 
commitments have often been used instrumentally by Italian decision-makers to justify potentially 
unpopular choices, fiscal restraint in the run-up to EMU being the paramount example (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1996; Radaelli 2002; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). Yet what the above quotes do say is 
that the authors of these documents were acutely aware of the EU discourse on employment. It is 
worth noting, on this point, that an influential figure like Tiziano Treu, Labour Minister of the Dini 
(1995-96) and Prodi (1996-98) governments, had long followed EU-level developments as a scholar 
and had even participated in a working group established after the 1994 Essen summit with the task
910to come up with a model of open coordination .
The launch of the EES and, less than three years later, of the Lisbon Strategy were 
welcomed with some enthusiasm by the Italian government and by the public opinion. Like in 
France, the issuing of guidelines and recommendations and the adoption of the NAPs were initially 
widely reported in the quality press. However, Italian ministerial bureaucracies proved at first 
dramatically unprepared to perform the reporting and monitoring duties entailed by the coordination 
exercise (Ferrera and Gualmini 2002,2004; Sacchi 2004; Ferrera and Sacchi 2005).
218II Sole-24 Ore, 1 June 2002.
219 Sestito, P. Interview with the author on 27 March 2006. Rome.
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Notwithstanding a reform of its internal structures enacted in 1987220, the Ministry of 
Labour, which from the start had been given the task of drafting the NAPs, was characterised by a 
high degree of internal fragmentation and staffed by personnel trained almost exclusively to deal 
with legal matters. The representation of the Ministry in international organisations and agencies 
was scarcely formalised, and relations with such bodies as the OECD, the ILO and the EU were 
kept on the basis of personal ties and contingent events. In addition to this, at the time the EES was 
launched the Ministry was going through a delicate phase of institutional transition as the 
responsibility over job placement and employment services were being handed to the regions and 
the national level was only left with a role of general orientation and supervision221.
The drafting of the first few NAPs, thus, was carried out in haste and outside the formal 
structure of the Ministry. The 1998 and 1999 plans were drafted by two ad hoc committees 
composed of about ten experts each with little direct involvement of the Ministry’s staff and other 
branches of the administration. Contacts with the social partners and regional authorities at this 
early stage were rare and informal, and had little impact on the content of the plans (Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2002). The first plan mostly reiterated the projects set out in the Pact for Labour and in 
the Christmas Pact that was being negotiated around that time: the decentralisation and privatisation 
of public employment services, the reform of the vocational training system, the new policies for 
local development, the planned reform of social shock absorbers. It essentially recorded the 
structural distance between the Employment Guidelines and Italy, which was faced with the 
enormous task of building a network of employment services providing active and preventative 
support for job-seekers practically from scratch222. The second plan, conjured up in a more timely 
manner with the help of the economics department of the Prime Minister’s office, showed a more 
assertive stance. In particular, in line with the preferences of the Labour Minister of the time 
(Antonio Bassolino, then mayor of Naples), the plan underlined some typically Italian specificities 
-  notably regional differentials -  and put great emphasis on the attempts that were being made to 
address them -  especially the new approach to local development based on negotiated planning223.
The procedures adopted for the first two NAPs, however, soon proved to be inadequate. The 
expert committees that had drafted the plans quickly disbanded after these were sent to Brussels, 
thus leaving the delicate task of defending them in front of the Commission and the other member 
states to Labour Ministry officials who felt neither involved nor able to do it (Sacchi 2004; Ferrera 
and Sacchi 2005). Moreover, the obligation to produce an Implementation Report to be attached to
220 See Chapter 5.
221 See Chapter 5.
222 Sestito, P. Interview with the author on 27 March 2006. Rome.
223 See Chapter 5.
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the NAP could not be immediately met due to the lack of comparable and up-to-date data on the 
impact of existing policies. Things started to change in the winter of 2000, when a new unit called 
‘Monitoring Group’ (Gruppo di monitoraggio) was established within the Minister’s cabinet with 
the task of collecting and analysing data on labour market trends and evaluating the impact of past 
policy. The group was initially coordinated by Paolo Sestito, a labour economist of the Bank of 
Italy who had also worked for the European Commission, and operated as an inter-service 
committee composed of personnel seconded from various branches of the central administration: 
not only the Ministry of Labour, but also the Prime Minister’s Office, the Bank of Italy, the national 
institute for social insurance (INPS), the national institute of statistics (ISTAT), the institute for 
work and training (ISFOL). The Monitoring Reports produced periodically by this group quickly 
established themselves as a standard reference for information on employment-related issues and 
policies, thus considerably enhancing the Ministry’s capabilities for policy planning and evaluation. 
In addition, the activism of the Monitoring Group triggered dynamics of internal organisational 
competition (Sacchi 2004). As a result the Directorate-General charged with IT and statistics was 
considerably strengthened and the Directorate-General for the Labour Market -  traditionally the 
most prominent branch of the Italian Ministry of Labour -  was forced to upgrade its own skills in 
order to make a contribution to monitoring and evaluation tasks.
In the wake of such developments, and partly because of them, the quality of Italy’s 
participation in the process got remarkably better over the years. The structure and content of the 
NAPs clearly improved. Explicit employment rate targets (58.5% by 2005 and 61.3% by 2010) 
were fixed in an addendum to the 2001 NAP -  an unprecedented effort considering the almost total 
lack of planning skills of the ministerial bureaucracy only a few years previously. Starting from 
2000-2001, regional authorities and the social partners were involved in a more fulsome and timely 
manner224. The government itself became more pro-active at the EU level. Prime Minister D’Alema 
made considerable efforts to shape the agenda of the 2000 Lisbon European Council and managed 
to get the recognition of the regional dimension of employment policies (a traditional Italian 
concern) inserted in the Council conclusions and in the 2001 employment guidelines (Sacchi 2004; 
Ferrera and Sacchi 2005). At the same time, other members of the executive mobilised to put 
forward their own preferences, albeit with less success. Labour Minister Salvi, a Senator who was 
close to CGIL and to the left wing of the variegated parliamentary majority that supported the 
government of the time, signed a joint declaration with his French and Belgian counterparts,
224 Esposito, T. Interview with the author on 3 March 2006. Rome. Tavemese, G. Interview with the author on 28 
March 2006. Rome. Treves, C. Interview with the author on 04 April 2006. Marchetti, M. Interview with the author on 
11 April 2006. Rome. Rossi, S. Interview with the author on 11 April 2006. Rome. Iacobelli, C. Interview with the 
author on 27April 2006. Rome.
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Martine Aubry and Franck Vandenbroucke, calling for a pan-European plan of investments to boost 
employment225.
The 2001 NAP was the last one to be drafted by an expert committee, although this time in 
close cooperation with the Monitoring Group. The new right-wing government that came to power 
after the general election of that year sent to Brussels an addendum to the NAP emphasising its own 
policy priorities in terms of a greater role for private providers in the field of employment services 
and a more permissive regulation governing the recourse to atypical work contracts. Starting from 
2002, then, the procedures in place were completely overhauled. The drafting of the NAPs was 
drawn into the structure of the Ministry and overseen directly by a Deputy Minister 
(sottosegretario), Maurizio Sacconi, thereby establishing a closer link between the plans and those 
responsible for policy. The drafting process was followed by the Directorate-General for the Labour 
Market, by the Minister’s technical secretariat (something in between a political cabinet and a 
purely administrative general secretariat) and by the Monitoring Group, which was itself gradually 
internalised by the Ministry’s structure226. Starting from 2003, the plans were adopted after the 
presentation in parliament of the budget for the following year, thus linking them more closely to 
the allocation of financial resources and integrating them better within the dynamics of national
policy-making. Although contacts took place mostly informally and outside specific institutional
001fora , regions and social partners became more closely associated with the process and had their 
own separate contributions inserted in the text of the plans. Even so, as in most other member states, 
the NAPs were generally seen as governmental documents on which local governments and non­
governmental actors do not ultimately have much of a say228.
In an interesting parallel with France, as the NAP drafting process acquired stability and 
became institutionalised it also lost political salience. Whereas in the first few years the Prime 
Minister’s Office as well as some key Ministries (Treasury, Education) insisted to be involved in 
the process, as the EES slipped out of newspaper headlines they lost interest and the NAPs became 
an exclusive responsibility of the Ministry of Labour229. The circle of actors involved changed again
225 Corriere della Sera, 25 June 1999 (see Chapter 5).
226 Esposito, T. Interview with the author on 3 March 2006. Rome. Battistoni, L. Interview with the author on 10 March
2006. Rome. Pirrone, S. Interview with the author on 10 March 2006. Rome. Sestito, P. Interview with the author on 27
March 2006. Rome.
227 The formal forum for policy coordination between the state and the regions is the Conferenza permanente stato- 
regioni, but most contacts with the regions concerning the NAPs took place informally and on a bilateral basis. 
Esposito, T. Interview with the author on 3 March 2006. Rome. Frascarelli, L. Interview with the author on 27 April 
2006. Rome. Iacobelli, C. Interview with the author on 27April 2006. Rome. Mancini, G. Interview with the author on 
29 May 2006. Catanzaro. Pacini, S. Interview with the author on 15 June 2006. Florence.
228 Tavemese, G. Interview with the author on 28 March 2006. Rome. Treves, C. Interview with the author on 04 April 
2006. Marchetti, M. Interview with the author on 11 April 2006. Rome. Rossi, S. Interview with the author on 11 April 
2006. Rome. Pacini, S. Interview with the author on 15 June 2006. Florence.
229 Sestito, P. Interview with the author on 27 March 2006. Rome.
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following the reform of the Lisbon Strategy’s governance framework in 2005. The Prime Minister’s 
Office took full charge of the National Reform Programme (NRP) delegating it to the junior 
Minister for EU policies, Giorgio La Malfa, who was appointed Italy’s ‘Mr. Lisbon’. Regional 
governments, the social partners and even the Ministry of Labour were hardly involved at all .
This seems to have caused a swift change in focus and discourse. The Italian NRP, which was not 
discussed in parliament and was barely mentioned in the main newspapers (Quaglia and Radaelli 
2007), focuses entirely on a large number of liberalising and growth-enhancing measures, while the 
part on employment policy is almost completely missing (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 
2005). So much so, in fact, that the EMCO asked the Italian government to provide an addendum on 
employment policy, which was swiftly drafted by the Labour Ministry’s staff, again without 
consulting the social partners, and sent to Brussels at the end of 2005231.
To sum up, the drafting of the Italian NAPs has triggered an intense process of institutional 
learning on the part of the ministerial bureaucracy. Under the pressure of the new requirements of 
EU coordination, the Labour Ministry’s structures were forced to upgrade their analytical and 
monitoring skills and to develop capabilities for policy planning and evaluation. New bodies were 
created and old ones were strengthened. The quality and presentation of the plans improved, as did 
the participation of sub-national governments and of the social partners. Like in France, though, as 
the process acquired stability it also lost political interest. The NAPs became the sole responsibility 
of the Ministry of Labour, turned into a more and more routinised, bureaucratic task and gradually 
slipped out of newspaper headlines. Yet the administrative adjustments and the new tools acquired 
facilitated the diffusion of information on the EES and, it is argued here, gave some additional 
resources to those within the administration who used arguments and advocated policy changes in 
line with it. The next section looks into the consequences this process had on the politics of the 
Labour Ministry and through what channels, if at all, the Strategy came to influence the 
government’s employment policy discourse.
2. The EES and Italian policy-making: political crisis and the role of experts
As argued in the previous chapter, despite the alternation of different party coalitions in 
government, employment policy discourse in Italy showed significant signs of continuity even after 
the inception of the EES. Most of the policy solutions put forth in the years of the Berlusconi 
government (2001-2006) had already been discussed in previous years. The liberalisation of 
placement services and the reform of employment contracts that were introduced by the legge Biagi
230 Battistoni, L. Interview with the author on 10 March 2006. Rome.
231 Battistoni, L. Interview with the author on 10 March 2006. Rome.
can be considered as further developments down the path already taken a few years earlier by the 
Pacchetto Treu. A revision of the two-tier collective bargaining system established in 1993 giving 
more weight to the local or plant level has been debated well into the current term of parliament. 
The reform of the ammortizzatori sociali (social shock-absorbers) has also been discussed for years 
and was the object (among other things) of the 1997 Report of a high-level group chaired by 
Romano Prodi’s chief economic advisor, the Bologna economist Paolo Onofri (Onofri 1997). 
Nevertheless, some important elements of change can also be detected. In particular, the emphasis 
put on the new ‘active’ role for public employment services and on a different design of income 
support policies based on the principles of conditionality and activation was a complete novelty in 
the Italian scenario.
The last section of this chapter will elaborate further on the extent to which one can speak of 
continuity or change in specific policy areas. This section, in the meantime, concentrates on what 
accounts for one or the other and on the role played by the EES. The explanation advanced here 
focuses on the role of a specific kind of actors -  academics, think tank experts, top civil servants -  
who, in the midst and in the aftermath of the political crisis of the 1990s assumed an exceptionally 
important position in Italy’s policy-making. They exercised great influence in the selection of the 
policy ideas and options that were considered and at times even took on direct government 
responsibilities. In this capacity, they performed important functions of liaison between the national 
and supranational arenas and brokered policy ideas and recipes that were in good currency beyond 
Italian borders. The EES guidelines and recommendations, it is argued, acquired influence in 
governmental circles precisely through this channel, thus accounting for some of the elements of 
discontinuity referred to above. This seems to confirm hypotheses 2 and 3 of this work, which posit 
that the composition of national coalitions advocating the EES discourse depends on the 
specificities of domestic policy-making and on the way the drafting of the NAPs was carried out in 
different domestic settings232. Nevertheless, as discussed in the next section, in a system like the 
Italian one in which authority is dispersed and policy-making typically involves a relatively large 
number of governmental and non-governmental actors, translating the EES into national policy and 
implementing it on the ground has so far proved to be exceedingly difficult. This responds to the 
concern raised by hypothesis 5 regarding the difficulties facing discourse diffusion in ‘multi-actor’ 
systems like Italy233.
The starting point of the argument put forth here is the state of the Italian political system in 
the 1990s. The 1990s, as shown in the previous chapter, were a momentous decade for Italy. The 
huge effort at financial adjustment that was required in order to qualify for EMU was made at a
232 See Chapter 1.
233 See Chapter 1.
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time in which the political parties that had led the country in the post-war era were experiencing a 
crisis of consensus and a difficult process of realignment after the end of the Cold War234. Against 
the backdrop of the weakness of traditional parties, a prominent role was gradually assigned to 
high-level technocrats and experts, particularly social scientists with expertise relevant to policy. 
Small numbers of politically active experts had always been present in ministerial cabinets and in 
the government’s representation to international bodies and organisations (Radaelli 1998). Yet in 
the 1990s crucial cabinet posts were given to academics or to bureaucrats coming from the most 
prestigious branches of the state apparatus (the Treasury, the Bank of Italy) who were not affiliated 
to any party. This was most clearly the case for the Ministries that were directly concerned with 
financial adjustment in the run-up to EMU, but it was also true for the Ministry of Labour, with 
such well-respected labour law professors like Gino Giugni and Tiziano Treu acting as Minister at 
crucial points in time -  1993/94 and 1995/98, respectively. More generally, external experts, 
academic consultants, leading technocrats and think tank experts were increasingly drawn into the 
policy process as the governments of the 1990s somewhat institutionalised the habit of setting up 
independent authorities and expert committees in crucial reform sectors such as welfare, macro- 
economic adjustment, collective bargaining reform235. Those people spoke foreign languages, had 
direct experience of the functioning of EU institutions or had studied them as well as the experience 
of other countries. As argued by Giuliani (2000), their reports and the results of their consultancy 
work were widely read and introduced into Italian debates ideas borrowed from different national 
contexts. Thus the Dutch model of negotiated flexibility, the Irish model of debt reduction or the 
logic of the EU principle of subsidiarity, once confined to academic debates, began to influence the 
choices of policy-makers.
The presence of this ‘new’ constellation of actors had clear consequences in all major areas, 
but especially so in the field of macro-economic policy, where the paradigm of low inflation and 
low public deficits upon which the Maastricht criteria for EMU were based was accepted virtually 
by all (Radaelli 1998; Radaelli and Martini 1998). Starting from the Prodi cabinet of 1996-98, well 
known EU catchwords like activation, territorial pacts and tax incentives began to characterise the 
government’s employment policy discourse (Giuliani 2000; Barbier and Fargion 2004). Political 
leadership in this field, as said in the previous chapter, was almost entirely left to the government 
(i.e. in primis the Minister of Labour and his staff) and interest organisations, whereas political 
parties were almost entirely marginalised. Expert committees were established and reports were 
written on a host of different issues, from the reform of social shock absorbers to the revision of the
234 On Italy’s political system in the 1990s see the articles published in West European Politics 20(1), 1997.
235 See, for instance, the report of the Onofri committee on welfare reform (Onofri 1997) and that of the Giugni 
committee on the reform of collective bargaining (Giugni 1997).
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Workers’ Statute, to the drafting of the first NAPs. Participation in the EES’ yearly cycles 
strengthened this process, as a small but active group of experts -  members of the Monitoring 
Group, the Italian representatives in the Employment Committee in Brussels, some top level 
consultants of the Minister of Labour -  formed over time around the various stages of the 
coordination process and started acting as brokers between the domestic and the European arenas 
(Ferrera and Gualmini 2002, 2004; Sacchi 2004; Ferrera and Sacchi 2005). The identity of those 
who wrote the Italian NAPS and discussed them within the EMCO tended to coincide with that of 
those who authored key policy documents like the 2001 White Paper236, especially as the drafting of 
the NAPs was drawn into the Ministry’s structure.
The most striking feature of this process of prise de parole (Muller quoted by Radaelli 1998) 
on the part of experts and bureaucrats is that they represented an element of continuity as Ministers 
succeeded one another. Apart from Deputy Minister Sacconi, all the other members of the working 
group which drafted the White Paper on the labour market -  Marco Biagi, Carlo Dell’Aringa, Paolo 
Sestito, Paolo Reboani, Natale Forlani -  had already worked in close contact with the Ministers of 
the centre-left governments237. Dell’Aringa, a labour economist from Milan’s Universita Cattolica, 
served as chairman of ARAN -  the body that negotiates public employees’ wages and working 
conditions on behalf of the state -  until 2000 and subsequently of ISFOL -  a research institute 
attached to the Labour Ministry -  until 2004. Forlani served as confederal secretary of CISL until 
1998 and in 2000 was appointed CEO of Italia Lavoro, an agency of the Labour Ministry in charge 
of promoting the development of active policies and employment services on the whole national 
territory. The LSE-educated Sestito and Reboani worked with the Ministry since the 1990s and 
were involved in the drafting of the NAPs from an early stage (Sestito from 2000, Reboani from the 
start). Sestito kept his role within the limits of technical support and acted as coordinator of the 
Monitoring Group in its first years of existence, while Reboani sought a more politically active 
stance and became head of the technical secretariat of Berlusconi’s Minister Roberto Maroni .
Probably the best example of a consultant that worked with all the Ministers of these years is 
Marco Biagi, a labour law professor based at the University of Modena who was assassinated by an 
extreme-left terrorist cell on 19 March 2002. Prof. Biagi was first called to Rome by Tiziano Treu
0 30in 1995 and worked on a number of projects, including the Pacchetto Treu and a draft reform of 
the Workers’ Statute. He chaired the group that wrote the first NAP in 1998 and was appointed to
236 Battistoni, L. Interview with the author on 10 March 2006. Rome. Sestito, P. Interview with the author on 27 March 
2006. Rome.
237 Sacchi, S. Interview with the author on 24 June 2006. Milan.
238 Sacchi, S. Interview with the author on 24 June 2006. Milan. Sestito, P. Interview with the author on 27 March 2006. 
Rome.
239 See Chapter 5.
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represent the Italian government in the EMCO, of which he became Vice-President in 2000. After 
Treu’s substitution, Biagi kept his role as consultant during the short-lived tenure of Antonio 
Bassolino, but his relationship with the Labour Ministry quickly deteriorated with the advent of 
Cesare Salvi and temporarily ended when he decided to accept a consultancy job for the right-wing 
Mayor of Milan, Gabriele Albertini. Biagi was asked to come up with ideas to deal with the most 
disadvantaged segments of the local labour market (migrants, youth from troubled backgrounds, the 
long-term unemployed, the disabled) and proposed to negotiate a local pact between the City Hall 
and interest organisations. The policy model that inspired the pact, the above mentioned Milano 
lavoro signed in February 2000, closely resembles that of the subsequent legge Biagi: the 
contracting parties agreed to use flexible contracts (agency work, work and training contracts, co. 
co. co.) in order to create employment opportunities in sectors of collective interest (street cleaning, 
facility management, care services etc.). Specific helpdesks were to be set up within the City Hall 
actively to help job-seekers to train, retrain and participate in the programme (Patto Milano lavoro 
2000). This episode marked the end of Biagi’s collaboration with the centre-left, even though he 
had been close to CISL and to the left-wing of the Christian Democrats for most of his life. After 
the centre-right’s victory in 2001, then, he was called back to Rome by Maurizio Sacconi and 
introduced to the newly appointed Minister Maroni. The White Paper on the labour market was 
Biagi’s idea, and it was him who came up with the first draft that served as the basis for the work of 
the group chaired by Sacconi and himself (Tiraboschi 2003). By the time he was assassinated, he 
had become the Minister’s top consultant and a public figure, loathed by the CGIL and by parts of 
the political left.
It is contended here that the continuing presence of the same high level experts and 
consultants as Ministers changed goes a long way toward explaining why the same issues were 
discussed again and again over the last ten years. This group of experts formed during the years of 
the centre-left and, despite being somewhat marginalised during Salvi’s period as Minister in 1999- 
2001, became especially prominent under Berlusconi with the backing of Maurizio Sacconi, who 
was himself a labour policy expert who had worked for years at the OECD. The Berlusconi 
government’s choice to abandon neo-corporatist bargaining in favour of a more unilateral, 
government-led style of policy-making further empowered the Ministry’s experts. Once the 
executive tried to regain the authority over employment policy-making that its predecessors had 
shared with interest organisations, it had to look for new a blueprint for action and, for this purpose, 
it turned to people with relevant policy expertise and accorded them a large amount of freedom in 
fulfilling their tasks. Biagi, for instance, only accepted to work for Minister Maroni on the condition 
that he be given carte blanche regarding the content of the White Paper (Tiraboschi 2003), which
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accounts for the remarkable resemblance it bears to the Pact Milano lavoro that he had drafted just 
over a year earlier. The cohesiveness of this group was not jeopardised even by Biagi’s death, as he 
was replaced by his closest collaborator, Michele Tiraboschi, both as Professor in Modena and as 
consultant for the Labour Ministry. The enduring influence of Biagi’s work is demonstrated by the 
fact that the Berlusconi government’s major policy choices in the field of employment -  with the 
only notable exception of the attempted abolition of Art. 18240 -  proceeded from his 2001 White 
Paper. So much so, in fact, that the parts of it that were still unimplemented were mentioned in the 
centre-right’s programme for the 2006 general election as priorities of action for the new term of 
parliament (Casa delle liberta 2006).
This group of experts was composed of people with different backgrounds (academics, trade 
unionists, civil servants), different political leanings (from left-wing Christian Democrats like Biagi 
and Dell’Aringa to former Socialists gone to Berlusconi’s Forza Italia like Sacconi) and different 
degrees of political commitment (from self-professed ‘technicians’ like Dell’Aringa and Sestito to 
more political figures like Sacconi and Reboani), but was cohesive and durable enough as to 
constitute a veritable coalition. They shared a common diagnosis of the problems of the Italian 
labour market that was highly consistent with the recommendations that the Commission addressed 
to Italy every year -  low overall employment rate; low employment rates of women, young and 
older workers; low levels of participation in education and training; large regional differentials -  
and a common take on the appropriate policy solutions -  liberalisation of employment relations; 
modernisation of employment services; improved coverage and ‘activation’ of income support 
schemes (see Dell’Aringa 2002; Sestito 2002; Sacconi et al. 2004). A further contention made here 
is that this coalition constituted the main channel through which EU guidelines and 
recommendations trickled into the domestic discourse. As said above, the drafting of the NAPs and 
the upgrading of the Ministry’s administrative capabilities it required strengthened the role of 
experts in Italian employment policy-making and provided them with additional resources 
(planning, statistical and monitoring tools) with which to support their arguments. This validates 
hypothesis 4 about the resources participation in the drafting of the NAPs would provide to the 
members of national coalitions advocating the EES discourse.
As hypothesised in Chapter 1 (hypothesis 1), their motives for appealing to the EES were 
both normative and strategic. On the one hand, the members of this coalition seem to have been 
deeply committed to the Strategy’s message and to have learnt things they did not know from their 
participation in it. As in the French case241, the fact that the policy model advocated by the EES is 
consistent with a widespread international employment policy consensus as well as with the
240 See above.
241 See Chapter 4.
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recommendations of bodies like the OECD certainly played a role. The experience of the late Prof. 
Biagi is, again, a fitting example. His belief in the potential of open coordination is testified by one 
of his last publications in English: *consistent application of the Luxembourg exercise might over 
time lead to a convergence of member states’ employment and labour market policies not dictated 
by Brussels, but based on a growing consensus on effective solutions through a process of trial and 
error ’ (Biagi 2000: p. 159). According to the memoirs written after his death by Tiraboschi (2003), 
during his years as a member of EMCO Biagi developed an active interest in comparative research 
and learnt the use of benchmarking as a crucial methodological tool. The emphasis put on the 
employment rather than the unemployment rate as a major policy target and the focus on the 
participation of specific age and gender groups was in Italy, as in France, an absolute novelty242. All 
of Biagi’s major accomplishments as a consultant -  not only, as shown above, the 2001 White 
Paper on the labour market, but also Milano lavoro, which explicitly recalls guidelines 12 and 13 of 
1999 -  use arguments and analytical tools borrowed from the EES and make reference to it as an 
inspiration and a justification243. The habit of constantly referring to the Strategy did not end with 
Biagi’s life, but continued as his colleagues carried on his work. Those who drafted the law that 
carries his name, in fact, took great care of describing it as a deliberate attempt to respond to the 
EES guidelines and recommendations through measures aimed at creating a modem and efficient 
system of employment services, at establishing new types of contracts that could help 
disadvantaged groups to enter the labour market and allow a more flexible organisation of work 
within firms, at boosting participation in training activities through the reform of contracts with a 
training purpose (Sacconi et al. 2004; Tiraboschi 2004, 2005).
On the other hand, though, coalition members seem to have drawn selectively from the 
Strategy in order to legitimise the policy plans of the government of the day, thus reproducing the 
time-honoured Italian habit of using (real or construed) EU commitments to push through 
potentially unpopular reforms. The White Paper on the Labour Market and the legge Biagi have 
been accused of drawing very selectively on the EES in order to legitimise the government’s 
agenda. For instance, whereas the White Paper itself is presented as a blueprint to meet the 
European guidelines and recommendations, the issues of job quality and equal opportunities are 
almost entirely disregarded. The quality of the jobs to be created, for instance, was presented by the 
WTiite Paper solely in terms of creating more employment opportunities thanks to increased labour 
market flexibility, with no regard for job security (Sacchi 2004).
The Strategy’s discourse, thus, entered the domestic employment policy arena through a 
small group of experts who played a key role in every major action taken by the Labour Ministry
242 Battistoni, L. Interview with the author on 10 March 2006. Rome.
243 See above.
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over this period. They were convinced of the failure of past policy choices and repeatedly and 
openly referred to the EES as the way forward. In order to investigate the EES’ transformative 
effects further, the last section of this chapter focuses on instances of policy change in specific areas 
highlighted by the employment recommendations as in need of reform from the Strategy’s 
perspective. The actors’ coalition supporting the Strategy always remained extremely narrow and 
only managed to exercise influence on the government’s employment policy discourse and on 
major policy choices under very specific conditions, which seemed to come about with particular 
intensity during the first years of the Berlusconi government as a result of its refusal of 
concertazione as a policy style. This chapter’s contention is that, as soon as one got out the 
restricted Ministerial circles in which the EES’ discourse was used as a point of reference, this 
became almost completely irrelevant. Thus, the resistance opposed by other branches of the central 
administration (i.e. the Ministry of the Treasury), local governments and social partners account for 
the little success that was met by the attempts to reform and implement policy in line with the 
Strategy.
3. The EES and employment policy change in Italy
The Italian ‘model’ of employment policies, based as it was on a hyper-bureaucratic network of 
public employment services, tight regulation of employment relations and an unbalanced system of 
passive income support policies, was very distant from the indications of the EES. Unsurprisingly, 
Italy was, after Greece, the member state that received the highest number of single-country 
recommendations from the Commission and the Council. The format of the recommendations 
changed over time, but their content remained remarkably stable and focused on some long­
standing features of the Italian system. The most recurrent themes and the years in which they were 
made the object of specific recommendations are listed in Table 6 below.
Table 6. Recommendations to Italy
Recommendations 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Complete the reform of employment services, implement active 
and preventative policies
yes yes yes yes yes
Alleviate the administrative burden on companies yes no no no no
Reduce the tax burden on labour yes yes yes no yes
Reform pensions and other benefit systems in order to reduce 
the outflow from the labour market into income support
yes yes yes no no
Address the wide gender gaps in employment and 
unemployment, sustain growth in employment rates especially
yes yes yes yes yes
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for women and older workers
Improve the balance in the policy mix across the four pillars no yes no yes no
Adopt and implement a coherent strategy on lifelong learning no yes yes yes yes
Continue to increase labour market flexibility combined with 
security to facilitate access to employment
no no yes yes no
Take action to reduce regional imbalances, fight undeclared 
work
no no no yes yes
Reduce labour market segmentation, improve the coverage and 
effectiveness of unemployment insurance
no no no no yes
Encourage the social partners to review wage bargaining 
systems
no no no no yes
Raise the educational attainment of the workforce no no no no yes
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/emplovment social/employment strategy/recomm en.htm.
As was done in the case study on France, the most recurrent recommendations addressed to Italy -  
those on the reform of employment services, on the reform of benefit systems, on lifelong learning, 
on the reduction of gender gaps -  are taken as touching upon policy issues that the Commission 
considers structural. The other, less frequent recommendations are linked either to issues that, in the 
Commission’s view, have been tackled (alleviating the administrative burden on companies, 
increasing labour market flexibility) or to issues that are emerging (labour market segmentation). 
Others still refer to sectors or areas that have been included in the EES only recently (regional 
imbalances, undeclared work) or rather are suggestions of method, like the 2001 recommendation 
(reiterated in a different form in 2003) regarding the policy mix across the Strategy’s four pillars.
The following sub-sections investigate single instances of policy and discourse change (or 
lack thereof) and trace the process behind them. Since many of the issues emphasised by the 
Strategy were already being discussed in Italy before it was launched, the main focus here is on the 
aspects of national employment policies that were highlighted by the Commission’s 
recommendations as those where the ‘lack of fit’ with the EES was greatest. Since the reduction of 
gender gaps is by nature a cross-cutting issue, the following will concentrate on employment 
services and vocational training (which are treated together) and on the reform of social shock- 
absorbers. As was done in Chapter 4, particular attention is paid to investigating the institutional 
conditions facilitating or hampering discourse diffusion. In the Italian case, where, as shown below, 
policy change and implementation have proved especially difficult, great emphasis is put on the 
actors and institutional settings opposing them. This should enable one to test the relevance of 
hypothesis 5 of this work, which postulated that the success of the coalitions advocating the EES
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discourse in influencing national employment policies is less likely in ‘multi-actor’ systems like 
Italy where a large number of actors have a say over policy-making244.
Hypothesis 6 regarding the types of impact one expects to observe245 is also at stake here. In 
addition to those made in Chapter 4 (degrees of specificity of the guidelines, different levels of 
impact on policy), a further fundamental distinction is drawn here between governmental discourse 
(based, in particular, on the documents produced by or in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour, 
in which the actors’ coalition described above operated), actual government policy (which 
necessarily involves Ministries other than Labour and Parliament) and policy implementation 
(which in Italy is often in the hands of sub-national authorities and non-state actors). As shown in 
the following discussion, the most striking difference with the French case is that in Italy, despite 
noticeable shifts in the government’s discourse and some instances of policy change, the overall 
outcome in the areas under analysis tended to be policy inertia or lack of implementation. In the 
case of employment services, the inaction and unpreparedness of regional governments, especially 
in the south, hampered the implementation of the reform process started by the Prodi government in 
1997. In the case of social shock absorbers, tight financial constraints and the opposition of the 
Treasury and Finance Ministries prevented the adoption of a reform aimed at improving the 
coverage of benefit schemes and at activating the beneficiaries.
3.1. The reform of employment services and vocational training
Italy has been rebuked by the Commission for lack of action in this area ever since it first proposed 
its country-specific recommendations on employment. Recommendation 1 of 2000 read:
‘Italy should take decisive, coherent and measurable action to prevent young and adult unem ployed people 
from drifting into long-term unemployment. In particular, strengthened efforts should be made to com plete 
the reform o f  em ploym ent services, to implement preventative policies in com pliance with guidelines 1 and 
2 and to improve the quality o f  vocational training [...]*
This refrain was repeated almost verbatim in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. The only additions were a 
reference to the fact that the reform of public employment services should be implemented across 
the whole country (Recommendations 3 of 2001 and 2002, 2 of 2004) and a mention of the 
announced introduction of an Employment Information System (Recommendations 3 of 2001 and 5 
of 2003). Vocational training was also the object of recurrent recommendations (Recommendations 
5 of 2001 and 2002, 3 of 2003 and 2004). According to Recommendation 5 of 2001 Italy should
244 Chapter 1.
245 See Chapter 1.
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‘adopt a coherent strategy on lifelong learning, including national targets; social partners should be more 
active in providing more training opportunities for the workforce.’
A few specifications were added in 2004, when requests were made to monitor recent reforms of 
the school system to ensure that they raise the educational attainment of the workforce and to 
increase participation in training through, among other things, an effective development of inter­
professional funds.
The emphasis put by the EES on the role of employment services and on active and 
preventative policies for the unemployed was alien to the Italian employment policy tradition246. 
The old system established in 1949 turned around a network of ufflci di collocamento (placement 
offices) run by the state and charged almost exclusively with the task of certifying hirings and lay­
offs and granting the status of unemployed on which entitlement to a number of public benefits 
depended. Expenditure on labour market programmes was comparatively low and biased toward 
passive income support schemes. In the 1970s, all responsibility for active policies and vocational 
training was given to the newly-formed regions without much funding or guidance from the centre 
(Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). Thus, aside from an ineffective framework law on vocational training 
passed in 1978 and the introduction of work and training contracts in 1984, very little was done in 
this field until the 1990s. Job-creation programmes, unlike in France, have always been marginal. 
One such programme for the unemployed youth was launched in 1979, but under union pressure the 
temporary posts thus created were subsequently turned into permanent public jobs. Such an 
outcome discredited this policy option in the eyes of the public for the years to come. In fact when, 
in the early 1990s, the recipients of mobility benefits were required to participate in so-called 
‘socially useful jobs’ {Lavori socialmente utili) the relevant funding was kept consistently low in 
order to steer clear of creating further public employment (Barbier and Fargion 2004).
At the time the EES was launched, however, a momentous reform of employment services 
was being put in place247. Not only was the responsibility for public employment services (PES) 
delegated to the regions and the sector opened to private providers, but the PES were now asked to 
perform a range of active and preventative functions -  from consultancy to orientation and pre­
selection services -  geared to getting the unemployed back into the labour market as soon as 
possible. Within a few months, the personnel and the related functions were transferred from the 
Labour Ministry to regional and provincial authorities (the latter were now responsible for the daily 
running of the new centri per Vimpiego, ‘employment centres’). New advisory bodies involving the 
social partners and different branches of the administration were established at the local level 
(‘Tripartite Regional Committees’ and ‘Inter-institutional Coordination Committees’). Regional
246 See Chapter 5.
247 See Chapter 5.
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laws transposing the new national legislation were passed by all regional legislatures by the year 
2000.
The reform found its inspiration in the experience of Scandinavian countries and represented 
a sea-change with respect to the traditional attitudes of the Italian bureaucracy248. Above all, there 
was not a clear sense of what the new employment centres should concretely do249. In this context, 
the EES is recognised by all interviewees as well as by ISFOL (2002) to have acted as a powerful 
stimulus. A first, somewhat ruffled reaction to the strategy took place in 1998 when, faced with the 
prospect of having to present some early results in the first NAP, the Ministry asked the 
employment centres to interview all the unemployed on their lists. The purpose of the interview, 
however, was utterly unclear and eventually resulted only in a one-off statistical survey250. A more 
fulsome response was given by a government decree adopted in 2000, which provided that the PES 
should offer the unemployed at least an interview and/or opportunities for training or re-training 
within twelve months in general and six months in the case of young people, women or recipients of 
unemployment benefits . This decree, overtly based on guidelines 1 and 2 of the ‘old’ EES, was
AM
partially modified in 2002 by the Berlusconi government . It is now established that the 
employment centres should offer at least an interview within three months of unemployment and a 
proposal for training, re-training or other forms of re-entry into the labour market within six months 
in general and four months for women, the young and the recipients of unemployment benefits.
This piece of legislation was the last one to be drafted by Marco Biagi before his death (Tiraboschi 
2003) and, although aiming to go beyond the Employment Guidelines, it is plainly based on the 
same rationale and can, thus, be considered as a further example of a policy reaction to the Strategy.
Nevertheless, the shift from a bureaucratic to a preventative, result-oriented approach has so 
far proved extremely slow and difficult in practice, especially in the less economically developed 
southern parts of the country. The lack of funds, the poor definition of the services to be offered and 
the inadequacy of the PES’ staff skills resulted in the reform being still largely unimplemented 
(Ferrera and Gualmini 2002; Ferrera and Sacchi 2005; Sestito and Pirrone 2006). To start with, the 
reform of public employment services was attempted without the backing of appropriate financial 
resources. Most of the regions’ employment policy budgets are spent on dealing with company
248 In Sacconi’s words, ‘the idea that the match between demand and supply of labour should pass through a 
professional and efficient channel was never present in the DNA of Italians (workers, firms, entrepreneurs). The reform 
has initiated an operation of genetic engineering of sorts’ (// Sole-24 Ore, 16 November 2005).
249 Pirrone, S. Interview with the author on 10 March 2006. Rome.
250 Pirrone, S. Interview with the author on 10 March 2006. Rome. Sestito, P. Interview with the author on 27 March 
2006. Rome.
251 Decreto Legislativo of 21 April 2000, n. 181.
252 Decreto Legislativo o f 19 December 2002, n. 297.
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crises or on providing financial incentives for firms that hire new workers . EU funds -  and in 
particular the European Social Fund (ESF) -  provided sizeable financial support to Italy’s initiatives 
in the field of active policies and vocational training. During the 2000-2006 structural fund 
programming period as much as 57% of the resources spent for the reform of the PES, 52% of those 
spent on equal opportunity policies and 42% of those spent to support the country’s lifelong 
learning strategy came from the ESF254. There is, indeed, some evidence that the priorities of ESF 
spending have changed in accordance with the employment guidelines, notably as regards the 
growing attention paid to equal opportunities, which in the 2000-2006 programming period 
accounted for about 10% of total funds255. Nevertheless, there seems to be little coordination 
between the programming of the ESF and the NAP/NRP process. Officials coming from the 
Ministry of Labour do participate in the preparation of structural fund documents, but this is 
motivated not so much by the need to ensure consistency between the EES and the ESF as by the 
willingness to participate in the utilisation of the available resources. Further proof of this is the fact 
that the officials responsible for the ESF within the Ministry are not generally asked to participate in 
the drafting of the NAPs (Fantacone 2004).
In addition to this, regional authorities have been exceedingly slow in implementing the 
reform and getting up to the task of providing active policies and more training opportunities. 
Notwithstanding a continuous process of devolution culminating in a constitutional reform in 2001, 
which has greatly extended their powers and responsibilities, the institutional capacities of Italian 
regions are relatively weak and extremely varied throughout the national territory (Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2002, 2004). Some regional governments have made interesting attempts to conduct 
forms of employment policy planning. Every regional law transposing the 1997 employment 
services reform called for multi-annual planning documents to be adopted in the field of 
employment policies by the local executives. In the absence of clear guidelines from the national 
government, some regions modelled the plans on the employment guidelines and the NAPs.
Tuscany adopted its first Regional Action Plan (RAP) in 1999, integrating the Employment 
Guidelines with the regional planning of the ESF. Subsequently, other regions of the centre-north -  
such as Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Liguria, Umbria, the autonomous provinces of Trento and 
Bolzano -  followed suit (Tecnostruttura 2004). In most cases, the RAPs were discussed with the 
social partners within the Tripartite Regional Committees before approval256. Even southern regions 
are starting to experiment with planning and, when they do, they generally follow the RAP model.
253 Mancini, G. Interview with the author on 29 May 2006. Catanzaro.
254 II Sole-24 Ore, 10 February 2006.
255 Frascarelli, L. Interview with the author on 27 April 2006. Rome.
256 Iacobelli, C. Interview with the author on 27 April 2006. Rome.
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This is the case for Sardinia, which adopted its first RAP in 2002, and Calabria, whose first RAP 
was being prepared at the time of writing257. This notwithstanding, the performance of PES in 
southern regions has consistently lagged far behind that of the rest of the country, despite the fact 
that they face the biggest problems with unemployment and slow growth. According to a recent 
survey (ISFOL 2004), barely 70% of employment centres in the south carry out some of the 
activities required of them by the above mentioned 2000 and 2002 government decrees, but this 
percentage falls to as little as 14% for more sophisticated services like individual job-insertion 
interviews.
Slow implementation and varying performance is due to the lack of binding central 
guidelines on standards and services (Sestito and Pirrone 2006; Ciccarone and Raitano 2006) and to 
the heterogeneity of the skills and expectations of the new PES’ staff, about 70% of which came 
from the old ministerial structures charged with eminently bureaucratic tasks and whose conversion 
has proved to be particularly slow in the south (Ferrera and Gualmini 2002, 2004). Compliance with 
the rules established at the centre, however, has not been impeccable even in the rest of the country. 
For instance, the above mentioned 2000 decree on placement re-defined the status of unemployment 
along ILO standards as direct availability for work and provided that job-seekers would lose it, 
along with the benefits it grants, if they refused a job or training offer made by the PES258. This 
measure, if properly applied, would have introduced a strong welfare-to-work bias in the Italian 
system. In practice, however, the availability criterion was never put into effect. On the contrary, 
the number of unemployed officially registered with the employment centres was unduly boosted in
259recent years .
As far as vocational training is concerned, recent legislation introduced two main novelties. 
On the one hand, the levy of a contribution of 0.3% of the salary was provided for in 2000 with a 
view to funding training initiatives and special ‘Inter-professional Funds’ were set up to manage 
them260. On the other hand, the 2003 legge Biagi abolished work-and-training contracts261, whose 
training obligations were always bland, and strengthened apprenticeship contracts (Sestito 2004). 
Furthermore, the legge Biagi allowed private parties such as private placement agencies, chambers 
of commerce, trade unions and universities to offer the full gamut of employment services including 
training, thus paying heed to the Commission’s recommendation calling for greater involvement of 
non-state actors -  especially trade unions -  in providing training opportunities (Tiraboschi 2003; 
Sacconi et al. 2004). However, much like in the case of PES reform, the further diffusion of lifelong
257 Mancini, G. Interview with the author on 29 May 2006. Catanzaro.
258 Decreto Legislativo of 21 April 2000, n. 181.
259 Pirrone, S. Interview with the author on 10 March 2006. Rome. See also Barbier and Fargion (2004: p.449).
260 Law of 8 March 2000, n. 53.
261 See Chapter 5.
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learning initiatives was hampered by lack of funds and difficulties of implementation. The level of 
public expenditure on vocational training in Italy is lower than the EU average (0.23% of GDP in 
Italy against an EU-15 average of 0.27%) and the quality and investment on training varies widely 
from south to north, partly due to the fact that the responsibility for it lies with regional authorities 
in the absence of strict guidelines from the centre. This, along with the fact that only a tiny minority 
of Italian firms organise training activities (24% in 1999 against an EU-15 average of 62%), 
accounts for the persistently low participation of Italian workers in training: only 26% of all 
employees compared to an average of 40% in the EU-15 (Ciccarone and Raitano 2006).
In sum, public employment services and vocational training in Italy are mainly a 
responsibility of regional authorities, which were delegated the relative functions without adequate 
funds and guidance from the centre. National legislation on public placement modelled on the 
relevant EU guidelines has been recently passed and ESF funding partially re-targeted to match the 
priorities set by the Strategy. Nevertheless, effective implementation has been thwarted by lack of 
funds and by the inability of weak regional administrations (especially in the poorer south) to 
perform new tasks. In the meantime, the future of the Italian PES looks uncertain as job placement 
has been opened to private providers and the announced reform of social shock absorbers, as is 
shown below, keeps on being postponed.
3.2. Benefit systems and the activation of the unemployed
The coverage and effectiveness of Italy’s income support policies has been criticised by the 
Employment Recommendations every year since 2000. As put by Recommendation 4 of 2000:
‘Italy should [. . . ]  continue the implementation o f  the reform o f  pensions and other benefit system s in order 
to reduce the outflow from the labour market into pensions and other schem es’.
Thus, the reform of benefit systems should aim to reduce the disincentives for people to take up 
paid work, thus contributing to raise employment rates. Moreover, the Commission added in 2004 
that the level, coverage and effectiveness of unemployment insurance should be improved in 
consideration of the growing imbalances between permanent and non-permanent contracts.
The reform of benefit systems, however, has so far proved extremely challenging. The 
Italian system of social shock absorbers essentially turns around a low ordinary unemployment 
benefit and generous income subsidies in case of temporary unemployment or reduction of working 
time (CIG, mobility allowance), in particular for industrial workers (CIGS)262. The system is based 
on a pure insurance logic: the access to and entity of the benefits depend on the accumulation of
262 See Chapter 5.
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social contributions, which leaves occasional and atypical workers without adequate coverage. No 
public assistance programme exists for those whose entitlements have expired. Most of the public 
resources spent on income support goes into the generous pension system, which takes up around 
15% of GDP as against a mere 0.8% for non-employment benefits (Ciccarone and Raitano 2006). 
Hence Italian income support policies discriminate between age groups (pensioners are treated 
better than anyone else), types of risks (old age receives more support than unemployment, and 
short-term unemployment more than long-term unemployment) and types of contracts (workers on 
permanent contracts receive better coverage than those on temporary or quasi-subordinate 
contracts) with no evident economic or social rationale.
The reform of benefit systems has been on the agenda of several governments for about 15 
years. Four pension reforms adopted in 1992, 1995,1997 and 2004 did not succeed in substantially 
cutting pension expenditure, but improved the financial sustainability of the system, made it more 
equitable and raised the average retirement age (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). As for non­
employment benefits, in 1997 the above mentioned Onofri Report recommended to re-calibrate and 
increase expenditure in order to improve coverage. The Report laid out a three-layered system 
based on income subsidies in case of temporary suspension from work extended to all categories of 
workers, a benefit for the unemployed who have already worked for a minimum amount of time and 
a safety net of last resort for those who do not qualify for any of the above (Onofri 1997). In 1999, 
on the basis of a promise made in the Christmas Pact of the previous year, parliament delegated the 
executive to put in place a reform along these lines, but nothing was done in the end due to cabinet 
instability and pressing financial constraints.
The reform of social shock-absorbers was then identified as one of the priorities of the 2001 
White Paper on the labour market. Marco Biagi was convinced of the urgency and necessity of a 
reform of Italian benefit systems at a time when other EU member states (like France) were 
implementing reforms based on the principles of activation and conditionality advocated by the 
EES264. Although suggestions regarding the introduction of workfare-type arrangements were 
circulated by a number of sources around those years (see Free 2001), it was Prof. Biagi who 
brokered into the Ministry of Labour the idea that the ammortizzatori sociali should, on the one 
hand, provide a safety net for the growing use of flexible temporary contracts and, on the other 
hand, be made conditional on the beneficiaries’ active search for new employment (Tiraboschi 
2003; Sacconi et al. 2004). As was put in the White Paper,
263 15.4% in 2005 (La Repubblica, 19 June 2006).
264 See Chapters 3 and 4.
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‘the experience o f  the European countries that have successfully reformed their labour markets demonstrate 
how  important it is to put in place even in Italy a new  set o f  incentives and social shock-absorbers with a 
view  to achieving a good balance between flexibility and security. Such a new system  must have the ultimate 
aim  to increase the em ploym ent rate and m inim ise the existing forms o f  precariousness, thus avoiding the 
em ergence o f  dangerous fractures between generations w hile the younger segm ents o f  the workforce enter 
the labour market on flexible contracts and the older, less dynamic ones keep their traditional permanent 
contracts’ (M inistero del lavoro 2001: p.8).
The 2002 Pact for Italy was even more explicit. The Berlusconi government and the social partners 
agreed on setting up a system of ‘active safeguards’ (tutele attive) that should accompany the 
worker’s expeditious re-entry into the labour market. Remarkably, non-employment benefits were 
no longer dubbed ‘social shock-absorbers’ but, rather laboriously, ‘forms of support to the re­
insertion into the labour market’:
‘the reform o f  “active safeguards”, which will necessarily have to be incremental and span over a number o f  
years, aims to encourage and assist the workers in the process o f re-insertion into the labour market. Hence, 
one must build a virtuous circle among incom e support, vocational training, em ploym ent and self- 
em ploym ent so as to strengthen the protection o f  workers in unintentional unemployment, reduce 
unem ploym ent spells and stimulate a responsible and active attitude toward em ploym ent’ (CNEL 2002: p.5).
The concrete proposals were very similar to those put forth by the Onofri Report, with the only 
noticeable difference that the receipt of benefits was to be made conditional on the unemployed 
looking for a new job and participating in the initiatives proposed by the employment centres.
If put into practice, these proposals would have aligned the Italian system to what had been 
done in France through the PARE-PAP programme265. Yet, despite such noticeable shifts in the 
governmental discourse, a comprehensive reform of income support policies is yet to be realised. 
The ordinary unemployment benefit was upgraded (to 40% of the previous wage in 2000, then to 
50% only for the period 2005-2006) and an experimental minimum income scheme -  largely 
inspired by the French RMI -  was run in a limited number of municipalities until the Berlusconi 
government decided to stop financing it in 2003 (Ferrera 1999; Barbier and Fargion 2004). A so far 
unsuccessful attempt was also made to introduce an element of conditionality in the operation of the 
PES266, but a real link between employment services and social shock absorbers (which are 
managed by an independent public fund called INPS) is still missing. Above all, it is the low level 
of expenditure and the weak institutional development of the ammortizzatori sociali that explains 
why Italy, unlike France, is not well placed to develop a coherent ‘activation’ policy aimed a getting 
beneficiaries from welfare dependency back into work. This kind of approach could at best apply to 
CIG beneficiaries, who numbered only around 80,000 in 2000 (Barbier and Fargion 2004).
265 See Chapters 3 and 4.
266 See above.
180
A further rise in public expenditure, though, has remained out of the question. Both the 1999 
delegation law and the Pact for Italy specify that the reform of ammortizzatori sociali should be put 
in place at no additional cost for the state budget. This systematic priority given to financial 
concerns over employment policy goals might seem natural in a country whose public debt amounts 
to over 100% of the yearly GDP . Yet it must also be understood by reference to the 
reorganisation of the central government machine that took place during the run-up to EMU, when, 
in order to control expenditure, the Ministries of the Treasury and the Budget -  and from 2001 also 
the Ministry of Finance -  were merged into one. The resulting Ministry of the Economy acquired, 
in substance if not in form, a status superior to that of other Ministries, including Labour, thus 
institutionalising in the executive apparatus the EMU paradigm of sound finance (Fantacone 2004). 
The resistance opposed by the financial Ministries was complemented by that opposed by the social 
partners, who, despite having adopted a consistent activation rhetoric since the late 1990s, are still 
fond of schemes like CIG that allow firms to externalise the cost of restructuring while freezing lay­
offs (Regalia and Regini 1998; Barbier and Fargion 2004). It is worth noting, in this respect, that 
the few resources (€ 750 million) that were destined to the start of the reform of social shock 
absorbers after the Pact for Italy were used up, with the support of unions and employers, to re-
9ARfinance CIG and partially upgrade the existing unemployment insurance scheme .
Nevertheless it is worth noting that when a package deal was finally reached by the 
government and the social partners concerning a reorganisation of the pension system, some 
modifications to the regulation of non-permanent contracts and the reform of the ammortizzatori 
sociali, the discursive shift that had taken place in the previous years seemed to matter 
notwithstanding the fact that in the meantime the government had changed. The short-lived second 
Prodi government (2006-2008), indeed, agreed in July 2007 a new tripartite accord with the unions 
and the employers (CNEL 2007) which was turned into law in December of the same year269. As 
regards social shock absorbers, the accord provided for an upgrading of the ordinary unemployment 
benefit (60% of the last wage for 6 months, then 50% for the seventh and eighth month of 
unemployment), a reorganisation of benefit schemes (the indennita di mobilita and the indennita di 
disoccupazione shall be merged, and so shall CIG and CIGS270) and a gradual extension of their 
coverage. In addition to this, some important workfare elements were introduced into the system. 
The accord calls for a stronger link between the provision of benefits and active policies to help the 
unemployed to find new jobs. Much along the same lines as PARE-PAP in France, the parties
267 It was still 104% of GDP in 2007 (Corriere della Sera, 11 March 2008).
268 Interview with Maurizio Sacconi from II Sole 24 Ore, 6 October 2005.
269 Law of 24 December 2007, n. 247.
270 See Chapter 5 for a description of these schemes.
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foresee the signing of a patto di servizio (service pact) between the beneficiaries of unemployment 
insurance and the employment services, making the receipt of benefits conditional on the 
participation in re-insertion activities. Thus the changes in discourse prompted by the EES, via the 
advocacy of the domestic coalition of which Prof. Biagi was a member, proved resilient. The 
intricacies of Italian policy-making made policy change impossible at first. Yet, when a government 
willing to employ more financial resources to reform benefit systems came to power, it was to the 
new discourse of conditionality and activation that policy-makers turned to design the new policy.
Conclusion
The present chapter has investigated the role played by the EES in Italian employment policy­
making during the ten years after its inception. It has identified a coalition of experts and 
technocrats who brokered into the Italian Labour Ministry the policy model advocated by the 
Strategy. Its members had either studied or worked in the EU and were familiar with the EES 
discourse, which was consistent with a widespread international consensus and with the 
recommendations of bodies like the OECD (hypothesis 1). It has been argued, in accordance with 
hypothesis 4 of this work, that the requirements of the coordination process, which forced Italian 
ministerial bureaucracies to upgrade their analytical skills and to develop new capabilities for policy 
planning and evaluation, facilitated the diffusion of information on the EES and strengthened the 
position of coalition members within the Ministry. Thus, even though this coalition remained 
consistently small (hypothesis 2) and except from the short period (1999-2001) in which the post of 
Minister was occupied by Cesare Salvi (a social democrat close to the positions of CGIL), it 
managed to exercise considerable influence over the activity of the Labour Ministry. This was 
especially the case in the years of Berlusconi as Prime Minister (2001-2006), when the government 
decided to adopt a more unilateral policy style and break with the tradition of consensus with the 
social partners. In this context, the members of this group, and especially the labour law specialist 
Marco Biagi, were given direct responsibility over major policy documents (the 2001 White Paper 
on the Labour Market) and major regulatory reforms (the 2003 legge Biagi). In the pursuit of these 
activities, they repeatedly and openly referred to the EES discourse as a source of inspiration and as 
the way forward.
The last section of this chapter focused on instances of policy change in two areas 
highlighted by the employment recommendations as in need of reform from the Strategy’s 
perspective. It has been shown that, as soon as one got out the restricted Ministerial circles in which 
the EES discourse was used as a point of reference, this became almost completely irrelevant. The
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resistance opposed by other branches of the central administration (i.e. the Ministry of the 
Treasury), local governments and social partners hampered attempts to reform and implement 
policy in line with the Strategy. First, the reform of PES decentralised the responsibility for 
employment services to regional and local authorities and gradually allowed private providers to 
offer placement and orientation for the unemployed. The new legislation passed in 2000 and 2002 
(the latter personally drafted by Biagi), which detailed the range of active and preventative services 
to be provided by the PES, was clearly modelled on the Employment Guidelines. Yet effective 
implementation was prevented by the lack of financial resources coming from the central 
government and by the inability of regional administrations (especially in the south) and of the staff 
coming from the old uffici di collocamento to perform the new tasks. Second, the long-debated 
reform of benefit systems was delayed for years due to the resistance of the Ministries concerned 
with financial stability (Treasury and Finance, now merged into one large ‘Ministry of the 
Economy’) and to the social partners’ attachment to old arrangements like the CIG. A remarkable 
shift in discourse did, nonetheless, take place. The traditional concern with improving the coverage 
of benefits, evident in the documents and legislation produced before 2001, gave way during the 
years of the Berlusconi government to a worltfare-tyipe approach emphasising the conditionality of 
income support on the beneficiaries actively seeking new employment. Once again, this shift was 
brokered into ministerial circles by the members of the above mentioned coalition, and notably by 
Marco Biagi. Even though the change in the terms of discourse was not translated into policy, it 
nonetheless proved resilient. Proof of this is the fact that, when a government willing to invest more 
financial resources on the reform of benefit systems came to power, the new policy was designed 
along the lines of activation and conditionality that had informed similar reforms in France (the 
PARE-PAP programme) and had been introduced in the Italian debate only a few years previously.
The comparison with the French case shows a similarly narrow coalition supporting the EES 
discourse within government. The most noticeable difference between the two is that, in the Italian 
case, the identified coalition was formed by a different kind of actors -  mainly experts and
971technocrats rather than top civil servants. As predicted by hypothesis 5 of this thesis , however, 
the success of domestic coalitions in influencing policy depended on the features of national 
systems of policy-making. The ‘single-actor’ character of French policy-making allowed the 
diffusion of information on the Strategy among restricted circles of actors coming from the 
government and interest organisations to create a new consensus on specific policy issues between 
the state, on one side, and the employers’ association and part of the labour movement, on the other. 
By contrast, the greater complexity of Italian policy-making and the larger number of actors that
271 See Chapter 1.
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take part in it meant that the significant shifts in governmental discourse that took place proved hard 
to translate into actual policy and, even when policies consistent with the EES were actually 
adopted, these proved hard to implement.
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CONCLUSION
T h e  D iffusion  and  Adoption  of EU  D isco urse: A gency  and 
Institutional Conditions
This thesis tried to take a novel perspective on the study of the domestic impact of EU ‘soft’ policy 
coordination. It did not concentrate on long-term processes of end-states (policy outcomes, labour 
market performance), which are difficult, if not impossible to trace back to a single source of 
inspiration. It contended, instead, that the best way to investigate the influence of such non-binding 
instruments as EU guidelines and recommendations is to trace the process behind specific policy 
decisions to see whether these provided those involved with resources, ideas, cognitive drives 
(Radaelli 2003a; see also Van Evera 1997; Checkel 2005). In turn, the need to formulate a number 
of working hypotheses that could guide a research of this kind spurred a degree theory-building. 
Hence it was argued that the existing accounts of the effects of the Strategy, which emphasise 
mechanisms relying on incentives and sanctions, policy-oriented learning and socialisation, do not 
pay enough attention to the dynamics of domestic politics, that is, the locus where employment
979policy decisions are still made . In particular, great store was laid by whether and why different 
national actors and groups might support the EES’ proposed policy model in the domestic arena and 
to the role of different national institutional settings in facilitating or hampering norm diffusion.
Thus the EES was as an attempt to set member states’ employment policy agenda by 
imposing a specific discourse (Radaelli 2003b; Jacobsson 2004) defining the problems of European
9 7 ^labour markets and the appropriate policy solutions . The availability of a discourse, however, 
does not necessarily imply that it will be adopted, especially in contexts in which existing policy 
traditions are somewhat distant from its proposed policy model. Moreover, there is always more 
than one discourse in every policy sector striving for discursive hegemony (Hajer 1995)274. What, 
thus, makes a particular discourse prevail over others? Under what conditions can the diffusion of a 
new discourse have innovative effects with respect to established policy traditions? This thesis 
aimed to investigate the conditions under which discourses promoted by one level of governance 
become diffused and accepted in another. It argued, first, that the diffusion of the EES discourse 
depended on the presence of national coalitions of actors willing to advocate it and, second, that 
these coalitions’ success depended on the institutional resources and constraints facing them in 
different national contexts. Given the existence of national advocacy coalitions, in particular, it is
272 See Chapter 2.
273 See Chapters 1 and 2.
274 See Chapter 1.
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contended that discourse diffusion is more likely in systems where a limited number of actors 
and/or organisations have a say over policy-making275.
This conclusion tries to make sense of the results of the comparison between the French and 
Italian cases as well as to draw further theoretical implications from it. Section 1 sums up the 
findings of the case studies. Each of the hypotheses put forth in Chapter 1 is compared to what was 
observed on the field in order to conclude whether each of them is to be considered validated or 
refuted. Section 2 discusses the contributions this thesis offers to the literatures on Europeanisation 
and policy change. The thesis’ findings, it is maintained, shed light on the importance of discourse 
in configuring and re-configuring actor coalitions, on the role of domestic coalitions in supporting 
or opposing EU policies and, as a consequence, in ensuring compliance with EU rules and norms. 
An assessment is, finally, attempted of the potential of soft law and policy coordination for 
promoting policy and discourse change. It is contended that the case studies presented by this thesis 
show that, notwithstanding the limits highlighted by the literature276, the EES can indeed assist the 
formation of coalitions of like-minded actors and institutionalise their position within national 
policy-making structures. Given the technocratic nature of the process, these coalitions are likely to 
be composed of actors who are often unknown to the public (top civil servants, experts, academics), 
but can nonetheless be influential in setting the terms of policy debates as governments succeed one 
another.
1. The French and Italian case studies: the results of a comparison
777The comparison between France and Italy was built following a ‘most similar cases’ strategy . On 
the one hand, these two countries present similar starting conditions. They have similar employment 
policy traditions as well as comparable labour market performances. In both cases, these are very 
far from the model proposed by the EES’ guidelines and recommendations. On the other hand, they 
have remarkably different institutional systems and policy-making arrangements. In France the 
executive, relying on a very centralised and resourceful state apparatus, has long been in a position 
to pass policy while practically ignoring interest organisations. Italy, by contrast, has for a long time 
been governed by weak executives that consistently sought the agreement of the social partners 
before adopting major pieces of employment legislation. Moreover, an ongoing process of 
administrative decentralisation meant that regional and local authorities over time acquired an 
important role in policy-making and implementation.
275 See Chapter 1.
276 See Chapter 2.'
277 See the Introduction.
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A comparison along these lines was meant to make it easier to signal policy change in line 
with the Employment Guidelines, rule out explanations relying on path-dependencies and policy 
traditions and, at the same time, provide enough leverage to investigate the effect of different 
institutional settings on discourse diffusion. The results of the case studies presented in Part II of the 
thesis seem to confirm these expectations. The findings provide a remarkable degree of variation of 
the phenomena under analysis: they show the presence of different kinds of national coalitions 
meeting different degrees of success in different national settings. The following sub-sections sum 
up these findings and group them around the six working hypotheses formulated in Chapter 1.
1.1. The advocacy of the EES discourse?
The theoretical approach adopted by this work borrows from garbage can and multiple streams 
models of political choice the idea that problems and solutions are not always identified in a 
consequential fashion (Cohen etal. 1982; Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2003). There are no objective 
‘truths’ out there and actors and organisations find it difficult to interpret reality, as they have little 
ability to process information and predict the consequences of alternatives courses of action. Such 
conditions of uncertainty and bounded rationality, as indicated in Chapter 1, are especially relevant 
to the politics of employment jand welfare reform in Europe, since there is no agreement among 
experts and policy-makers regarding either the causes of sluggish labour market performance and 
rising costs, or the appropriate solutions (Schelkle 2005).
In order to understand policy change in such conditions, therefore, one must investigate the 
conceptual frameworks decision-makers rely on, where they come from and how they become 
diffused and adopted. It was argued that the notion of discourse is useful in this respect278. Based on 
Schmidt and Radaelli (2002, 2004), policy discourse was defined as entailing both a set of policy 
ideas regarding the soundness and appropriateness of policy programmes and the processes of 
policy formulation and communication that serve to generate and disseminate those policies. A 
focus on discourse, it was contended, has the advantage of adding a ‘dynamic’ dimension to 
constructivist accounts, as there is always more than one discourse battling for ‘discursive 
hegemony’ in each sector (Hajer 1995). In particular, in order to become accepted a particular 
discourse must be adopted and advocated by purposeful individuals and groups. Furthermore, 
discourse diffusion must be seen in institutional context (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). Different 
institutional settings might make it easier for new discourses to become diffused and adopted.
278 See Chapter 1.
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the EES guidelines and recommendations provide a 
comprehensive employment policy discourse, which tries to strike a balance between different 
European models. Yet, since the adoption of a discourse does not depend on its innate qualities 
alone, this thesis has advanced a number of hypotheses highlighting the conditions under which 
discourse diffusion might be most likely. Since, as argued in Chapter 1, discourse is essentially a 
spoken act, all the hypotheses proceeded from the argument that, in order for the EES discourse to 
become diffused and adopted at the national level, it must be advocated by coalitions of domestic 
actors. The case studies presented in Part II have shown that, both in France and in Italy, groups of 
actors involved in policy-making consistently supported the policy model proposed by the EES. 
They made reference to the EES when interviewed by the author279, in their own writings (see, for 
instance, Biagi 2000; Sacconi et al. 2004; Tiraboschi 2004, 2005), in the policy documents they 
were in charge of . They were involved, in different capacities and at different stages, both in 
national day-to-day policy-making and in the drafting of the NAPs on employment, thus 
constituting themselves the link between the two levels of governance.
The first three hypotheses concern the composition of national coalitions and the 
motivations of their members. The fust hypothesis put forth by this thesis was that (1) actors 
advocating the Strategy's discourse were motivated by both strategic and normative considerations. 
The expectation behind this was that, as argued by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), the distinction 
between interest-based and norm-driven behaviour, albeit analytically useful, is untenable in 
practice. As regards the key issue of the composition of national coalitions, the second hypothesis 
posited that (2) the composition of national coalitions depends on specific features of national 
systems of policy-making, such as the identity of those involved in policy formulation and the degree 
of centralisation of executive authority within the state apparatus. Hypothesis 3, moreover, stated 
that, since the drafting of the NAPs constituted possibly the key moment at which information on 
the Strategy could be diffused at the national level, (3) the composition of national supporting 
coalitions and the resources at their disposal depended on how the NAP-drafting process was 
carried out, notably the degree of involvement of bodies other than Labour Ministries and its 
incorporation in the broader framework of national policy-making. The findings of the case studies 
provide a range of evidence in support of these hypotheses.
First, in both countries the EES remained unknown to the larger public and the NAPs 
gradually became eminently bureaucratic reporting duties rather than proper policy planning 
documents. This meant that the Strategy’s discourse remained limited to narrow communities of
279 See, for instance, Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 2007. Paris. Barbaroux, C. Interview with the 
author on 28 March 2007. Paris
280 See Biagi’s White Paper on the Labour Market (Ministero del lavoro 2001). See Chapters 5 and 6.
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actors within the national Ministries (generally Labour Ministries) in charge of the coordination 
exercise. The composition of these ‘communities’, however, varied considerably. In France, after 
two years (1998-99) in which the NAP was taken care of at the highest political level, the process 
turned into a more bureaucratised exercise and became an almost exclusive responsibility of the 
Labour Ministry’s administration. It was, thus, the haute administration, and notably the Directors- 
General of the two DGs of the Labour Ministry that were involved (DGEFP and DARES), who 
grasped the potential of the coordination process and actively tried to interest the social partners281. 
In Italy the new reporting and planning duties were initially entrusted to ad hoc groups of 
academics and experts and was only later (since 2002) drawn into ministerial structures. It was 
shown that it was this group of academics and experts, who came to occupy an influential position 
within the Labour Ministry in the 1990s and early 2000s, who brokered the EES discourse into 
ministerial structures282.
Hypotheses 2 and 3, therefore, appear to be relevant. As predicted by hypothesis 3, the scope 
of national coalitions was limited due to the closed and bureaucratic nature of the coordination 
process nationally. As predicted by hypothesis 2, the composition of the relevant coalitions varied 
according to the specific features of national systems of policy-making. In France, where a strong 
and centralised state apparatus always relied on a powerful and highly trained haute
•J G  O
administration , it was a restricted group of top civil servants who sought to advocate and diffuse 
the Strategy’s discourse. In Italy, in the midst of a double crisis of public finances and of traditional 
political parties in the early 1990s, direct government responsibilities were taken by experts coming 
from the academia or international organisations as well as civil servants coming from the most 
prestigious branches of the pubblica amministrazione (the Treasury, the Bank of Italy). The role of 
experts with knowledge relevant to policy increased in the course of the decade, with such respected 
labour law and industrial relations professors as Gino Giugni and Tiziano Treu becoming Labour 
Minister (in 1993-94 and in 1995-98, respectively)284. It is not surprising, in this context, that the 
task of drafting the NAPs was given to experts coming from outside the administration, which at the 
time had very little ability to plan and evaluate policy.
Hypothesis 1 regarding actors’ motivations also seems to hold. Evidence could be found of 
both normative and strategic motives on the part of national coalition members. On the one hand, 
their members seemed to be personally convinced of the appropriateness of the Strategy’s model. 
The fact that it was consistent with an emerging international policy consensus, which was also
281 See Chapter 4.
282 See Chapter 6.
283 See Chapter 3.
284 See Chapter 5.
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supported, with some significant differences in emphasis, by the OECD’s Job Study285, was 
mentioned286. Single instances of learning could also be derived from the memoirs of some of the
987participants . On the other hand, though, coalition members also seemed to have their own 
agendas. Particular attention was paid, first, to the kinds of actors who composed the relevant 
national coalitions. Based on Smith (2006), it was maintained that experts and bureaucrats have an 
interest in using European rather than purely national lines of argument. These, indeed, tend to be 
highly complex and unintelligible by the larger public, which privileges those who master technical 
argumentation and have an understanding of the modalities of power within European networks288.
98QThe achievement of such discursive influence , in turn, was used to serve eminently domestic 
purposes. In France, it was argued, the diffusion of the EES discourse to interest organisations was 
meant to diminish the level of social conflict and help the state push through some long-awaited 
policy changes290. In Italy the EES was often interpreted selectively, thus reproducing the time- 
honoured habit to make reference to real or construed EU commitments in order to legitimise 
potentially unpopular reforms291.
Given all the above, the issue of the exact characterisation of national coalitions can finally 
be settled. Among the four types of actor coalitions presented in Chapter 1, it was already resolved 
that epistemic communities and discourse coalitions were not relevant to this thesis’ findings. 
Epistemic communities are bound together by common knowledge, but their members need not 
have the same political views or a common agenda. Discourse coalitions are very loose groupings 
which only share a particular way of talking about one or more issues. At this point, one can also 
rule out policy coalitions, as the national coalitions that have been identified were not issue-specific, 
but adopted a common discourse on a range of employment policy-related issues. The coalitions 
this thesis talks about are small, tightly-knit groups composed of experts, academics, top civil 
servants who knew each other, worked together for a prolonged period of time, shared the same 
views and adopted the same discourse over the employment policy issues covered by the EES. 
Furthermore, as said above, in trying to diffuse the EES discourse they behaved strategically in 
order to pursue their own agendas. Such coexistence of common beliefs and strategic behaviour on 
the part of tightly-knit, purposeful groups is, clearly, best described by Sabatier’s advocacy
285 See Chapter 2.
286 See, for instance, Fouquet, A. Interview with the author on 9 March 2007. Paris. Sestito, P. Interview with the author 
on 27 March 2006. Rome.
287 See Chapter 6: Tiraboschi (2003) reports that Marco Biagi learnt the use of benchmarking as a methodological tool 
during his years as a member of the EMCO.
288 See Chapter 4.
289 See Chapter 1 on power and discourse.
290 See Chapter 4.
291 See Chapter 6: the issues of job quality and equal opportunities, for instance, were long disregarded in Italian 
debates.
coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1998)292, which was already 
applied to discourse and policy paradigm change in Italy by Radaelli (1998). A promising aspect of 
the advocacy coalition framework that was not highlighted in this work is the emphasis it puts on 
the interaction of opposing coalitions. This thesis concentrated, instead, on coalition-building and 
on how this was aided by the EES. In doing so, it brought the level of analysis as deep as possible 
into the dynamics of national employment policy-making, which, to the author’s knowledge, is a 
significant innovation with respect to the existing literature on the domestic impact of EU ‘soft’ 
policy coordination .
1.2. The diffusion o f the EES’ discourse in institutional context?
Having discussed the composition and motivations of the national coalitions advocating the EES 
discourse, one must now turn to the determinants of their success in diffusing it and, consequently, 
in influencing policy. Thus it was hypothesised that national institutional and policy-making 
arrangements can facilitate or hamper discourse diffusion in a number of ways. The fourth 
hypothesis, in particular, held that (4) the success of national coalition members in influencing the 
discourse o f their organisations (especially Labour Ministries) depended on the adjustments made 
to meet the Strategy’s reporting obligations and on the extent to which the process became 
institutionalised. Beside the resources offered by the coordination process, though, the ease with 
which new discourses might become diffused and adopted critically depends on factors such as the 
degree of governmental autonomy from parliament and political parties, the degree of involvement 
of interest organisations and the degree of centralisation or de-centralisation of the state apparatus. 
These, indeed, determine the number of actors who have a say in policy-making and 
implementation and must, therefore, be ‘convinced’ by a given discourse in order for it to influence 
policy. Hence, hypothesis 5 posited that (5) the success o f the coalitions advocating the EES 
discourse in influencing national employment policies is more likely in systems where a limited 
number of actors have a say over policy-making and implementation.
As far as hypothesis 4 is concerned, it was noticed how in both countries the requirements of 
the coordination process caused the adoption of new targets and indicators, the diffusion of a new 
language and of a new frame of reference. A degree of institution-building was also reported. In 
France an old informal committee used for OECD-related purposes was re-named (CDSEI, Comite 
du Dialogue Social pour les Questions Europeennes et Internationales) and revamped as a forum
292 See Chapter 1.
293 See Chapter 2.
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for discussion with employers and trade unions294. In Italy a new ‘Monitoring Group’ was created in 
2000 with the task of developing capabilities for statistical analysis and policy evaluation which the 
Ministry did not have at the time . In Italy, again, participation in the drafting of the NAPs 
contributed to strengthening the position of a group of experts and academics, the best known 
among whom was probably the late Professor Marco Biagi, who had started working with the 
Labour Ministry as consultants on international affairs and then, over time, were put in charge of 
the Ministry’s most prominent initiatives, from the 2001 White Paper on the Labour Market to the
J Q j r
2003 legge Biagi on the reform of labour market regulation. As a consequence of all this, some 
remarkable instances of discourse change could be noticed in both countries. The analyses of 
specific policy areas highlighted by the EES recommendations as in need of reform presented in the 
last sections of Chapters 4 and 6 showed evidence of the Strategy’s language and indicators in 
official government initiatives (white papers, social pacts, new legislation), official reports 
produced by public agencies (such as the reports of the COR and the Conseil Economique et Social 
on active ageing in France), inter-professional agreements (such as the ones on unemployment 
insurance, lifelong learning and active ageing in France297).
As predicted by hypothesis 5, however, policy change in line with the Strategy proved to be 
easier in ‘single-actor’ France than in ‘multi-actor’ Italy. Paradoxically, however, by the time the 
Strategy was launched, French governments could no longer afford to act unilaterally and utterly 
ignore interest organisations298. The adoption of the EES discourse, instead, was key to get part of 
the labour movement to agree to some long-debated reforms of unemployment insurance, pre­
retirement benefits and the vocational training system. Equally paradoxically, the group of experts 
and academics that brokered the EES discourse into Italian debates became most influential in a 
period in which a centre-right government with a large parliamentary majority tried to adopt a more 
unilateral stance and do away with the consensus of the biggest union confederation (CGIL)299. As 
the executive sought unilaterally to set the agenda on employment policy, thus, it turned to those 
with relevant expertise for a blueprint. The intricacies of Italian policy-making, however, made it 
exceedingly difficult to pass and implement policy in line with the EU discourse. The inability of 
regional governments, especially in the Mezzogiorno, to implement the reform of Public 
Employment Services meant that the relevant Employment Guidelines (EGs) remain largely 
unapplied. The opposition of the financial Ministries meant that a reform of ammortizzatori sociali
294 See Chapter 4.
295 See Chapter 6.
296 See Chapter 6.
297 See Chapter 4.
298 See Chapter 3.
299 See Chapter 5.
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according to principles of conditionality and activation similar to those applied in France through 
the PARE programme had to be repeatedly postponed300.
Finally, as regards the kinds of impact one expected to observe, it was hypothesised that (6) 
the kind of policy impact obtained by the EES depended on the specificity o f the relevant guidelines. 
Wherever a policy impact could be observed, in fact, it tended to follow this pattern. In the few 
cases in which the guidelines contained specific policy prescriptions -  as was the case with EGs 1 
and 2 of the ‘original’ EES -  one could discern an impact on the design of the instruments and 
settings of national policy. The French programme Nouveau Depart described in Chapter 4 is one 
such case, as are the 2000 and 2002 decrees on employment services in Italy discussed in Chapter 6. 
By contrast, when the guidelines only set broad targets to be reached while leaving it to the member 
states to determine the means, the impact on national policy was noticeable only at the level of 
goals and ambitions. This, for instance, was the case for the reform of pre-retirement benefits in 
France, where the EU employment rate targets had the effect of drawing the attention of policy­
makers to the issue of the employment of older workers, but the specific measures that were 
discussed clearly belonged to the French tradition301. In all the cases in which a policy impact could 
be detected, though, this could be said to be significant. The instances of policy change, whether 
real or just attempted, that were discussed in Chapters 4 and 6 entailed significant budgetary 
commitments (see the PARE programme and the Plan Seniors in France) and the renunciation of 
old and entrenched habits, such as the reliance of French firms and unions on pre-retirement as a 
tool of human resource management. None of these touches upon the traditional ‘core’ of labour 
market regulation, that is, the rules governing hiring and firing. Yet that is because the EES always 
shied away from encroaching upon these issues, which were probably thought to be too politically 
sensitive not to be left to the discretion of national governments.
2. What the European Employment Strategy can do: coalition-building and discursive power
The findings of the research presented by this thesis offered a somewhat different perspective on the 
domestic impact of the EES from that of most existing studies. The early optimistic accounts 
produced by the governance literature and discussed in Chapter 2 failed to provide convincing 
evidence that learning and convergence processes were actually occurring. They were thus soon 
replaced by accounts stressing the futility of soft coordination (Chalmers and Lodge 2003), its 
opaqueness and lack of transparency (Radaelli 2003b; De La Porte and Nanz 2004) and even the
sheer danger its diffusion represented for the development of EU law (Scott and Trubek 2002). This
✓
300 See Chapter 6.
301 See Chapter 4.
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thesis, conversely, reached the conclusion that the EES is not entirely futile. Its findings constitute 
evidence of the fact that, notwithstanding its limits, there are a number of things that the EES can 
indeed do. The reason for such a more positive view is that the empirical focus and research method 
adopted by this work, on the one hand, and the theoretical approach chosen, blending elements of 
discourse theory with the literatures on agenda-setting and historical institutionalism, on the other 
hand, shed new light on the national processes through which the EES was advocated and diffused. 
Focusing exclusively on policy outcomes, thus seeking evidence of national compliance with EU 
demands, was never thought to be appropriate to study the impact of non-binding instruments like 
guidelines and recommendations. This last section elaborates, in turn, on the implications of this 
thesis’ research focus and of the theoretical approach it adopted.
As far as research focus and methods are concerned, while the greatest part of previous 
studies on the EES concentrated on its governance at the EU-level (see Goetschy 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2003; Scott and Trubek 2002; Trubek and Mosher 2003; Cohen and Sabel 2003), this thesis looked 
almost exclusively at the dynamics of employment policy-making in two member states. What is 
more, instead of focusing primarily on policy outcomes, the national case studies investigated the 
processes of decision and debate through which those outcomes were produced. The adoption of the 
mix of methods -  from personal interviews to content analysis of official documents, press 
materials and academic publications -  that goes under the name of process-tracing302 aimed to 
uncover the role played by the EES discourse in decision-makers’ strategies and beliefs. In so 
doing, this work followed the advice of Radaelli (2003a) and Olsen (2002), who suggested that 
researchers studying the domestic impact of EU poiicies should be less interested in observing end- 
states or final outcomes and more in analysing processes and the coexistence of different kinds of 
developments both at the EU and at the national level. With this in mind, this work embraced the 
notion of multi-causality: none of the policy changes discussed in the empirical chapters was 
presented as solely (or even mainly in some cases) the product of EES influence. Great emphasis 
was put on identifying the different levels at which the impact of the guidelines could be observed 
(specific policy provisions, overall goals and targets). Also, rather than presenting the adoption of 
the EES discourse as a sort of conversion on the road to Damascus, the case studies paid a great 
deal of attention to explaining the reasons why national actors decided to take it up. Even though 
instances of learning have been highlighted whenever evidence of them could be found, these 
reasons had more often to do with contextual domestic political developments and with the 
strategies of national coalition members303.
302 See the Introduction.
303 See above.
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The theoretical approach chosen by this thesis upholds these methodological choices. The 
EES is conceived of as an attempt on the part of the EU to set the employment policy agenda in the 
member states by providing a comprehensive legitimising discourse. In this sense, it bears some 
resemblance to some previous accounts (see Radaelli 2003b; Jacobsson 2004). Yet the present work 
took a step further with respect to existing studies. It investigated the interactive processes through 
which the EES discourse was advocated and diffused nationally and took into account the role of 
domestic institutions as barriers or facilitators. In doing so, this thesis paid heed to the studies of 
Europeanisation that theorised on the ways in which domestic institutions may act as filters of 
European stimuli (see Borzel 1999; Green Cowles et al. 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003), but went 
beyond the notion of institutional ‘fit’304 by discussing cases of evident ‘misfit’ which produced, 
nonetheless, widely diverging outcomes. The focus on the role of national actor coalitions in 
advocating EU models and discourses also proceeded from the insights of Europeanisation studies, 
especially as they speculated on the role of domestic ‘mediating factors’ (see Borzel and Risse 
2003). Yet, as discussed in Chapter 1, the Europeanisation literature remained remarkably 
indeterminate as regards the patterns of interaction through which EU influence is felt at the 
national level. This thesis, by contrast, sought to offer an articulate set of hypotheses which detailed 
the variables determining the composition, logic of action, resources and success of the relevant 
actor coalitions.
Such a focus on agency also emphasised the eminently political nature of the processes of 
national adaptation to EU-level initiatives. This is apparent in the case of the EES guidelines and 
recommendations, which entail no legal obligation for the member states. Yet, as implied by the 
results of recent research on the transposition of directives, even compliance with EU law is 
ultimately a matter of state choice (Haas 1998). The findings of the large-scale study conducted by 
Falkner et al. (2005, 2007), discussed in Chapter 1, confirm the importance of political variables in 
explaining national patterns of compliance. In other words, member states are most likely to comply 
with EU legislation if they deem it appropriate or if they think it is in their interest. This suggests, 
first, that in order to adopt EU-produced rules and norms, whether binding or non-binding, member 
states must ‘believe’ in them. Second, although formally different, the processes of political choice 
through which member states deal with EU law, on the one hand, and non-binding instruments like 
guidelines and recommendations, on the other, are analytically remarkably similar.
Based on the above, this thesis’ research contributes to un-packing the processes through 
which states come to believe in the appropriateness of EU policies and decide to adopt them. Its 
findings, in short, point to two kinds of conditions: the presence of supporting actor coalitions and
304 See Chapter 1.
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an institutional and policy-making set-up that is conducive to policy change rather than inertia. A 
further conclusion the thesis findings suggest is that the value-added of open coordination, at least 
in its most structured version (the EES), is that it can promote the occurrence of the first broad 
condition (coalition-building). The EES, in other words, may foster the formation of domestic 
coalitions and provide them with resources to diffuse its discourse.
This has to do, first and foremost, with the role of discourse and policy ideas in configuring 
and re-configuring coalitions and creating new possibilities for action. As pointed out by Hall 
(1989), there is indeed a complex relationship between ideas and the material reality. It is 
immediately evident that a given policy discourse cannot get to inform policy unless it is adopted by 
actors in a position to influence decision-making. However, ideas and discourse have a force of 
their own and cannot be reduced to mere rhetorical instruments used to justify a given set of 
material circumstances. Ideas and discourse are not, as argued by Moravcsik (Checkel and 
Moravcsik 2001), just ‘epiphenomenal’: they do not simply reflect group interests and preferences, 
but can re-define perceptions and definitions of the material reality. This is especially true when one 
considers the fact that, as pointed out in Chapter 1, conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity are 
widespread in collective choice situations. New discourses, therefore, may provide the catalyst for 
the creation of new coalitions and provide them with a blueprint for action.
Given the above, the value-added of the EES lies in what one may call its structuring and 
institutionalising effects. The Strategy, although broadly based on an international employment 
policy consensus that was also embraced by the OECD, built its own EU-specific version of it that 
could be acceptable to all member states and declined it into pillars, guidelines, recommendations, 
targets and indicators. In turn, the cyclical nature of the coordination process, the reporting duties 
and peer review sessions it entailed, institutionalised the use of the Strategy’s discourse among the 
participants. The fact that the EES turned out to be a closed, bureaucratic process involving a 
relatively small number of experts and civil servants, in this sense, does not matter too much. The 
case studies show that, even so, narrow advocacy coalitions of influential domestic actors formed. It 
should be clarified once more, at this point, that this thesis does not look at processes of 
socialisation or social learning of the kind which researchers like Jacobsson (2004) and Nedergaard
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(2005) talk about . Where and how coalition members’ beliefs were formed is not of interest here. 
The available evidence points to the fact that these were already broadly in line with the Strategy’s 
indications before it was even launched306. What this work tried to show, instead, is that 
participation in the EES coordination process had the effect of bringing like-minded actors together 
and strengthening their position and influence within their organisations.
305 See Chapter 2.
306 See Chapters 4 and 6.
The identity of coalition members inspires a final set of considerations. Given the 
technocratic nature of the process and the scarce diffusion of information thereon, it is hardly 
surprising that the relevant national coalitions were composed exclusively of experts and civil 
servants unknown to the wider public. Since the EES discourse did not travel much beyond these 
restricted ministerial circles, it was argued, it only managed to have an influence when the 
responsibility for policy decisions and implementation stayed with a limited number of actors at the 
central level307. These actors’ influence, however, went beyond specific policy applications. They 
remained in place as different governments succeeded one another, which, as indicated by the 
empirical chapters, goes a long way to explaining why the same issues were discussed again and 
again in spite of the relative political instability of the 1990s and early 2000s. This is particularly 
evident in the Italian case, where the identity of the experts and consultants who drafted the main 
pieces of labour market legislation in the years of the centre-left (1996-2001) was surprisingly 
similar to that of those who participated in the major initiatives of the Berlusconi years (2001- 
2006). By setting the terms of the debate and ensuring continuity in policy discourse, these actors 
exercised a subtle form of power, a sheer ‘discursive power’. They defined the problems to be 
addressed and identified the range of alternatives among which decision-makers could choose308. 
Since the EES discourse, as was argued here, entered domestic debates via the intermediation of 
these actors, then this discursive power was also exercised, albeit indirectly, by the EU. It is thus 
that the convergence in national employment policy debates, which was mentioned by the European 
Commission (2002) as the most easily traceable domestic impact of the EES309, can finally be 
explained.
Conclusion
This thesis investigated the processes through which policy discourses promoted by one level of 
governance (the EU) become advocated and diffused in another (the member states). It identified a 
number of conditions under which discourse diffusion is most likely to succeed. This conclusion 
summed up the results of the national case studies presented in Chapters 3 to 6. It was found that 
narrow coalitions of national actors advocating the EES discourse emerged around the different 
stages of the coordination process. Their composition, strategies and degree of success in 
influencing policy all depended on specific features of national systems of employment policy­
making. In particular, coalition success was greater in systems like France where only a restricted
307 See Chapters 4 and 6.
308 See Chapter 1.
309 See Chapter 2.
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number of actors at the central level have a say over policy-making. By contrast, in Italy, where 
policy-making involves a wider range of actors and different levels of government, discourse 
diffusion proved more difficult. Whenever a policy impact could be observed, this entailed 
significant budgetary commitments and the reversal of established habits. Yet in both countries, 
given the vagueness of the guidelines, substantive impacts could generally be observed on policy 
goals and ambitions, and only rarely on the design of specific policy provisions.
The key contention made by this Conclusion is that the thesis’ findings offered a more 
nuanced view of the potential of EU-level coordination to set the agenda of national employment 
policies than that provided by existing studies. This was due, on the one hand, to the empirical focus 
and research method that were adopted. Rather than focusing on policy outcomes, which are 
virtually impossible to trace back to a single source of inspiration, the empirical research conducted 
for this work looked into the processes of decision and debate that led to select policy initiatives. 
This was meant to find out whether non-binding EU guidelines were taken into account by national 
policy-makers as well as whether these provided them with additional arguments and resources. 
Moreover, evidence of EES influence was never presented in a top-down fashion, as a necessary 
national reaction to an EU demand. Rather, policy developments were shown to be at least in part 
the product of contextual national political developments.
On the other hand, in keeping with these choices of focus and method, the theoretical 
approach adopted, mixing elements of discourse theory, agenda-setting and historical 
institutionalism, concentrated on the role of domestic agency in advocating and diffusing EU 
models and discourses and of different national institutional settings as filters or facilitators. It was 
suggested in this Conclusion that these propositions can have a more general applicability since, as 
shown by recent research (Haas 1998; Falkner et a l 2005, 2007), even national adaptation to EU 
legislation is ultimately a matter of political choice. It was contended, in addition, that the thesis 
findings lead to the conclusion that the value-added of open coordination, at least as organised by 
the EES, through what has been called its ‘structuring’ and ‘institutionalising’ effect, may lie in 
assisting the creation of national coalitions of like-minded actors. Given the technocratic and non­
public nature of the process, it is scarcely surprising that these coalitions were composed 
exclusively of experts and bureaucrats operating within restricted ministerial circles. Nevertheless, 
since these kinds of actors tended to stay in place as governments changed, they managed to ensure 
a remarkable degree of continuity in policy discourse, thereby exercising a subtle but effective form 
of power over policy-making.
This thesis, in sum, sought to provide a novel way of studying and theorising the national 
impact of forms of European integration not based on legislation. It tried to investigate the role open
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coordination can play in national systems of policy-making and, in particular, its effectiveness in 
creating the domestic political and institutional conditions which are most likely to allow the 
diffusion and adoption of EU models and discourses. Achieving a better understanding of these 
dynamics is all the more necessary given the increasingly narrow scope for the expansion of EU 
legislation and the application of forms of open coordination in a growing number of sectors of EU 
activity310. Further research should aim to refine this thesis’ theoretical contributions by providing 
more in-depth national case studies. Also, a similar approach should be applied to studying national 
reactions to the Lisbon Strategy’s reformed governance framework turning around the integrated 
guidelines for growth and jobs. Be that as it may, this should altogether significantly improve our 
understanding of the dynamics of economic and social policy-making in the complex, multi-layered 
system of governance that rules the European continent in the twenty-first century.
310 See Chapter 2.
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